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FOREWORD
Information and communications technologies have become indispensable to the 
modern lifestyle. We depend on information and communications infrastructure 
in governing our societies, conducting business, and exercising our rights and 
freedoms as citizens. In the same way, nations have become dependent on their 
information and communications infrastructure and threats against its availability, 
integrity and confidentiality can affect the very functioning of our societies.
The security of a nation’s online environment is dependent on a number of 
stakeholders with differing needs and roles. From the user of public communications 
services to the Internet Service Provider supplying the infrastructure and handling 
everyday functioning of services, to the entities ensuring a nation’s internal and 
external security interests – every user of an information system affects the level 
of resistance of the national information infrastructure to cyber threats. Successful 
national cyber security strategies must take into consideration all the concerned 
stakeholders, the need for their awareness of their responsibilities and the need 
to provide them with the necessary means to carry out their tasks. Also, national 
cyber security cannot be viewed as merely a sectoral responsibility: it requires a 
coordinated effort of all stakeholders. Therefore, collaboration is a common thread 
that runs through most of the currently available national strategies and policies. 
Moreover, the different national cyber security strategies represent another 
common understanding: while national policies are bound by the borders of 
national sovereignty, they address an environment based on both infrastructure 
and functioning logic that has no regard for national boundaries. Cyber security 
is an international challenge, which requires international cooperation in order to 
successfully attain an acceptable level of security on a global level.
National interests tend to have priority over common interests and this is an 
approach which may be difficult to change, if it needs changing at all. As long as we 
can find the common ground and discuss the problematic issues out in the open, 
national interests should not impede international cooperation.
The task of drafting a national cyber security strategy is a complex one. In addition 
to the versatile threat landscape and the various players involved, the measures to 
address cyber threats come from a number of different areas. They can be political, 
technological, legal, economic, managerial or military in nature, or can involve 
other disciplines appropriate for the particular risks. All of these competences 
need to come together to offer responses capable of strengthening security and 
resisting threats in unison, rather than in competition for a more prominent role or 
for resources. Also, any security measures foreseen must consistently be balanced 
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against basic rights and freedoms and their effects on the economic environment 
must be considered. In the end, it is important to understand that cyber security is 
not an isolated objective, but rather a system of safeguards and responsibilities to 
ensure the functioning of open and modern societies. 
We believe that this Manual will provide not only an appreciation for all the facets 
that need to be considered in drafting a national cyber security strategy, but also 
genuine tools and highly competent advice for this process. It is our hope that the 
Manual will serve to further a higher level of cyber security both on the national 
and international levels. 
Artur Suzik 
Colonel, EST-A 






As stated in the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation of November 2010, NATO Member 
States have recognised that malicious cyber activities ‘can reach a threshold 
that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability’.1 In 
order to assure the security of NATO’s territory and populations, the Alliance has 
committed to continue fulfilling its essential core tasks, inter alia, to deter and to 
defend against emerging security challenges, such as cyber threats.2 The revised 
NATO Policy on Cyber Defence of 8 June 2011 focuses NATO on the protection of 
its own communication and information systems in order to perform the Alliance’s 
core tasks of collective defence and crisis management.3 However, as cyber threats 
transcend State borders and organisational boundaries, the policy also stresses the 
need for cooperation of the Alliance with NATO partner countries, private sector 
and academia.4 NATO Member States reinforced the importance of international 
cooperation by stating in the Chicago Summit Declaration of May 2012 that ‘[t]o 
address the cyber security threats and to improve our common security, we are 
committed to engage with relevant partner countries on a case-by-case basis and 
with international organisations [...] in order to increase concrete cooperation.’5
Against this background, it is of paramount importance to increase the level 
of protection against cyber threats and to steadily improve the abilities to 
appropriately address cyber threats by Allies and NATO’s partner countries. The 
‘National Cyber Security Framework Manual’ addresses national cyber security 
stakeholders in NATO Member States or NATO partner countries, including leaders, 
legislators, regulators and Internet Service Providers. It will serve as a guide to 
develop, improve or confirm national policies, laws and regulations, decision-
making processes and other aspects relevant to national cyber security. Hence, this 
Manual will support NATO’s goal of enhancing the ‘common security’ with regard 
1 Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO 
in Lisbon 19-20 November 2010, at para. 12, available at http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/
Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.
2 Ibid., at para 4.a); Defending the networks. The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, available at http://www.
nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberdefence.pdf.
3 Defending the networks. The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, available at http://www.nato.int/nato_
static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberdefence.pdf.
4 Information available at the NATO website ‘NATO and cyber defence’, available at http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/SID-714ABCE0-30D8F09C/natolive/topics_78170.htm.
5 Chicago Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012, at para. 49, available at http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/SID-D03EFAB6-46AC90F8/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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to ‘cyber security threats’, as expressed by the Allies in the aforementioned Chicago 
Summit Declaration. 
The implementation, maintenance and improvement of national cyber security 
comprises a range of elements. These can address strategic documents of political 
nature, laws, regulations, organisational and administrative measures, such as 
communication and crisis management procedures within a State, but also purely 
technical protection measures. Furthermore, awareness raising, training, education, 
exercises and international cooperation are important features of national cyber 
security. Thus, the aspects to be considered reach from the strategic through the 
administrative or operational to the tactical level. This Manual addresses all of 
those levels in the various sections, shows different possibilities of approaches to 
national cyber security, and highlights good practices within national cyber security 
strategies and techniques. This approach is based on the reasoning that States have 
different features and prerequisites with regard to their legal framework, historical 
and political contexts, governmental structure, organisational structures, crisis 
management processes, and mentality. Therefore, this Manual cannot provide 
a ‘blueprint’ which would be feasible and useful for all States, but rather shows 
diverse aspects and possibilities to be considered in the course of drafting a national 
cyber security strategy. Due to its rather academic approach – although being of 
practical use – and the incorporation of military aspects, the Manual differs from 
publications with a similar goal and target audience.
The editor and the authors of the manual are internationally recognised experts 
in the arena of cyber security and cyber defence, representing a diversity of 
nationalities and disciplines, and showing a variety of professional backgrounds 
and experience. Their biographies, which can be found at the end of this volume, 
provide a more detailed illustration of their expertise.
The publication was elaborated within the context of a project funded by the NATO’s 
Science for Peace and Security Programme (NATO SPS Programme), ‘a policy tool 
for enhancing cooperation and dialogue with all partners, based on civil science 
and innovation, to contribute to the Alliance’s core goals and to address the priority 
areas for dialogue and cooperation identified in the new partnership policy’.6 The 
project consisted of three workshops with the participation of experts from various 
disciplines and from different NATO Member States and partner countries. The 
workshops discussed, at high level and in a round-table setting, different national 
policy approaches to the cyber domain. The experts represented a supranational 
organisation (EU), diverse governmental agencies, including the military, academia, 
6 See NATO SPS website, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-51871B1B-CD538A0D/natolive/
topics_85373.htm.
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think tanks, private companies and NGOs. Many of them have extensive professional 
experience in advising governmental entities with regard to national cyber security 
or aspects thereof. The three workshops7 directly supported the present publication 
by generating discussions between the experts gathered, including the authors of 
the manual and the NATO CCD COE project manager. This publication was funded 
by the aforementioned NATO SPS Programme.
We hope that this volume will prove to be a valuable tool supporting NATO Member 
States and NATO partner countries, as well as all stakeholders in cyber security, in 
improving their ability to appropriately address cyber threats. In this way, it will 
directly support NATO’s strategic goal to improve the level of cyber defence within 
the geographic scope of the Alliance and its partner countries.
Last but not least, we would like to thank all the authors and the editor for their 
superb contributions and friendly cooperation in the course of the publication 
process.
Dr Katharina Ziolkowski 
DEU-Civ 




7 The first workshop was held by NATO CCD COE in Austria in cooperation with the Austrian Institute for 
International Affairs. The second workshop was held in Sweden in cooperation with the Swedish Armed 
Forces Computer Network Operations Unit. The third workshop was conducted by NATO CCD COE in 
Geneva in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The term ‘national cyber security’ is increasingly used in policy discussions, 
but hardly ever defined. In this, it is very similar to the wider subject of cyber 
security itself – where common interpretations and implied meanings are much 
more frequent than universally accepted and legally-binding definitions. In cyber 
security, as a rule, the individual national context will define the specific definitions, 
which in turn will define the specific approaches – there are very few fixed points 
in cyber security.
Accordingly, the ‘National Cyber Security Framework Manual’ does not strive 
to provide a single universally applicable checklist of things to consider when 
drafting a national cyber security strategy. Rather, it provides detailed background 
information and theoretical frameworks to help the reader understand the different 
facets of national cyber security, according to different levels of public policy 
formulation. The four levels of government – political, strategic, operational and 
tactical (technical) – each have their own perspectives on national cyber security, 
and each is addressed in individual sections. Additionally, throughout the Manual 
there are call-out boxes that give examples of relevant institutions in national 
cyber security, from top-level policy coordination bodies down to cyber crisis 
management structures and similar institutions. The Manual can thus be read as 
a collective volume or on a section-by-section basis, according to the needs of the 
reader.
Section 1 (‘Preliminary Considerations’) provides an introduction to the 
general topic of national cyber security. Particular attention is paid to terms and 
definitions: the use of certain terms (such as ‘cyber security’ rather than ‘internet 
security’) is connected not only to different policy choices, but also develops out 
of fundamentally different world-views. National cyber security is examined in 
relation to various national definitions of cyber security and national security. Also, 
an overall definition of national cyber security is offered. Further, the overall theory 
is presented that national cyber security effectively amounts to the precarious 
equilibrium of various contradictory needs – effectively ‘Five Dilemmas’ – that need 
to be balanced.
Section 2 (‘Political Aims’) considers the role that national security plays at the top 
level of security policy formulation. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of new 
threats and risk factors have competed for the attention of policy-makers. Cyber 
security is only one of these new issues that need to be considered. However, there 
is an increasing shift towards seeing cyber security as one of the most important 
of these new challenges. An analysis of 20 national cyber security strategies shows 
that there are diverging definitions of both cyberspace and cyber security. While all 
XVI  
strategies understand the centrality of working with different stakeholders, many 
strategies lack effective engagement mechanisms for defining those relationships.
 
Table 1:  The Core Theoretical Approaches 
National Cyber Security 
(NCS)
Defined
‘The focused application of specific governmental levers and informa-
tion assurance principles to public, private and relevant international 
ICT systems, and their associated content, where these systems 
directly pertain to national security.’
The 5 Mandates
Different 
interpretations of NCS & 
common activities
 - Military Cyber
 - Counter Cyber Crime
 - Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
 - Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Crisis Management
 - Cyber Diplomacy and Internet Governance
+ 3 ‘Cross Mandates’: coordination, information exchange and data 
protection, research & development and education
The 3 Dimensions
Different stakeholder groups 
in NCS
 - Governmental (central, state, local) – ‘coordination’
 - National (CIP/contactors, security companies, civil society) – ‘co-
operation’
 - International (legal, political and industry frameworks) – ‘collabora-
tion’
The 5 Dilemmas
Balancing the cost and 
benefits of NCS
 - Stimulate the Economy vs. Improve National Security
 - Infrastructure Modernisation vs. Critical Infrastructure Protection
 - Private Sector vs. Public Sector
 - Data Protection vs. Information Sharing
 - Freedom of Expression vs. Political Stability
 
Section 3 (‘Strategic Goals’) evaluates key elements of cyber security within 
national security. The centrality of offensive and defensive activities in cyberspace, 
the variety of actors that engage in these activities, and the tensions that arise 
through various institutional heritages are examined from the perspective of 
developing strategic goals to fit a specific national security requirement. The 
importance of understanding different stakeholder groups in national cyber 
security is incorporated into a theory of the ‘Three Dimensions’ of cyber security – 
where governmental, societal and international stakeholders need to work together 
in order to succeed.
Section 4 (‘Organisational Considerations’) emphasises the ‘Five Mandates’ (or 
interpretations) of national cyber security and their over-arching cross-mandate 
activities. Each of the ‘Five Mandates’ has a different set of requirements and 
goals that need to be brought into proper relationship with each other. Moreover, 
three cross-mandates are highlighted. Adapting the incident management model 
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to these mandates, a possible distribution of cyber security-related tasks within a 
governmental framework is offered. Additionally, the importance of collaboration 
with a number of international organisations is highlighted as a key factor for 
effective national cyber security.
Section 5 (‘Commitments, Mechanisms and Governance’) explores some of the 
legal and governance frameworks for actually delivering operational national 
cyber security. In particular, relevant international agreements and regulations, 
such as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and the International 
Humanitarian Law, are examined with a view towards their implications for 
operational cyber security. The wider framework of NATO collaboration, both for 
Member States and partners, is considered as well.
Section 6 (‘Conclusion’) summarises some of the previous points, and illustrates 
the need for national cyber security in both developing and developed nations, even 
though the very concept is likely to change in the medium- and long-term future.
The ‘National Cyber Security Framework Manual’ is intended to provide both 
academics and policy-makers with an in-depth examination of the relevant 
factors when dealing with cyber security within a national security context. The 
theoretical frameworks employed are intended to help further understanding of 
the various facets of the issue, not to prescribe a certain political or developmental 
path. Indeed, national cyber security as a topic is sufficiently complex that no one 
individual approach can be seen as being universally valid across all nations and all 
local circumstances. Like the very term itself, each interpretation of ‘cyber security’ 
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1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: ON 
NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY
Melissa E. Hathaway, Alexander Klimburg
1.1. INTRODUCTION
What, exactly, is ‘national cyber security’? There is little question that the advent of 
the internet is having a decisive influence on how national security is being defined. 
Nations are increasingly facing the twin tensions of how to expedite the economic 
benefits of ICT1 and the internet-based economy while at the same time protecting 
intellectual property, securing critical infrastructure and providing for national 
security. Most nations’ electronic defences have been punctured and the potential 
costs of these activities are considerable. More than one hundred nations have some 
type of governmental cyber capability and at least fifty of them have published some 
form of a cyber strategy defining what security means to their future national and 
economic security initiatives.2 There can be little doubt, therefore, that countries 
have an urgent need to address cyber security on a national level. The question is 
how this need is being formulated and addressed.
This section provides a context for how national cyber security can be conceived. 
It provides an introduction, not only to the topic itself, but also to the Manual as a 
whole, setting the scene for the further sections to explore in depth. Accordingly, 
this section highlights the broad set of terms and missions being used to describe 
the overall cyber environment. It examines how various nations integrate their 
respective concepts of national security and cyber security, and proposes its own 
definition of what national cyber security could entail. Three conceptual tools are 
introduced to help focus the strategic context and debate. These are termed the 
‘three dimensions’, the ‘five mandates’, and the ‘five dilemmas’ of national cyber 
security. As the reader will discover, each dimension, mandate and dilemma will 
play a varying role in each nation’s attempt to formulate and execute a national 
cyber security strategy according to their specific conditions. This section, like 
the Manual as a whole, does not attempt to prescribe a specific set of tasks or a 
checklist of issues that need to be resolved. Rather, it concentrates on helping to 
formulate a conceptual picture of what ‘national cyber security’ can entail.
1 ‘Information and communications technology‘ used interchangeably with the term ‘information 
technology’ (IT).
2 James A. Lewis and Katrina Timlin, Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare. Preliminary Assessment of 
National Doctrine and Organization, (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2011), http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/
pdf-1-92-9045-011-J-en.pdf. 
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1.1.1. Cyber: Converging Dependencies
The internet, together with the information communications technology (ICT) that 
underpins it, is a critical national resource for governments, a vital part of national 
infrastructures, and a key driver of socio-economic growth and development. 
Over the last forty years, and especially since the year 2000, governments and 
businesses have embraced the internet, and ICT’s potential to generate income and 
employment, provide access to business and information, enable e-learning, and 
facilitate government activities. In some countries the internet contributes up to 8% 
of gross domestic product (GDP), and member countries of both the European Union 
(EU) and the G20 have established goals to increase the internet’s contribution 
to GDP.3 This cyber environment’s value and potential is nurtured by private and 
public sector investments in high-speed broadband networks and affordable mobile 
internet access, and break-through innovations in computing power, smart power 
grids, cloud computing, industrial automation networks, intelligent transport 
systems, electronic banking, and mobile e-commerce.
The rise of the internet, and the increasing social dependence on it, did not occur 
overnight. The first ‘internet’ transmission occurred in October 1969 with a simple 
message between two universities. Now, 294 billion e-mail are sent per day. Internet 
protocols evolved during the 1970s to allow for file sharing and information exchange. 
Now, in one day, enough information is generated and consumed to fill 168 million 
DVDs. In 1983 there was a successful demonstration of the Domain Name System 
(DNS) that provided the foundation for the massive expansion, popularisation and 
commercialisation of the internet. E-commerce and the e-economy were made 
possible in 1985 with the introduction of top-level-domains (e.g., .mil, .com, .edu, 
.gov) and this growth was further fuelled in 1990 with the invention of the world 
wide web which facilitated user-friendly information sharing and search services. 
Today, nearly two-thirds of the internet-using population research products and 
businesses online before engaging with them offline, and most use search engines 
like Google, Baidu, Yahoo, and Bing to complete that research. Social networks now 
reach over 20% of the global population.4 SMS traffic generates $812,000 every 
minute.5 
3 David Dean et al., ‘The Connected World: The Digital Manifesto: How Companies and Countries Can 
Win in the Digital Economy,’ BCG. Perspectives, 27 January 2012.
4 comScore, ‘It’s a Social World: Top 10 Need-to-Knows About Social Networking and Where It’s 
Headed,’http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Presentations_Whitepapers/2011/it_is_a_social_
world_top_10_need-to-knows_about_social_networking.
5 ITU-D, The World in 2010. ICT Fact and Figures, (Geneva: ITU, 2010), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/
material/FactsFigures2010.pdf.
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In 1996, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) adopted a protocol 
that allowed transmission of voice communication over a variety of networks. 
This innovation gave way to additional technological breakthroughs like 
videoconferencing and collaboration over IP networks. Today, 22 million hours of 
television and movies are watched on Netflix and approximately 864,000 hours 
of video are uploaded to YouTube per day.6 Skype has over 31 million accounts 
and the average Skype conversation lasts 27 minutes.7 The mobile market has also 
exploded, penetrating over 85% of the global population. 15% of the population use 
their mobile phones to shop online and there are now more mobile phones on the 
planet than there are people.8
The internet economy has delivered economic growth at unprecedented scale, 
fuelled by direct and ubiquitous communications infrastructures reaching almost 
anyone, anywhere. At the same time, infrastructure modernisation efforts have 
embraced the cost savings and efficiency opportunities of ICT and the global reach 
of the internet. Over the past decade, businesses replaced older equipment with 
cheaper, faster, more ubiquitous hardware and software that can communicate with 
the internet. At the heart of many of these critical infrastructures is an industrial 
control system (ICS) that monitors processes and controls the flow of information. 
Its functionality is like the on or off feature of a light switch. For example, an ICS can 
adjust the flow of natural gas to a power generation facility, or the flow of electricity 
from the grid to a home. Over the last decade, industry has increased connections 
to and between critical infrastructures and their control system networks to reduce 
costs and increase efficiency of systems, sometimes at the expense of resiliency.9
Today, businesses around the world tender services and products through the 
internet to more than 2.5 billion citizens using secure protocols and electronic 
payments. Services range from e-government, e-banking, e-health and e-learning 
to next generation power grids, air traffic control and other essential services, all 
of which depend on a single infrastructure.10 The economic, technological, political 
and social benefits of the internet are at risk, however, if it is not secure, protected 
and available. Therefore, the availability, integrity and resilience of this core 
infrastructure have emerged as national priorities for all nations.
6 Cara Pring, ‘100 Social Media, Mobile and Internet Statistics for 2012 (March),’ The Social Skinny, 21 
March 2012.
7 Statistic Brain, ‘Skype Statistics,’ Statistic Brain, 28 March 2012.
8 Edward Coram-James and Tom Skinner, ‘Most Amazing Internet Statistics 2012,’ Funny Junk, http://
www.funnyjunk.com/channel/science/Most+Amazing+Internet+Statistics+2012/umiNGhz.
9 Melissa E. Hathaway, ‘Leadership and Responsibility for Cybersecurity,’ Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs Special Issue (Forthcoming).
10 Services and applications include, but are not limited to: e-mail and text messaging, voice-over-IP-based 
applications, streaming video and real-time video-conferencing, social networking, e-government, 
e-banking, e-health, e-learning, mapping, search capabilities, e-books, and IPTV over the internet.
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It is anticipated that a decade from now, the internet will touch 60% of the world’s 
population (over 5 billion citizens); will interlink more than 50 billion physical 
objects and devices; and will contribute at least 10% of developing nations’ 
GDP including China, Brazil, India, Nigeria and the Russian Federation.11 These 
predictions, if realised, will certainly alter politics, economics, social interaction 
and national security. How countries nurture and protect this infrastructure will 
vary. Hard choices and subtle tensions will have to be reconciled, because there are 
at least two competing requirements under constrained fiscal budgets: delivering 
economic wellbeing and meeting the security needs of the nation.
 





7 billion people ~8 billion people
Estimated Internet Popu-
lation
2.5 billion people 
(35% of population is online)
~5 billion people 
(60% of population is online)
Total Number of Devices
12.5 billion internet connected 
physical objects and devices 
(~6 devices per person)
50 billion internet connected 
physical objects and devices 
(~10 devices per person)
ICT Contribution to the 
Economy
~4% of GDP on average for G20 
nations
10% of worldwide GDP (and per-
haps more for developing nations)
1.1.2. The Cost of Connectivity
Governments around the world are pushing for citizen access to fast, reliable, and 
affordable communications to meet the demand curve of the e-economy. This vision 
is reflected in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD) Internet Economy; Europe’s Digital Agenda; the United States’ National 
Broadband Plan, and in most ITU initiatives. A number of developing nations have 
grasped the importance of ICT for development. Brazil, for instance, is in the middle 
of a major upgrade to its broadband infrastructure.13 Progress towards becoming 
11 Dave Evans, The Internet of Things. How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing Everything, 
(San Jose, CA: Cisco Internet Business Solutions Group, 2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/
docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf.
12 Evans, The Internet of Things. How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing Everything.
13 Angelica Mari, ‘IT’s Brazil: The National Broadband Plan‘ itdecs.com, 26 July 2011.
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an advanced member of the information society is often measured in terms of 
lower price-points, expanded bandwidth, increased speed and better quality of 
service, expanded education and developed skills, increased access to content and 
language, and targeted applications for low-end users.14 But is the ITU measuring 
the right things? Should the ITU also be measuring the attendant investments in the 
security of that infrastructure, connectivity and information service? For example, 
South Korea was ranked the most advanced nation in the ITU’s information society 
in terms of its internet penetration, high-speed broadband connections and ICT 
usage; yet it was also ranked by the Internet security research firm Team Cymru 
as ‘Asia-Pacific’s leading host of peer-to-peer botnets.’15 South Korea is not the only 
advanced nation to experience the challenges of connectivity. Highly-connected 
countries are tempting targets for criminals.16 In fact, according to Symantec, 
the G20 nations harbour the majority of malicious code and infected computers. 
Among the top three countries are China, Germany, and the United States; of those 
three, the United States accounts for the highest number (23%) of all malicious 
computer activity.17
The internet is under siege and the volume, velocity, variety, and complexity of 
the threats to the internet and globally connected infrastructures are steadily 
increasing. For example, it is estimated that the G20 economies have lost 2.5 million 
jobs to counterfeiting and piracy, and that governments and consumers lose $125 
billion annually, including losses in tax revenue.18 Organisations everywhere are 
being penetrated, from small businesses to the world’s largest institutions. Criminals 
have shown that they can harness bits and bytes with precision to deliver spam, 
cast phishing attacks, facilitate click-fraud and launch distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks.19 Attack toolkits sold in the underground economy for as little as 
$40 allow criminals to create new malware and assemble an entire attack plan 
14 ITU, Measuring the Information Society, (Geneva: ITU, 2011), http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/
backgrounders/general/pdf/5.pdf. See also Melissa E. Hathaway and John E. Savage, Stewardship 
of Cyberspace. Duties for Internet Service Providers, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, 2012), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyberdialogue2012_hathaway-
savage.pdf.
15 Botnet: compromised, internet-connected computers typically used for illegal activities, usually 
without the owner’s knowledge.
16 Reuters, ‘South Korea discovers downside of high speed internet and real-name postings,’ The Guardian, 
6 December 2011.
17 Ibid.
18 Frontier Economics Europe, Estimating the global economic and social impacts of counterfeiting and 
piracy. A Report commissioned by Business Action to counterfeiting and piracy (BASCAP), (Paris: 
ICCWBO, 2011), http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Bascap/Global-Impacts-Study---Full-
Report.
19 See Melissa E. Hathaway, ‘Falling Prey to Cybercrime: Implications for Business and the Economy,’ 
in Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security, ed. Nicholas Burns and Jonathon Price 
(Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, 2012).
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without having to be a software programmer.20 In 2011, Symantec identified over 
400 million unique variants of malware that exposed and potentially exfiltrated 
personal, confidential, and proprietary data.21 Many governments suffered data 
breaches in 2011, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, France, New Zealand, 
Russia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Hundreds of companies have also suffered significant breaches in 
2011-2012, including Citigroup, e-Harmony, Epsilon, Linked-In, the Nasdaq, Sony 
and Yahoo. One industry report estimates that over 175 million records were 
breached and another industry report estimates that it cost enterprises £79 
($125.55) per lost record,22 excluding any fines that may have been imposed for 
violations of national data privacy laws.
At the same time, the pace of foreign economic collection and industrial espionage 
activities against major corporations and governments is also accelerating. The 
hyper-connectivity and relative anonymity provided by ICT lowers the risk of 
being caught and makes espionage straightforward and attractive to conduct. In 
recent testimony before the United States Congress, the Assistant Director of the 
Counterintelligence Division of the FBI told lawmakers that the FBI is ‘investigating 
economic espionage cases responsible for $13 billion in losses to the US economy.’23 
Some of the cases referenced include the targeting, penetration, and compromising 
of companies that produce security products. In particular, certificate authorities 
including Comodo, DigiNotar, and RSA, fell prey to their own weak security 
postures, which were subsequently exploited facilitating a wave of other computer 
breaches.24 Digital certificates represent a second form of identity to help enhance 
‘trust’ for financial or other private internet transactions by confirming that 
something or someone is genuine.25 These certificates have become the de facto 
credentials used for secure online communications and sensitive transactions, 
such as online banking or accessing corporate e-mail from a home computer. 
20 Symantec Corporation, Internet Security Threat Report: 2011 Trends, (Mountain View, CA: Symantec 
Corporation, 2012), http://www.symantec.com/threatreport.
21 Ibid., 9.
22 Verizon, 2012 Data Breach Investigations Report, (Arlington, VA: Verizon Business, 2012), http://
www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2012_en_xg.pdf; 
Ponemon Institute, 2010 Annual Study: U.K. Cost of a Data Breach. Compliance pressures, cyber 
attacks targeting sensitive data drive leading IT organisations to sometimes pay more than necessary, 
(Mountain View, CA: Symantec Corporation, 2011), http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/
media/pdfs/UK_Ponemon_CODB_2010_031611.pdf?om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_twitter_facebook_
marketwire_linkedin_2011Mar_worldwide_costofdatabreach.
23 U.S. House of Representatives, Testimony: Before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 
Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives: Committee on Homeland 
Security, 28 June 2012.
24 Hathaway, ‘Leadership and Responsibility for Cybersecurity.’
25 Certificate Authorities issue secure socket layer (SSL) certificates that help encrypt and authenticate 
websites and other online services.
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During oral testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, US 
Army General Keith Alexander identified China as the prime suspect behind the 
RSA penetration and subsequent theft of intellectual property.26 Perhaps the US 
National Counter-Intelligence Executive put it best when he reported that, ‘[m]any 
states view economic espionage as an essential tool in achieving national security 
and economic prosperity. Their economic espionage programs combine collection 
of open source information, HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and cyber 
operations – to include computer network intrusions and exploitation of insider 
access to corporate and proprietary networks – to develop information that could 
give these states a competitive edge over the United States and other rivals.’27
Finally, unauthorised access, manipulation of data and networks, and destruction 
of critical resources also threatens the integrity and resilience of critical core 
infrastructures. The proliferation and replication of worms like Stuxnet, Flame, and 
Duqu that can penetrate and establish control over remote systems is alarming. 
In an April 2012 newsletter, the Industrial Control System Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (ICS-CERT) disclosed that it was investigating attempted intrusions 
into what it described as ‘multiple natural gas pipeline sector organisations.’ It 
went on to say that the analysis of the malware and artefacts associated with this 
activity was related to a single campaign with the initial penetration, resulting 
from spear-phishing multiple personnel.28 While the Stuxnet attack against Iran 
was quite sophisticated, it does not necessarily require a strong industrial base or 
a well-financed operation to find ICS vulnerabilities – teenagers regularly are able 
to accomplish the task.29 Those motivated to do harm seek software vulnerabilities 
– effectively errors in existing software code – and create malware to exploit them, 
subsequently compromising the integrity, availability and confidentiality of the ICT 
networks and systems.30 Some researchers hunt for these ‘zero-day’ vulnerabilities 
on behalf of governments, others on behalf of criminal syndicates, but many ‘white 
hat’ researchers constantly do the same job for little or no pay. To encourage 
the ‘white hat’ security community to effectively find holes in their commercial 
26 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander United 
States Cyber Command, 27 March 2012.
27 U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in 
Cyberspace. Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011, 
(Washington, DC: US Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2011), http://www.ncix.gov/
publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf.
28 ICS-CERT, ICS-CERT Monthly Monitor, (Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 
http://www.us-cert.gov/control_syssupratems/pdf/ICS-CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Apr2012.pdf.
29 Robert O’Harrow, ‘Cyber search engine Shodan exposes industrial control systems to new risks,’ The 
Washington Post, 3 June 2012.
30 Hathaway, ‘Leadership and Responsibility for Cybersecurity.’
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products before criminals or cyber warriors do, companies like Google, Facebook, 
and Microsoft have programmes that pay for responsibly disclosed vulnerabilities.31
The above examples illustrate that the internet and its associated global networks 
have greatly increased the world’s dependence on ICT and thus also increased the 
level of disruption that is possible when the infrastructure is under attack. And it is 
constantly under attack, both by state and non-state actors. Although the problem 
is obvious, the role of government vis-à-vis the private sector in the protection 
of this critical infrastructure is often still unclear. This lack of clarity and vision 
regarding government action is not totally unsurprising, however. To date, there 
is not even a universal understanding on basic cyber terms and definitions, so 
common solutions will remain scarce.
1.2. CYBER TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
The internet, the ICT that underpin it and the networks that it connects are at times 
also referred to as comprising ‘cyberspace’. Merriam-Webster defines ‘cyber’ as: 
‘of, relating to, or involving computers or computer networks (as the Internet).’32 
Cyberspace is more than the internet, including not only hardware, software and 
information systems, but also people and social interaction within these networks. 
The ITU uses the term to describe the ‘systems and services connected either directly 
to or indirectly to the internet, telecommunications and computer networks.’33 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) uses a slightly different 
term, defining cyber as ‘the complex environment resulting from the interaction of 
people, software and services on the internet by means of technology devices and 
networks connected to it, which does not exist in any physical form.’34 Separately, 
governments are defining what they mean by cyberspace in their national cyber 
security strategies (NCSS). For example, in its 2009 strategy paper, the United 
Kingdom refers to cyberspace as ‘all forms of networked, digital activities; this 
includes the content of and actions conducted through digital networks.’35 By 
adding the phrase, ‘the content of and actions conducted through,’ the government 
31 Chris Rodriguez, ‘Vulnerability Bounty Hunters,’ Frost & Sullivan, 3 February 2012.
32 Cyber, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cyber.
33 ITU, ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide, (Geneva: ITU, 2011), http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/
cybersecurity/docs/ITUNationalCybersecurityStrategyGuide.pdf. 5.
34 ISO/IEC 27032:2012, ‘Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for cybersecurity.’
35 UK Cabinet Office, Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. Safety, security and resilience in 
cyber space (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2009). 7. However, in 2011 a new definition of cyberspace 
was put forward understood as an interactive domain made up of digital networks that is used to store, 
modify and communicate information. It includes the internet, but also the other information systems 
that support our businesses, infrastructure and services (see UK Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security 
Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world (London: UK Cabinet Office, 2011).).
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can also address human behaviours that it finds acceptable or objectionable. For 
some nations, this includes consideration of internet censorship, online information 
control, freedom of speech and expression, respect for property, protection of 
individual privacy, and the protection from crime, espionage, terrorism, and 
warfare. Governments, businesses, and citizens know intuitively that cyberspace is 
man-made and an ever-expanding environment, and that therefore the definitions 
are also constantly changing.
1.2.1. Information, ICT, and Cyber Security
Most governments start their NCSS process by describing the importance of 
‘securing information’, implementing ‘computer security’ or articulating the need 
for ‘information assurance’. These terms are often used interchangeably, and 
contain common core tenets of protecting and preserving the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information. ‘Information security’ focuses on 
data regardless of the form the data may take: electronic, print or other forms. 
‘Computer security’ usually seeks to ensure the availability and correct operation of 
a computer system without concern for the information stored or processed by the 
computer. ‘Information assurance’ is a superset of information security, and deals 
with the underlying principles of assessing what information should be protected. 
Effectively, all three terms are often used interchangeably, even if they address 
slightly different viewpoints. Most unauthorised actions that impact any of the core 
tenets or information security attributes36 are considered a crime in most nations.
The globalisation of the ICT marketplace and increasing reliance upon globally 
sourced ICT products and services can expose systems and networks to exploitation 
through counterfeit, malicious or untrustworthy ICT. And while not defined in 
diplomatic fora, the term ‘ICT security’ is often used to describe this concern. 
In general, ICT security is more directly associated with the technical origins 
of computer security, and is directly related to ‘information security principles’ 
including the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information resident on a 
particular computer system.37 ICT security, therefore, extends beyond devices that 
are connected to the internet to include computer systems that are not connected 
to any internet. At the same time, the use of the term ‘ICT security’ usually excludes 
all questions of illegal content, unless they directly damage the system in question, 
and includes the term ‘supply chain security’.
36 The most basic attributes are Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, and are known as the C-I-A 
triad. Some systems expand this by including authenticity, reliability, or any number of other attributes 
as well.
37 See, for instance, US DoC/NIST, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 
Information Systems, (Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, 2006), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips200/
FIPS-200-final-march.pdf.
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Figure 1:  Relationship between Cyber Security and other Security Domains38
38 This Figure has been adopted from ISO/IEC 27032:2012, ‘Information technology – Security 
techniques – Guidelines for cybersecurity.’ It slightly differs from the original in that it contains ICT 
Security* instead of ‘Application Security’. The latter has been defined as ‘a process to apply controls 
and measurements to an organization’s applications in order to manage the risk of using them. Controls 
and measurements may be applied to the application itself (its processes, components, software and 
results), to its data (configuration data, user data, organization data), and to all technology processes 
and actors involved in the application’s life circle’ (ibid., 10.). Information Security ‘is concerned 
with the protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information in general, to serve 
the needs of the applicable information user’ (ibid.). Network Security ‘is concerned with the design, 
implementation, and operation of networks for achieving the purposes of information security on 
networks within organizations, between organizations, and between organizations and users’ (ibid.). 
Internet Security ‘is concerned with protecting internet-related services and related ICT systems and 
networks as an extension of network security in organizations and at home, to achieve the purpose of 
security. Internet Security also ensures the availability and reliability of Internet services’ (ibid., 11.). 
CIIP ‘is concerned with protecting the systems that are provided or operated by critical infrastructure 
providers, such as energy, telecommunication, and water departments. CIIP ensures that those systems 
and networks are protected and resilient against information security risks, network security risks, 
internet security risks, as well as Cybersecurity risks’ (ibid.). Cybercrime has been defined as the 
‘criminal activity where services or applications in the Cyberspace are used for or are the target of a 
crime, or where the Cyberspace is the source, tool, target, or place of a crime’ (ibid., 4.). Cybersafety has 
been defined as the ‘condition of being protected against physical, social, spiritual, financial, political, 
emotional, occupational, psychological, educational or other types or consequences of failure, damage 
error, accidents, harm or any other event in the Cyberspace which could be considered non-desirable’ 
(ibid.). ‘Cybersecurity’, or ‘Cyberspace Security’ has been defined as the ‘preservation of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information in the Cyberspace’ (ibid.). However, it has also been noted that 
‘[i]n addition, other properties such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability can 
also be involved’ (ibid.) in cyber security.
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The United States, India, Russia and many other countries are increasingly voicing 
concerns that the introduction of counterfeit, malicious or untrustworthy ICT could 
disrupt the performance of sensitive national security systems, and compromise 
essential government services. The ICT supply chain consists of many phases, 
including design, manufacture, integrate, distribute, install and operate, maintain 
and decommission. The processes by which nations consider the security of their 
ICT supply chain should try to address each phase of the lifecycle. Protection 
measures must be developed across the product lifecycle and be reinforced through 
both acquisition processes and effective implementation of government/enterprise 
security practices. For example, the highest risk factors in the supply chain are 
‘after build’ (e.g., during the install and operate and retire phases) because this 
is where multiple vendors participate in the process (e.g., integrate products with 
other systems, patch/update, etc.) and there are few measures to monitor and assure 
integrity throughout the entire process. This is a problem for all countries: the 
evolution of the ICT industry means that many countries and global corporations 
now play a role in the ICT supply chain, and no country can source all components 
from totally ‘trusted providers’. This trust is needed, however, as the promise of 
ICT-driven economic growth is dependent upon the core infrastructure being both 
secure and resilient.
There is no agreed definition of ‘internet security’. Within a technical context, 
internet security ‘is concerned with protecting internet-related services and related 
ICT systems and networks as an extension of network security in organizations 
and at home, to achieve the purpose of security. Internet security also ensures 
the availability and reliability of internet services.’39 However, in a political 
context, internet security is often equated with what is also known as ‘internet 
safety’. In general, internet safety refers to ‘legal internet content’. While this has 
sometimes been linked to government censorship in autocratic governments, 
restrictions on internet content are, in fact, common. Besides issues surrounding 
the exploitation of children, internet censorship can also include issues such as 
intellectual property rights as well as the prosecution of political or religious views. 
What internet security probably does not include is non-internet relevant technical 
issues, including those that address the various ‘internets’ which are not connected 
to the world wide web. These, however, are covered by the term ‘network security’. 
Network security is particularly important for critical infrastructures that are often 
not directly connected to the internet. Consequently, for some, internet security 
implies a global government regime to deal with the stability of the internet code 
and hardware, as well as the agreements on the prosecution of illegal content.
39 ISO/IEC 27032:2012, ‘Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for cybersecurity,’ 11.
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The term ‘cyber security’ was widely adopted during the year 2000 with the 
‘clean-up’ of the millennium software bug.40 When the term ‘cyber security’ is 
used, it usually extends beyond information security and ICT security. ISO defined 
cyber security as the ‘preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information in the Cyberspace.’41 The Netherlands defined cyber security more 
broadly, to mean ‘freedom from danger or damage due to the disruption, breakdown, 
or misuse of ICT. The danger or damage resulting from disruption, breakdown or 
misuse may consist of limitations to the availability or reliability of ICT, breaches of 
the confidentiality of information stored on ICT media, or damage to the integrity 
of that information.’42 The ITU also defined cyber security broadly as:
‘[T]he collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, 
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment 
and organization and user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include 
connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, 
telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored 
information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the 
attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization 
and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment. The 
general security objectives comprise the following: availability; integrity, which 
may include authenticity and non-repudiation; and confidentiality.’43
Many countries are defining what they mean by cyber security in their respective 
national strategy documents. As of the publication of this Manual, more than 50 
nations have published some form of a cyber strategy defining what security means 
to their future national and economic security initiatives.
When the term ‘defence’ is paired with ‘cyber’ it usually is within a military context, 
but also may take into account criminal or espionage considerations. For example, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) uses at least two terms when it 
comes to cyber defence and information security. The first addresses a broader 
information security environment: communications and information systems44 
40 The millennium bug was a problem for both digital (computer-related) and non-digital documentation 
and data storage situations which resulted from the practice of abbreviating a four-digit year to two 
digits.
41 ISO/IEC 27032:2012, ‘Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for cybersecurity.’
42 Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, ‘The National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS). Strength through 
Cooperation,’ (The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, 2011), 4.
43 Recommendation ITU-T X.1205 (04/2008), Section 3.2.5.
44 CIS security is defined as: The ability to adequately protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and the information processed, stored or transmitted.
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(CIS) security, where ‘security’ is defined as the ability to adequately protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of CIS and the information processed, 
stored or transmitted.45 NATO uses a different definition for the term ‘cyber 
defence’: ‘the ability to safeguard the delivery and management of services in an 
operational CIS in response to potential and imminent as well as actual malicious 
actions that originate in cyberspace.’46 The United States military defines it in 
two contexts as well. The first, from the Joint Staff, defines ‘computer network 
defence’ (CND) as: ‘actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond 
to unauthorized activity within the Department of Defense information systems 
and computer networks.’47 Finally, the newly formed United States Cyber Command 
operationalised the term and defines ‘defensive cyber operations’ as: ‘direct and 
synchronize actions to detect, analyse, counter and mitigate cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities; to outmanoeuvre adversaries taking or about to take offensive 
actions; and to otherwise protect critical missions that enable US freedom of action 
in cyberspace.’48
The common theme from all of these varying definitions, however, is that cyber 
security is fundamental to both protecting government secrets and enabling 
national defence, in addition to protecting the critical infrastructures that permeate 
and drive the 21st century global economy. The slight differentiation in definition 
between governments and intergovernment organisations is irrelevant, as their 
shared focus on the issues illustrates the first step in the long journey to actually 
providing for cyber security – no matter what the definition.
1.2.2. Cyber Crime
There does not appear to be a common view regarding what constitutes illegal or 
illicit activity on the internet. Yet most would agree that one of the fastest-growing 
areas of crime is that which is taking place in cyberspace.49 Efforts to clarify and 
address this issue began in the United Nations (UN) in 1990, where the General 
Assembly (UN GA) debated and adopted a resolution dealing with computer crime 
legislation which was later expanded in 2000 and again in 2002 to combat the 
45 Geir Hallingstad and Luc Dandurand, Cyber Defence Capability Framework – Revision 2. Reference 
Document RD-3060 (The Hague: NATO C3 Agency, 2010).
46 Ibid.
47 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 6-0. Joint Communications System, (Ft. Belvoir, VA: DTIC, 
2010), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp6_0.pdf.
48 GAO, Defense Department Cyber Efforts. More Detailed Guidance Needed to Ensure Military Services 
Develop Appropriate Cyberspace Capabilities, (Washington, DC: GAO, 2011), http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-11-421. 5.
49 Europol, Threat Assessment (Abridged). Internet Facilitated Organised Crime (iOCTA), (The Hague: 
Europol, 2011), https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/iocta.pdf.
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criminal misuse of ICT.50 As a result, these early discussions encouraged countries 
to update their penal codes. For example, in 1997, the Russian government updated 
the Russian Penal Code (Chapter 28) to address cyber crime, IT crime, and cyber 
terrorism. Penalties were identified for, among other things, illegal access to the 
information on a computer, computer systems and networks; creation, spreading 
and usage of harmful software and malware; violation of operation instructions 
of a computer, computer systems and networks; illegal circulation of objects of 
intellectual property; illegal circulation of radio-electronic and special high-tech 
devices; and manufacturing and spreading of child pornography.
Also in 1997, the felonies of ‘illegal intrusion into a computer information system’ 
and ‘causing damage to a computer information system’ were specifically added to 
the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. In June 2010, the Information 
Office of the State Council published a white paper on the internet in China. It detailed 
China’s principles for the internet and identified particular activities that were 
objectionable to the state. For example, it stated: ‘the security of telecommunications 
networks and information shall be protected by law. No organization or individual 
may utilise telecommunication networks to engage in activities that jeopardise 
state security, the public interest or the legitimate rights and interests of other 
people.’51 In addition to China and Russia, many other countries also have updated 
their legal frameworks to address criminal activities in accordance with the spirit 
of the discussion that began nearly 25 years ago.
The Council of Europe (CoE) also adopted a Convention on Cybercrime in July 2004,52 
the first international convention to address this issue. It contains a relatively high 
standard of international cooperation for investigating and prosecuting cyber crime. 
It recognised that criminals exploit the seams of cross-jurisdictional cooperation 
and coordination among nations. The treaty defined key terms such as ‘computer 
system’, ‘computer data’, ‘traffic data’, and ‘service provider’ in an effort to create 
commonality among signatories’ existing statutes, but does not define the key term 
‘cybercrime’. The treaty went on to highlight actions that nations must undertake 
to prevent, investigate and prosecute, including copyright infringement, computer-
related fraud, child pornography and violations of network security. For example, it 
outlined offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer 
data and systems (e.g., illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system 
interference, misuse of devices). It also discussed computer-related fraud and 
forgery. The treaty also contained a series of powers and procedures, such as the 
50 Marco Gercke, ‘Regional and International Trends in Information Society Issues,’ in HIPCAR – Working 
Group 1 (St. Lucia: ITU, 2010).
51 Chinese Information Office of the State Council, The Internet in China (White Paper) (Beijing: 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2010).
52 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185) (Budapest: Council of Europe, 2001).
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search of computer networks and interception. Over ten years after the treaty 
was formed, it has been signed by 47 states, and has been ratified by 37.53, 54 This 
is controversial in some nations, and might explain the relatively small number 
of countries that have managed to approve the treaty in accordance with their 
domestic constitutional requirements and thereby making it enforceable.
Other organisations have taken similar approaches, within their own frameworks. 
In July 2006, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) issued a statement that its 
members should implement cyber crime and cyber security laws ‘in accordance 
with their national conditions and should collaborate in addressing criminal 
and terrorist misuse of the Internet.’55 These commitments were later codified 
in the 2009 agreement within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (ASEAN-
China Framework Agreement) on information security. Additionally, it is the only 
international treaty that addresses concerns of a wider concept of ‘information 
war’, which the treaty defined as ‘confrontation between two or more states 
in the information space aimed at damaging information systems, processes 
and resources, and undermining political, economic and social systems, mass 
brainwashing to destabilise society and state, as well as forcing the state to take 
decisions in the interest of an opposing party.’56
Illicit and illegal activity definitions differ from region to region. Online fraud, online 
theft and other forms of cyber crimes which misappropriate the property of others 
are on the rise. It is inexpensive to develop and use malware, as was observed in 
2011 with the 400 million unique variants and as many as eight new zero-day 
vulnerabilities were exploited per day.57 As citizens adopt and embed more mobile 
devices into their business and personal lives, it is likely that malware authors will 
create mobile specific malware geared toward the unique opportunities that the 
mobile environment presents for abuse of electronic transactions and payments. 
Nations around the world have identified cyber crime (however it is defined) as 
a national priority. They also recognise that jurisdiction for prosecuting cyber 
crime stops at national borders, which underscores the need for cooperation and 
coordination through regional organisations like ASEAN and the Council of Europe.
53 Brian Harley, ‘A Global Convention on Cybercrime?,’ Science and Technology Law Review, 23 March 
2010.
54 Council of Europe, ‘Convention on Cybercrime (Treaty Status),’ http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG.
55 Greg Austin, ‘China’s Cybersecurity and Pre-emptive Cyber War,’ NewEurope, 14 March 2011.
56 See Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Ensuring 
International Information Security [based on unofficial translation] (Yekaterinburg: Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, 2009). Annex I; Nils Melzer, ‘Cyber operations and jus in bello,’ Disarmament 
Forum, no. 4 (2011).
57 Symantec Corporation, Internet Security Threat Report: 2011 Trends. See also Hathaway, ‘Falling Prey 
to Cybercrime: Implications for Business and the Economy.’
16Cyber Terms and Definitions
1.2.3. Cyber Espionage
Cyberspace provides an exceptional environment for espionage because it provides 
‘foreign collectors with relative anonymity, facilitates the transfer of a vast amount 
of information, and makes it more difficult for victims and governments to assign 
blame by masking geographic locations.’58 While some nations define these 
intrusions or unauthorised access to data or an automated information system as 
an ‘attack,’ most of the observed activity today does not qualify as an attack under 
international law. It is considered to be theft of commercial intellectual property 
and proprietary information, of data with significant economic value, or the theft 
of government sensitive and classified information. These given considerations are 
defined by almost all nations as criminal acts first, and espionage second. This 
is also a simple necessity: with the rise of presumed state-sponsored industrial 
espionage, it is very often unclear if an activity that for certain can be categorised 
as cyber crime should instead be described as cyber espionage.
Espionage is defined as, ‘the practice of spying or using spies to obtain information 
about the plans and activities especially of a foreign government or a competing 
company.’59 In this context, espionage is when foreign governments or criminal 
networks steal information or counterfeit goods in ways that erode the public’s 
trust in internet services. It is pervasive throughout the world, the number of 
businesses falling victim to these crimes increases daily and no sector is without 
compromise. Companies and governments regularly face attempts by others 
to gain unauthorised access through the internet to their data and information 
technology systems by, for example, masquerading as authorised users or through 
the surreptitious introduction of malicious software.60 Some define this activity 
as Computer Network Exploitation (CNE): enabling operations and intelligence 
collection capabilities through the use of computer networks to gather data from 
target or adversary automated information systems or networks.61 It is important to 
note that CNE is often an enabling prerequisite for disruptive or damaging activities 
on an information system (see below). 
However it is defined, cyber espionage, particularly when targeting commercial 
intellectual property, risks, over time, undermining a national economy. Many 
countries use espionage to spur rapid economic growth based on advanced 
technology, targeting science and technology initiatives of other nations. Because 
58 US Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in 
Cyberspace. Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011.
59 Espionage, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/espionage.
60 See Hathaway, ‘Falling Prey to Cybercrime: Implications for Business and the Economy.’
61 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13. Information Operations, (Ft. Belvoir, VA: DTIC, 2006), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf.
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ICT forms the backbone of nearly every other technology used in both civilian and 
military applications today, it has become one of the primary espionage targets. 
Of course, military and civilian dual-use technologies will remain of interest to 
foreign collectors, especially advanced manufacturing technologies that can boost 
industrial competitiveness.
1.2.4. ‘Cyber Warfare’
The term ‘cyber warfare’ is both ambiguous and controversial – there is no official 
or generally accepted definition. While the term itself is virtually never used in 
official documents, its relatives – ‘Information Operations’ (Info Ops or also IO) and 
‘Information Warfare’ (IW) – are commonly used, albeit with different meanings. 
More than 30 countries have an articulated doctrine and have announced dedicated 
offensive cyber warfare programmes, mostly using IO or IW as terminology.62 
Nonetheless, the term ‘cyber war’ has a useful academic purpose, in terms that 
it concentrates thinking on state to state conflict within and through cyberspace, 
and the ramifications this can have. Accordingly, cyber warfare has become an 
unavoidable element in any discussion of international security. For example, 
Russia discusses information warfare methods as a means to ‘attack an adversary’s 
centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities,’ and goes on to state that by doing so, 
‘it is possible to win against an opponent, militarily as well as politically, at a low 
cost without necessarily occupying the territory of the enemy.’63, 64 This doctrine 
is a synthesis of the official position of state policy for maintaining information 
security. Likewise, China also discusses information warfare in depth, and the need 
to conduct offensive operations exploiting the vulnerabilities and dependence of 
nations on ICT and the internet in a recently published book.65 China continues 
62 Lewis and Timlin, Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare. Preliminary Assessment of National Doctrine and 
Organization.
63 Roland Heickerö, Emerging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information 
Operations, (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency 2010), http://www.highseclabs.com/
Corporate/foir2970.pdf. 18.
64 Alexander Klimburg and Heli Tirmaa-Klaar, Cybersecurity and Cyberpower: Concepts, Conditions and 
Capabilities for Cooperation for Action within the EU, (Brussels: European Parliament, 2011), http://
www.oiip.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/EP_Study_FINAL.pdf.
65 For a recent non-state Chinese account see Hunan People’s Publishing House, China Cyber Warfare: We 
Can’t Lose the Cyber War (Hunan: China South Publishing & Media Group).
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to evolve its military strategy and doctrine for conducting information warfare 
campaigns and taking advantage of the ‘informationisation’66 of society.
Of course when nations begin to discuss cyber warfare, they need to clarify what 
they mean by cyber attack.67 Germany defines a cyber attack as an IT attack in 
cyberspace directed against one or several other IT systems and aimed at damaging 
IT security – confidentiality, integrity and availability – which may all or individually 
be compromised.68 The United Kingdom outlined four different methods of cyber 
attack in its national cyber strategy: electronic attack, subversion of supply chain, 
manipulation of radio spectrum, disruption of unprotected electronics using high 
power radio frequency.69 The United States defines Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
as ‘actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, 
or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers and networks themselves’.70 The difference between the US and German 
definition of cyber attack is an illustrative one: the US definition does not include 
attacks on confidentiality (e.g., through a ‘probe’ or espionage) as a cyber attack 
while, according to the German definition, there is no difference between a probe 
and a cyber attack. The term takes on different meanings to meet the security remit 
of different communities. For example, it is natural for the military to be ambiguous 
as to whether an attack is considered a use of force (as defined by the Law of Armed 
Conflict), whereas the law enforcement community (police and prosecutors) are 
more likely to describe an attack as a crime. Incident response professional and 
technical experts will likely use the term to generically characterise any malicious 
attempt against confidentiality or availability. A single definition will not help this, 
but clarity about which meaning of ‘attack’ is meant in a particular context can help 
reduce confusion.
In general, there is agreement that cyber activities can be a legitimate military 
activity, but there is no global agreement on the rules that should apply to it. This 
is further complicated by the ambiguous relationship between cyber war and cyber 
66 China has is promoting informationisation development for economic restructuring, infrastructure 
modernisation, and national security. It is similar to the Digital Agenda of Europe, in that it is promoting 
all the means to accelerate the process from the industry society to the information society. It contains 
seven areas of emphasis: (1) ICT and ICT industries (manufacture, service); (2) ICT applications (e-gov, 
e-commerce); (3) Information Resources (Content); (4) Information Infrastructure (Network); (5) 
Information Security; (6) Talents (all kinds); (7) Laws, Regulations, Standards, and Specifications (see 
Xiaofan Zhao, ‘Practice and Strategy of Informatization in China,’ (Shanghai: UPAN, 2006).).
67 See Section 3.1.3 for a more detailed examination of cyber attack classifications.
68 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany (Berlin: Beauftragter der 
Bundesregierung für Informationstechnik, 2011). 14-5.
69 UK Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world: 
13-4.
70 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13. Information Operations.
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espionage – there is a very fine line between breaking into a computer to spy and 
breaking in to attack.71 Nations are concerned that infrastructure disruption could 
inflict significant economic costs on the public and private sectors and impair 
performance of essential services. This is why some nations are demanding a 
dialogue regarding what constitutes a legitimate target in cyberspace, code of 
conduct for stewardship and conflict, and the need for confidence building measures 
to reduce the risk of unwanted or unnecessary miscalculation and subsequent 
escalation of conflict and misunderstanding.
For example, China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan introduced an International 
Code of Conduct for Information Security for consideration by the 66th UN General 
Assembly.72 This document was intended to jumpstart discussion on wide-ranging 
approaches for dealing with appropriate behaviours in cyberspace. This specific 
proposal and the overall concept of a ‘code of conduct’, will likely be raised at a 
number of upcoming international fora dealing with cyber security and internet 
policy matters.
To date, it appears that the United States and a number of European countries 
oppose the notion that a code of conduct or treaty is needed to address cyber 
warfare. They argue that the proposed obligations seem to be in conflict with 
existing international law built around concepts such as refraining from the ‘threat 
or use of force’ (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) and the right to exercise ‘self-defence 
if an armed attack occurs’ (Article 51 of the UN Charter). Moreover, it is unclear how 
a proposed code’s concepts of ‘hostile activities’ and ‘threats to international peace 
and security’ relate to the ‘threat or use of force’ standard in Article 2(4), or whether 
the proposed code would constrain the inherent right to self-defence recognised 
in Article 51. Other nations are taking the initiative to drive debate and resolution 
regarding what is needed, given the economic and national security consequences 
of what is at stake. These efforts have taken on a new tempo and seriousness given 
the use of Stuxnet against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. For example, the United 
Kingdom hosted a conference on norms of behaviour in London in 2011 to help 
foster an international dialogue, and it is expected that this discussion will continue 
in Hungary and South Korea in the coming years.
71 James Lewis, ‘Confidence-building and international agreement in cybersecurity,’ Disarmament Forum, 
no. 4 (2011): 56.
72 See UNGA, Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General 
(A/66/359) (New York: United Nations, 2011).
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1.3. NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY
There is no universally accepted explicit definition of what constitutes ‘national 
cyber security’ (or NCS for short). Indeed, although the exact term is hardly ever 
used in official strategies, it is commonly employed by government spokespersons 
without ever being defined. NCS has two obvious roots: the term ‘cyber security’ and 
the term ‘national security’ – both of which are often differently defined in official 
national documents. Even if the term ‘national cyber security’ is seldom explicitly 
defined, it is possible to derive a working definition based on the respective use of 
the other two terms.
1.3.1. Comparison of ‘National’ and ‘Cyber’ Security
When analysing the use of the terms ‘cyber security’ and ‘national security’ 
in official documents, it is first and foremost necessary to accept that national 
differences (to say nothing of linguistic differences) will often prevent a direct and 
literal comparison. As discussed above, the term ‘cyber security’ does not have 
a single accepted common definition, and this is especially the case when used 
within public policy documents. Also, the term ‘national security’ is not always 
defined even within a specific national context – an often intentional move aimed to 
provide government with needed flexibility.73
Until relatively recently, the term ‘national security’ was largely used only within 
the United States. The widespread introduction of dedicated ‘national security 
strategies’ (NSS) in a number of OECD countries is a relatively recent phenomenon 
that appears to have been closely tied to a shift in strategic thought away from 
focusing on a few specific ‘threats’ to the idea against of mitigation against myriad 
‘risks’. Thus, for example, in nearly all of the post-2007 strategies, cyber security is 
defined as a key national security issue. Indeed, in some cases, the topic of ‘cyber 
security’ (or even ‘national cyber security’) predates the actual creation of the 
national security strategy, and sometimes even seems to function as a driver for the 
paradigm shift to a more comprehensive national security strategy; one in which 
the state not only recognises that various risks need to be addressed, but that they 
only can be addressed by working together with non-state actors.
73 For example, the UK Security Service (also known as MI5) states that: ‘The term ‘national security’ is 
not specifically defined by UK or European law. It has been the policy of successive Governments and 
the practice of Parliament not to define the term, in order to retain the flexibility necessary to ensure 
that the use of the term can adapt to changing circumstances’ (UK Security Service (MI5), ‘Protecting 
National Security,’ https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/protecting-national-security.
html.).
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When looking at specific countries, this paradigm shift becomes fairly clear. Australia, 
for instance, published its First National Security Statement to its Parliament in 
2008,74 which was put in place as part of a long-term reform agenda to establish a 
sustainable national security policy framework. When the Australian government 
released its Cyber Security Strategy75 in 2009, it was clear that the strategy dealt with 
both Australia’s national security and its digital economy. While the National Security 
Strategy highlights the vitality of ‘partnerships between industry, governments and 
the community’,76 in order to maintain ‘a secure, resilient and trusted electronic 
operating environment’,77 the government’s cyber security policy has a similar 
emphasis on partnerships with the private sector; while simultaneously referring to 
the fact that ‘the Australian Government has an important leadership role’.78
Although the term ‘national security’ has been used in Canada since the 1970s, the 
first official incorporation of a national security strategy did not occur until 2004.79 
However, as set out in its National Security Strategy, threats that ‘undermine the 
security of the state of society [...] generally require a national response, as they are 
beyond the capacity of individuals, communities or provinces to address alone.’80 In 
context with Canada’s cyber security strategy, this implies ‘a shared responsibility, 
one in which Canadians, their governments, the private sector and our international 
partners all have a role to play.’81
In Germany, at least until 2008, the term ‘Sicherheitspolitik’ was considered to be 
sufficiently analogous to the English term ‘national security’. But in recent years 
the term ‘national security’ has taken root in German policy and political discourse, 
perhaps in an effort to draw attention to the increased blurring of national and 
international risks (as opposed to the threat-based model of the Cold War) requiring 
an increased ‘national’ cooperation. As part of these efforts, the term ‘cyber security’ 
might be considered directly analogous to ‘national cyber security’, in that it is also 
directly tied with a single specific programme – the national protection plan for the 
critical information infrastructure.82
74 Australian Prime Minister, The First National Security Statement to the Australian Parliament 
(Canberra: Australian Government, 2008).





79 Canadian Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (Ottawa: 
Canadian Government, 2004).
80 Ibid., vii.
81 Canadian Department for Public Safety, Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy. For a Stronger and More 
Prosperous Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Government, 2010). 17.
82 The implementation of this protection plan is known as UP-KRITIS (civilian) and UP-BUND (for 
government).
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Similarly, in France there was no formal tradition of the term ‘national security’ 
until 2008, when it was first introduced in the Defence White Book.83 In contrast 
to Germany, the concept of national security was comprehensively defined, based 
upon both ‘defence’ (military) and ‘domestic’ (internal) civilian strategies, together 
with an overall set of guiding principles.84 Recent French government documents85 
make it clear that ‘cyber defence’ aims to protect the security of France’s ‘critical 
information systems’ according to ‘information assurance measures’.
The first British National Security Strategy was introduced in 2008 and has been 
reviewed at least two times since. The rationale for moving away from the previous 
emphasis on Strategic Defence Reviews or Defence White Papers was made quite 
clear:
‘The aim of this first National Security Strategy is to set out how we will address 
and manage this diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and 
underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the 
nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our way of life.’86
The focus on this ‘diverse set of security challenges’ was particularly directed at 
cyber security. To enjoy freedom and prosperity in cyberspace, the government 
set out four guiding objectives: successful handling of cyber crime; establishing 
the UK as one of the most secure places in the world to do business; improvement 
of resilience to cyber attacks, and protection of national interests in cyberspace.87 
The British National Cyber Strategy is a comprehensive document that goes beyond 
national security issues. Although the ‘national security’ component of the Cyber 
Security Strategy remains partially classified, it appears to be well funded in that 
over £650 million was made available for the period 2011-2015. Interestingly, the 
definition of cyber security seems equally concerned with protecting systems as 
well as ‘exploiting opportunities’ and encompasses missions as diverse as internet 
governance, trade policy, counter-terrorism and intelligence.
83 French White Paper Commission, The French White Paper on Defence and National Security (Paris: 
Odile Jacob, 2008).
84 ‘The ’republican compact’ that binds all French people to the State, namely the principles of democracy, 
and in particular individual and collective freedoms, respect for human dignity, solidarity and justice’ 
(ibid., 58.).
85 French Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security, Information systems defence and 
security. France’s strategy (Paris: French Network and Information Security Agency, 2011).
86 UK Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. Security in an interdependent 
world (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2008).
87 UK Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world: 
21.
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Document Year Basic Definition / Understanding Document Year
Basic Definition / 
Understanding Key Objectives / Areas




to the  
Parliament88
2008 ‘Freedom from attack 
or the threat of attack; 
the maintenance of 
our territorial integ-
rity; the maintenance 
of our political sover-
eignty; the preserva-
tion of our hard won 
freedoms; and the 
maintenance of our 
fundamental capacity 
to advance economic 





2009 ‘Measures relating 
to the confidential-
ity, availability and 
integrity of informa-
tion that is processed, 
stored and communi-
cated by electronic or 
similar means.’
Three key objectives: 
- ‘All Australians are aware of cyber risks, se-
cure their computers and take steps to protect 
their identities, privacy and finances online’  
- ‘Australian Businesses operate secure and 
resilient informations and communications 
technologies to protect the integrity of their 
own operations and the identity and privacy of 
their customers’ 
- ‘The Australian Government ensures its 
information and communications technologies 
are secure and resilient’







2004 ‘National security 
deals with threats that 
have the potential 
to undermine the 
security of the state or 
society. These threats 
generally require a 
national response, as 
they are beyond the 
capacity of individu-
als, communities or 
provinces to address 
alone. 
National security 
is closely linked to 
both personal and 
international security. 
While most criminal 
offences, for example, 
may threaten personal 
security, they do not 
generally have the 
same capacity to un-
dermine the security 
of the state or society 
as do activities such 
as terrorism or some 
forms of organized 
crime. 
Given the interna-
tional nature of many 
of the threats affecting 
Canadians, national 
security also intersects 
with international 
security. At the same 
time, there are a grow-
ing number of interna-
tional security threats 
that impact directly on 
Canadian security and 










2010 ‘detect, identify and 
recover’ from cyber 
attacks which ‘include 





electronic means) of 
electronic informa-
tion and/or the elec-
tronic and physical 
infrastructure used to 
process, communi-
cate and/or store 
that information. The 
severity of the cyber 
attack determines 
the appropriate level 




- ‘Securing Government systems’ 
- ‘Partnering to secure vital cyber systems 
outside the federal Government’ 
- ‘Helping the Canadians to be secure online’









2006 ‘German security 
policy is based on a 
comprehensive con-
cept of security; it is 
forward-looking and 
multilateral. Security 
cannot be guaranteed 
by the efforts of any 
one nation or by 
armed forces alone. 
Instead, it requires 
an all-encompassing 
approach that can 







2011 ‘Cyber security and 
civilian and military 
cyber security: (Glob-
al) cyber security is 
the desired objective 
of the IT security 
situation, in which 
the risks of global 
cyberspace have been 
reduced to an accept-
able minimum. 
Hence, cyber security 
in Germany is the 
desired objective of 
the IT security situ-
ation, in which the 
risks of the German 
cyberspace have been 
reduced to an accept-
able minimum. Cyber 
security (in Germany) 




rity focuses on all IT 
systems for civilian 
use in German cyber-
space. Military cyber 
security focuses on 
all IT systems for 
military use in Ger-
man cyberspace.’
Ten strategic areas (ob-
jectives and measures): 
- ‘Protection of critical 
information infrastruc-
tures’ 
- ‘Secure IT systems in 
Germany’ 
- ‘Strengthening IT 
security in the public 
administration’ 
- ‘National Cyber 
Response Centre’ 
- ‘National Cyber Security 
Council’ 
- ‘Effective crime 




to ensure cyber 
security in Europe 
and worldwide’ 





opment in federal 
authorities’ 
- ‘Tools to 
respond to cyber 
attacks’





2008 ‘The aim of France’s 
National Security 
strategy is to ward off 
risks or threats liable 
to harm the life of the 
nation. 
Its first aim is to 
defend the population 
and French territory, 
this being the first 
duty and responsi-
bility of the State. 
The second aim is 
to enable France to 
contribute to Euro-
pean and international 
security: this corre-
sponds both to its own 
security needs, which 
also extend beyond 
its frontiers, and to 
the responsibilities 
shouldered by France 
within the framework 
of the United Nations 
and the alliances and 
treaties which it has 
signed. The third aim 
is to defend the values 
of the ‘republican 
compact’ that binds 
all French people to 
the State, namely the 
principles of democ-
racy, and in particular 
individual and collec-
tive freedoms, respect 








2011 ‘The desired state 
of an information 
system in which it 
can resist events from 
cyberspace likely 
to compromise the 
availability, integrity 
or confidentiality of 
the data stored, pro-
cessed or transmitted 
and of the related 
services that these 
systems offer or 
make accessible. 
Cybersecurity makes 
use of information 
systems security 
techniques and is 




Four strategic objectives: 
‘- Become a cyberdefence world power in 
cyberdefence 
- Safeguard France’s ability to make decisions 
through the protection of information related 
to its sovereignty 
- Strengthen the cybersecurity of critical 
national infrastructures 





‘National security is at 
stake when the vital 
interests of our state 
and/or our society [1. 
territorial security, 2. 
economic security, 3. 
ecological security, 4. 
physical security, and 
5. social and political 
security] are threat-
ened in such way that 
it leads to – potential 
– social disruption. 
National security 
contains both the cor-
rosion of security by 
intentional human 
action (security) as 
well as the damage 
caused by disasters, 
system or process 
failures, human error 
or natural anomalies 











2011 ‘Cyber security is 
freedom from danger 
or damage due 
to the disruption, 
breakdown, or misuse 
of ICT. The danger 
or damage resulting 
from disruption, 
breakdown, or 
misuse may consist 
of limitations to the 
availability or reliabil-
ity of ICT, breaches of 
the confidentiality of 
information stored on 
ICT media, or damage 
to the integrity of 
that information.’
‘Security and trust in an open and free digital 
society: 
The Strategy’s goal is to strengthen the security 
of digital society in order to give individuals, 
businesses, and public bodies more confidence 
in the use of ICT. To this end, the responsible 
public bodies will work more effectively with 
other parties to ensure the safety and reliability 
of an open and free digital society.
This will stimulate the economy and increase 
prosperity and well-being. It will ensure legal 
protection in the digital domain, prevent social 
disruption, and lead to appropriate action if 
things go wrong.’
UK A Strong 
Britain in an 






2010 ‘The security of our 
nation is the first 
duty of government. 
It is the foundation of 
our freedom and our 
prosperity.’ 
[...] 
‘The National Security 
Strategy of the United 
Kingdom is: to use 
all our national 
capabilities to build 
Britain’s prosperity, 
extend our nation’s 
influence in the world 









the UK in 
a digital 
world99
2011 actions taken ‘to 
reduce the risk and 
secure the benefits 





‘- The UK to tackle cybercrime and be one of the 
most secure places in the world to do business 
in cyberspace
- The UK to be more resilient to cyber attacks 
and better able to protect our interests in 
cyberspace
- The UK to have helped shape an open, stable 
and vibrant cyberspace which the UK public can 
use safely and that supports open societie
- The UK to have the cross-cutting knowledge, 





2010 ‘Our national secu-
rity depends upon 
America’s ability to 
leverage our unique 
national attributes, 
just as global security 
depends upon strong 
and responsible 
American leadership. 
That includes our mili-




and efforts to shape 
an international 
system that serves the 
mutual interests of na-
tions and peoples. For 
the world has changed 
at an extraordinary 
pace, and the United 
States must adapt to 
advance ou interests 







2003 ‘protect against the 
debilitating disrup-
tion of the operation 
of information 
systems for critical 
infrastructures and, 
thereby, help to 
protect the people, 
economy, and na-
tional security of the 
United States. We 
must act to reduce 
our vulnerabilities to 
these threats before 
they can be exploited 
to damage the cyber 
systems supporting 
our Nation’s critical 
infrastructures and 
ensure that such 
disruptions of cyber-
space are infrequent, 
of minimal duration, 
manageable, and 
cause the least dam-
age possible. 
Securing cyberspace 
is an extraordinarily 
difficult strategic 
challenge that re-
quires a coordinated 
and focused effort 
from our entire soci-
ety – the federal gov-
ernment, state and 
local governments, 
the private sector, 
and the American 
people.’
Three Strategic Objectives:
‘- Prevent cyber attacks against America’s criti-
cal infrastructures
- Reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks; 
and
- Minimize damage and recovery time from 














[...] includes strategy, 
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‘- establishing the 
National Cyber Security 
Center within the  
Department of Homeland 
Security’
‘- Move towards manag-
ing a single federal 
enterprise network;
- Deploy intrinsic detec-
tion systems;
- Develop and deploy in-
trusion prevention tools;
- Review and potentially 
redirect research and 
funding;
- Connect current govern-
ment cyber operations 
centers;




- Increase the se-
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supply chain risk 
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- Define the role 
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The Netherlands was one of the first countries to move away from a threat-based 
national security picture to a more ‘risk’ based view.104 As part of this shift, the first 
Dutch National Security Strategy was adopted in 2007, with a detailed work plan 
leading to the eventual adoption of a national cyber security strategy in 2011. The 
drafting of the strategy was coordinated by the Ministry of Security and Justice, 
and was a response to the Parliament’s demand (referred to as the Amendment 
Knops) for the creation of a ‘National Cyber Strategy’. The document was conceived 
as providing a road-map to a Whole of Government approach to national 
security.105 The definition of national security is closely aligned to the philosophy 
of ‘Comprehensive Security’106 and initiated a national risk assessment based 
approach to decision making.107 The language within the NCSS is clearly orientated 
toward ‘ICT-based threats’, and the Dutch definition of cyber security contemplates 
the ‘freedom from danger or damage due to the disruption, breakdown, or misuse 
of ICT.’
The United States has used the term ‘national security’ at least since 1947, and in the 
ensuing six decades, the implicit meaning of ‘national security’ has changed many 
times – an explicit meaning was often avoided in order to secure an advantage 
through strategic ambiguity.108 Since 1986, the United States has produced 15 
National Security Strategies (NSS), the most recent of which was published in 2012. 
The US definition of ‘national security’ is much wider than commonly employed 
abroad. While ‘securing cyberspace’ is also a particular item within the NSS 2010, 
the majority of mentions of ‘cyber’ are outside of that particular section, illustrating 
that the issue is considered to be cross-vertical and not, in the most narrow sense, 
a security issue alone. Similarly, the US has avoided creating a dedicated single 
overarching national cyber security strategy, instead relying on a collection of 
documents to fulfil the same goal. Since the White House first established formal 
104 For an in-depth study, see Michel Rademaker, ‘National Security Strategy of the Netherlands: An 
Innovative Approach, ’Information and Security 23, no. 1 (2008), http://infosec.procon.bg/v23/
Rademaker.pdf.
105 See, for instance, Marcel de Haas, From Defence Doctrine to National Security Strategy: The Case of the 
Netherlands, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2007), http://
www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20071100_cscp_art_srsa_haas.pdf.
106 The five securities are Territorial, Economic, Physical, Ecological and Social/Political.
107 Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, ‘The National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS). Strength through 
Cooperation.’
108 According to a US defence department manual, ‘national security’ is ‘[a] collective term encompassing 
both national defence and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: 
a. a military or defence advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favourable foreign 
relations position; or c. a defence posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action 
from within or without, overt or covert’ (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Department 
of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Ft. Belvoir, VA: DTIC, 2012), http://www.dtic.
mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.).
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structures in 1998 to coordinate various cyber security activities,109 a number of 
documents have been released that can claim to directly address strategic national 
cyber security issues.110 Yet there is no clear definition of what the US government 
considers to be cyber security, although the term ‘national cyber security’ (albeit 
undefined) has been employed.111
1.3.2. Cyber Power and National Security
Until fairly recently there have been few theoretical models of interstate conflict 
and international relations that directly have cyber security at their core. The 
concept of ‘cyber warfare’ is highly contentious, not the least because, for liberal 
democratic governments, the distinction between warfare and mere attacks is a 
vital one. Not all approaches, however, make the distinction between peacetime and 
wartime activities. The purported Chinese ‘Information Warfare’112 concept (known 
as ‘Three Warfares’) includes methods such as ‘Legal Warfare’ and ‘Media Warfare’ 
that might seem to be anathema to liberal democracies, yet certainly acknowledges 
the importance of information in the so-called Information Age. While some nations 
cannot easily countenance such strategies, it is clear that a new conflict paradigm is 
necessary, one that acknowledges the importance of the information domain while 
not violating hallowed principles of democracy. An equally important question is 
how to include the breadth of national cyber security issues and functions in times 
of both peace and war, and across the different components of ‘national power’,113 
e.g., to exert ‘cyber power’.
109 The Critical Infrastructure Protection (PDD-63) as part of: National Security Presidential Directive 
54: Cyber Security and Monitoring (NSPD-54) / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23: Cyber 
Security and Monitoring (HSPD-23).
110 These include: White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2003); Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection (HSPD-7); White House, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative (as codified in NSPD-54/HSPD-23) (Washington, DC: White House, 2008); White House, 
Cyberspace Policy Review. Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications 
Infrastructure (Washington, DC: White House, 2009); White House, International Strategy for 
Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (Washington, DC 2011).
111 The context is a Whole of Government Cyber Security Strategy and, in particular, enhanced cooperation 
between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. Overall, the term 
‘national cyber security’ implies here the protection of the .mil and .gov domain, and the ability of the 
systems within these domains to operate normally at home and abroad (US Department of Defense, 
Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington, DC 2011). 8.).
112 For a comprehensive study of the ‘Three Warfares Study’ see Timothy Walton, ‘Treble Spyglass, Treble 
Spear?: China’s Three Warfares,’ Defense Concepts 4, no. 4 (2009).
113 Concepts of ‘national power’ refer to leverages of power of a nation-state or alliance; and can include 
different specific instruments. Most commonly these are referred to as including Diplomatic, Military, 
Informational and Economic (DIME) instruments. These are active in times of peace and war. 
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What actually constitutes power in and through cyberspace within the larger 
framework of national power is still poorly understood and the subject of much 
debate. What is clear is that the ‘cyber power’ of a nation does not necessarily 
derive solely from the amount of trained hackers it has, but rather the sum total 
of resources or capabilities it can leverage to pursue political and economic goals 
while ensuring the resilience of its own infrastructure. 
One attempt to define cyber power reads: ‘the ability to use cyberspace to create 
advantages and influence events in all the operational environments and across the 
instruments of power.’114 This definition illustrates what has become official policy 
not only in the United States, but also in many countries in Europe: cyberspace 
is viewed as an operational domain of military operations, equal to land, air, sea 
and space.115 Unlike the other domains of conflict, however, cyberspace plays a role 
across each of the ‘instruments of national power’. Each of these instruments is 
therefore directly influenced by cyber means.116
This approach to cyber security and national power has one particular disadvantage 
– it is very much a ‘major power’ doctrine, most applicable to nations whose size 
or intent propels them to seek a highly proactive engagement in the international 
strategic landscapes, i.e., to actively ‘create strategic opportunities via cyberspace’. 
The discourse has largely emerged from the military, despite other attempts to 
define cyber power within a ‘soft power’ context.117 Not all nations will share these 
goals of power projection.
The concept of ‘national cyber security’ that is seemingly emerging by default, 
rather than by intent, addresses a more modest set of requirements than notions 
of cyber power. While military capabilities and international power-projection still 
play a role, the view is often more orientated towards managing the cyber risks 
that a nation faces, rather than proactively trying to exploit those cyber risks in 
advancing its global power. Nations that seek to define a pronounced NCSS often do 
so more with a view towards domestic security, rather than expanding their global 
114 Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry Wentz, eds., Cyber Power and National Security 
(Washington, DC: National Defence UP, 2009).Kramer and his colleagues, however, approach the issue 
primarily from a military perspective. A slightly broader view was offered by Joseph Nye, who considers 
the most important application of soft (cyber) power to be outward-facing, influencing nations, rather 
than inward-facing (see Joseph S. Nye, Cyber Power, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, 2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf.).
  See Mark Thompson, ‘U.S. Cyberwar Strategy: The Pentagon Plans to Attack,’ Time, 2 February 2010.
115 See, for instance, US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace.
116 Kramer, Starr, and Wentz, Cyber Power and National Security.
117 Nye, Cyber Power; Alexander Klimburg, ‘The Whole of Nation in Cyberpower,’ Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs Special Issue (2011).
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strategic position. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Manual, we will define 
‘national cyber security’ as:
‘the focused application of specific governmental levers and information 
assurance principles to public, private and relevant international ICT systems, 
and their associated content, where these systems directly pertain to national 
security.’
1.4. CONCEPTUALISING NATIONAL CYBER 
SECURITY
As discussed above, what ultimately constitutes national cyber security (NCS) 
will always remain in the eye of the beholder. However, any overall strategy that 
seeks to address NCS will most likely need to orientate itself according to various 
parameters: what is the purpose of the strategy? who is the intended audience? 
These questions will be addressed in full in Section 2 as they are standard questions 
for any national security strategy, and are independent of the cyber security 
domain. What is inherent to the cyber security topic are more specific questions: 
firstly, where is the strategy directed at, what is its actual purpose, who are the 
stakeholders? This question is addressed in more depth in Section 3. Secondly, how 
is the cyber security domain segmented, and how are the different interpretations 
of NCS understood? This question is addressed in more depth in Section 4. And 
thirdly, how does this all relate to the wider well-being of the nation?
For these last three questions this Manual suggests three conceptual tools to help 
focus strategic deliberations: respectively, they are termed the ‘three dimensions’, 
the ‘five mandates’, and the ‘five dilemmas’ of national cyber security. Together they 
provide for a comprehensive view of the topic. Not all NCSS will want to provide 
equal weight to the different aspects of national cyber security described in this 
Manual. Therefore, these tools are intended to provide an overview of what aspects 
can be considered, rather than a checklist of what should be taken into account.
1.4.1. The Three Dimensions: Governmental, National and 
International118
Any approach to a NCS strategy needs to consider the ‘three dimensions’ of activity: 
the governmental, the national (or societal) and the international. Since the 1990s a 
particular trend in public policy theory has focused on the cooperation of different 
118 See Section 3 for further details. Based on Klimburg, ‘The Whole of Nation in Cyberpower.’
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actors. Initially the focus was on improving the coordination of government 
actors (the Whole of Government approach or WoG), particularly between the 
departments most involved in stabilisation or peace building operations in places 
like Afghanistan or Iraq. Subsequently, the general notion was picked up by 
international organisations as diverse as NATO and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, who backed concepts of international, trans-border and ‘like for 
like’ collaboration (also called the Whole of System approach or WoS) rather than 
intergovernmental cooperation. More recently, states have begun looking at better 
methods for cooperating with their ‘national’ non-state actors, ranging from aid 
and humanitarian groups to critical infrastructure providers (sometimes called the 
Whole of Nation approach or WoN) or even, more generally, their national civil 
society.
The lessons learned from the prolonged engagements in countries like Afghanistan 
and Iraq emphasise the importance and the challenge of different actors working 
together. The same challenges apply even more so to the field of national cyber 
security where, if anything, power and responsibility is distributed far more widely 
than within so-called stabilisation or peace building operations.
Governmental: within government alone, it is not unusual for up to a dozen 
different departments and agencies to claim responsibility for national cyber 
security in various forms, including military, law enforcement, judicial, commerce, 
infrastructure, interior, intelligence, telecommunications, and other governmental 
bodies. This is understandable due to breadth and depth of what constitutes 
NCS but leads to considerable difficulty in establishing coherent action. A major 
challenge for all NCS strategies is, therefore, improving the coordination between 
these governmental actors. This Whole of Government effort can be achieved by a 
number of different methods, ranging from appointing a lead agency or department 
to simply improving the inter-departmental process. Due to the esoteric nature 
of cyber security, however, it probably requires much more effort to achieve this 
Whole of Government synergy than practically any other security challenge.
International: virtually no NCS document ignores the international dimension. 
The very basis of the internet,119 to say nothing of the myriad companies and 
organisations that effectively constitute the internet, is thoroughly globalised. For 
any nation state or interest group, to advance its interests requires collaboration 
with a wide range of international partners. This applies at any level: from 
internationally binding treaties (e.g., the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention), 
to politically binding agreements (e.g., regarding Confidence Building Measures 
119 The internet is marked by the routing of data ‘packets’ and these packets rarely take the most direct 
geographic route: it is perfectly possible for an e-mail sent from Los Angeles to New York to be routed 
through China and Russia on the way. 
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in Cyberspace), to non-governmental agreements between technical certification 
bodies (e.g., membership of FIRST120 and similar bodies). Many of the international 
collaborations will occur outside a specific national government. In fact, it can be 
necessary to work with non-state actors abroad. Therefore, the emphasis must be 
on relationships with all the relevant actors within specific systems (in particular, 
but not limited to the field of ‘internet governance’). This Whole of System approach, 
therefore, emphasises the need for a government to agree on a single lead actor 
(which can be also outside of government itself), and to enable that actor to be 
flexible enough to engage with the entire range of actors globally.121
National: engagement with security contractors and critical infrastructure 
companies has always been seen as critical for national security. The steady 
expansion of the number of actors relevant to national cyber security within any 
particular nation has meant that some governments have decided to make their 
overall strategy ‘comprehensive’, including the entire society, or the Whole of 
Nation. A Whole of Nation approach tries to overcome the limitations of simply 
having special legally-defined relationships with a small number of specific 
security contractors. Often it tries to encourage a wide range of non-state actors 
(in particular private companies but also research establishments and civil 
society) to cooperate with the government on cyber security issues. While many 
governments are increasingly expanding their legal options, the general principle 
is that specific ‘cooperation’ is needed from such a great number of non-state actors 
that a pure legislative approach would be largely unworkable in most democracies. 
To encourage cooperation, Whole of Nation approaches usually include various 
incentives that directly support the security of these enterprises, and indirectly 
can be of other advantage as well (e.g., commercially).
1.4.2. The Five Mandates of National Cyber Security122
Within the general context of discussing national cyber security, it is important to 
keep in mind that this is not one single subject area. Rather, it is possible to split 
the issue of NCS into five distinct perspectives or ‘mandates’, each of which could 
be addressed by different government departments. This split is not an ideal state 
120 The ‘Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams’ (FIRST) is an international certification 
organisation for Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs, sometimes CSIRTs). CERTs are the 
principle organisation form for dealing with all manner of technical cyber security tasks and national 
CERTs that wish to belong to FIRST must be certified by the organisation. 
121 As an example, the US government interaction with part of worldwide technical CERT community is 
largely managed by the non-governmental Carnegie-Mellon University. 
122 See Section 4.3 for additional details. Based on Klimburg in Alexander Klimburg and Philipp Mirtl, 
Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65), (Vienna: Austrian Institute for International 
Affairs, 2012), http://www.oiip.ac.at/publikationen/arbeitspapiere/publikationen-detail/article/92/
cyberspace-and-governance-a-primer.html.
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but it is a reality due to the complexity and depth of cyber security as a whole. Each 
mandate has developed its own emphasis and even its own lexicon, despite the fact 
that they are all simply different facets of the same problem. Unfortunately, there is 
frequently a significant lack of coordination between these mandates, and this lack 
of coordination is perhaps one of the most serious organisational challenges within 
the domain of national cyber security.
Military Cyber: the internet security company McAfee has been warning since 
2007 that, in its opinion, a ‘virtual arms race’ is occurring in cyberspace with a 
number of countries deploying cyber weapons.123 Many governments are building 
capabilities to wage cyber war,124 while some NATO reports have claimed that up 
to 120 countries are developing a military cyber capability.125 These capabilities 
can be interpreted as simply one more tool of warfare, similar to airpower, which 
would be used only within a clearly defined tactical military mission (for instance, 
for shutting down an air-defence system). Military cyber activities, therefore, 
encompass four different tasks: enabling protection of their own defence networks, 
enabling Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities, battlefield or tactical cyber 
warfare, and strategic cyber warfare.
Counter Cyber Crime: cyber crime activities can include a wide swathe of activities 
that impact both the individual citizen directly (e.g., identity theft) and corporations 
(e.g., theft of intellectual property). At least as significant for national security, 
however, is the logistical support capability cyber crime can offer to anyone 
interested in conducting cyber attacks. This is also where cyber crime interacts 
not only with military cyber activities, but also with cyber terrorism. As of 2012, 
there has not occurred any event that would be considered a ‘cyber terrorist’ attack 
despite, for instance, threats by the hacker group Anonymous to ‘bring down the 
internet.’126 This said, there have been a rising number of criminal acts, including 
attempts at mass disruption of communications, and this suggests cyber terrorism 
will be an issue for the future.
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence: distinguishing cyber espionage from cyber 
crime and military cyber activities is controversial. In fact, both missions depend 
on similar vectors of attack and similar technology. In practice, however, serious 
espionage cases (regarding intellectual property as well as government secrets) are 
in a class of their own, while at the same time it can be very difficult to ascertain 
for sure if the perpetrator is a state or a criminal group operating on behalf of a 
123 See Zeenews, ‘US, China, Russia have ‘cyber weapons’: McAfee,’ Zeenews.com, 18 November 2009.
124 See Michael W. Cheek, ‘What is Cyber War Anyway? A Conversation with Jeff Carr, Author of ‘Inside 
Cyber Warfare’,’ The new new Internet, 2 March 2010.
125 See Julian Hale, ‘NATO Official: Cyber Attack Systems Proliferating,’ DefenceNews, 23 March 2010.
126 Tyler Holman, ‘Anonymous threatens to bring down the internet,’ Neowin.net, 27 March 2012.
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state, or indeed operating on its own. Whoever is actually behind the attack, cyber 
espionage probably represents the most damaging part of cyber crime (if included 
in the category). Cyber espionage, when directed toward states, also makes it 
necessary to develop specific foreign policy response mechanisms capable of 
dealing with the inherent ambiguity of actor-nature in cyberspace. At the same time, 
counter-intelligence activities (i.e., detecting and combating the most sophisticated 
cyber intrusions) very often will depend upon other types of intelligence activity, 
including human intelligence, signals intelligence, forensic analysis, etc., as well as 
extensive information sharing between international partners.
Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Crisis Management: critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) has become the catch-all term that seeks to 
involve the providers of essential services of a country within a national security 
framework. As most of the service providers (such as public utilities, finance or 
telecommunications) are in the private sector, it is necessary to extend some sort 
of government support to help protect them and the essential services they provide 
from modern threats. While the original focus of these programmes post-September 
11, 2001 was often on physical security, today the majority of all CIP activity is 
directly connected to cyber acts, usually cyber crime and cyber espionage. In this 
context, National Crisis Management must be extended by an additional cyber 
component. This includes institutional structures which enhance the cooperation 
between state and non-state actors both nationally and internationally, as well 
as a stable crisis communication network and an applicable legal framework to 
exchange relevant information.127
‘Cyber Diplomacy’ and Internet Governance: if diplomacy at its core is about how 
states exchange, deal with, gather, assess, present and represent information,128 
cyber diplomacy is about ‘how diplomacy is adapting to the new global information 
order.’129 Within this context, the promotion of aims such as ‘norms and standards 
for cyber behaviour’ (discussed primarily within the UN) and the aim for promoting 
‘confidence building measures between nations in cyberspace’ needs to be 
understood as a mostly bilaterally-focused activity. Internet governance, in contrast, 
is largely a multilateral (or even multi-stakeholder) activity, and is probably the 
most international of all mandates. Internet governance is generally referred to as 
127 See, for instance, Austrian Federal Chancellery, National ICT Security Strategy Austria (Vienna: Digital 
Austria, 2012). 14-5.
128 Adapted from Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1977). 170-83.
129 Evan H. Potter, ed. Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century (Quebec: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 7. Potter originally is discussing ‘e-diplomacy’, which however 
in this Manual is defined as the ability to conduct diplomacy with cyber means. 
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the process by which a number of state and non-state actors interact to manage 
what, in effect, is the programming (or code, or ‘logical’) layer of the internet.
The above segmentation is an attempt to provide for a more structured discussion 
on the scope of national cyber security. The reality of these different mandates is 
that they are each dealt with by different organisational groups not only within 
government, but also within the non-state sector. Normatively speaking, all of these 
mandates should be holistically engaged if a comprehensive NCS perspective is to 
be developed.
1.5. THE FIVE DILEMMAS OF NATIONAL CYBER 
SECURITY
National cyber security is a tool to reach a desired state of affairs, not an end in 
itself. Most nations define a strategic goal of a safe and secure environment within 
which they can achieve full economic potential, and protect citizens from various 
cyber and non-cyber related risks, both domestic and foreign. To achieve this, NCS 
has to deal with its own, overarching set of ‘national cyber security dilemmas’. In 
international relations theory, the traditional ‘security dilemma’ states that both a 
country’s security strength and its weakness can create unfavourable reactions in 
their adversaries.130 The NCS Dilemmas are, however, different: both a strong and a 
weak NCS posture can have economic and social costs.
1.5.1. Stimulate the Economy vs. Improve National Security
Nations are constantly facing the twin tensions of how to expedite the economic 
benefits of ICT and the internet economy while, at the same time, protecting 
intellectual property and privacy (data protection), securing critical infrastructure, 
and providing for defence of the homeland. The productivity promise that ICT 
brings for some nations will approach 10% of their GDP by 2015.131 This growth 
is being documented in policies and funded through initiatives around the world. 
For example, the European Union is pursuing the Digital Agenda, the United 
States is pursuing the Innovation Agenda, and China is pursuing a policy of 
130 See, for instance, Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). 66-72.
131 Soumitra Dutta and Irene Mia, The Global Information Technology Report 2009-2010. ICT for 
Sustainability, (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2010), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GITR_
Report_2010.pdf. 12 and 61. See also Scott C. Beardsley et al., ‘Fostering the Economic and Social 
Benefits of ICT,’ The Global Information Technology Report 2009-2010 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 
2010), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GITR_Report_2010.pdf; Dean et al., ‘The Connected 
World: The Digital Manifesto: How Companies and Countries Can Win in the Digital Economy.’
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‘Informationisation’. The agendas have common components: provision of high-
speed internet to citizens and businesses modernisation of critical infrastructures 
with new ICT components that can communicate with the internet and promotion of 
research and innovation to ensure that innovative ideas can be turned into products 
and services that create growth and jobs and, ultimately, drive competitiveness. 
Businesses and governments embrace the efficiency savings that ICT presents and 
are accelerating the pace and mechanisms by which transactions and services are 
conducted over the internet. Businesses are using just-in-time manufacturing and 
retail distribution, and essential services like electricity, water, and fuel supply are 
increasingly being managed over the internet. ICT is the platform for innovation, 
prosperity and advancing a nation’s economic and national security interests.
The success of a nation’s ability to leverage ICT to achieve the desired economic 
stimulus and social benefits should depend on its use of the different market 
levers to assure the confidentiality, integrity and availability, and the security of 
networks and information systems that are central to the economy and society. The 
most important issue, however, remains, simply put, cost – it supersedes all other 
concerns, including those of security. This is certainly short-sighted: the advances 
of ICT can be more than off-set through ICT-amplified disasters. The security of the 
ICT hardware supply chain, for example, is a well-known issue but an issue where 
there are seemingly no simple and, most importantly, no cheap solutions.132
Despite increasing awareness of the associated risks, consumers and large 
businesses do not take advantage of available technology and processes to secure 
their systems, nor do they take protective measures to blunt the evolving threat. 
This general lack of investment puts firms and consumers at greater risk, leading to 
economic loss at the individual and aggregate level and thus poses direct a threat 
to national security.133 Three issues are central to the national security debate: how 
does the government assure the availability of essential services; provide for the 
protection of intellectual property; and maintain citizen confidence (and safety) 
when participating in the internet economy? Nations are struggling with finding 
the appropriate mix of policy interventions and market levers to boost the impacts 
of ICT. Connectivity among individuals, businesses and markets demand more 
robust security to reduce consumer risk and enable organisations to offer better 
service and increased capabilities online. Policy intervention (both regulatory and 
132 One programme intended to provide ‘trusted’ microchips for sensitive US ICT systems is the ‘Trusted 
Foundry Program’ (Catherine Ortiz, ‘DOD Trusted Foundry Program: Ensuring ‘Trust‘ for National 
Security & Defense Systems,’ in NDIA Systems Engineering Division Meeting (Arlington, VA: Trusted 
Foundry Program, 2012).).
133 US Department of Commerce, Cybersecurity, Innovation, and the Internet Economy (Green Paper), 
(Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, 2011), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/Cybersecurity_Green-Paper_
FinalVersion.pdf.
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incentives based) must harness the capabilities and responsibilities of the private 
sector to achieve a prudent level of security without hindering productivity, trade 
or economic growth.
1.5.2. Infrastructure Modernisation vs. Critical 
Infrastructure Protection
A key tension that stems from the economic vs. national security debate is the 
tension between the forces that are driving infrastructure modernisation 
(economic stimulus) vis-à-vis the forces that are demanding critical infrastructure 
protection.134 These infrastructures are being modernised, harnessing affordable 
access to broadband applications and services, and inexpensive ICT devices. As 
such, they increasingly comprise a heterogeneous composite of hardware and 
software products that, for the most part, combine unverified hardware and 
software that is manufactured by a heterogeneous global industry using global 
distribution channels.
Businesses are capturing the ICT dividend; gaining efficiency and productivity 
but perhaps at the expense of basic security. Owners and operators of these 
infrastructures (e.g., water, finance, communications, transportation and energy 
installations and networks) are first and foremost worried about providing returns 
for shareholders, whereas a government’s concern is with overall public security and 
safety.135 Governments recognise that a disruption in one infrastructure can easily 
propagate into other infrastructures and that they are responsible for protecting 
the nation from catastrophic damage. Perhaps this is why, ‘critical infrastructure 
services are regarded by some governments as national security related services.’136
The short-term economic gains of adopting new technologies and transforming the 
cyber infrastructure must be balanced against the medium and longer-term losses 
stemming from failing to adequately secure these systems and infrastructures.137 
While there a number of examples of this, the current discussions around 
modernising the electric power sector to internet-facing ‘smart grids’ is emblematic: 
134 ‘Critical infrastructures are those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services 
and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security 
or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of governments’ (See European Union, 
‘Critical infrastructure protection,’ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_
security/fight_against_terrorism/l33259_en.htm.).
135 Peter Sommer and Ian Brown, Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk, (Paris: OECD, 2011), http://www.
oecd.org/sti/futures/globalprospects/46889922.pdf.
136 ISO/IEC 27032:2012, ‘Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for cybersecurity,’ 11.
137 Jack Goldsmith and Melissa Hathaway, ‘The cybersecurity changes we need,’ The Washington Post, 29 
May 2010.
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while the industry would reap great productivity gains, there are a number of 
serious unsolved security concerns. For example, ‘smart meters with designated 
public IP addresses may be susceptible to denial of service attacks which could 
result in loss of communication between the utility and the meters and therefore 
deny power to homes and businesses.’138 Thus, a potential ‘modernisation’ agenda 
is brought into direct conflict with a security agenda.
Deploying appropriate security measures to manage risk to critical systems and 
assets is costly. The question is: what are the most appropriate and effective security 
measures to manage risk to critical systems and assets and who pays for it? Owners 
and operators of these infrastructures have to play an active role in defining the 
standards that must be implemented to meet the government’s mandate in assuring 
essential services. Industry also may be asked to make security investments that 
go beyond what is required to meet compliance and regulatory regimes. The 
policy intervention that a government uses to meet the needs of the nation must 
be carefully balanced to heighten cyber security without creating barriers to 
innovation, economic growth, and the free flow of information.
1.5.3. Private Sector vs. Public Sector
A critical feature of modern NCS is the role of the private sector. It is responsible 
for the research, design, development and manufacturing of the vast majority of 
software and hardware used in ICT. It has, in effect, become ‘the’ service provider; 
the steward of the internet that plans and manages resources, provides reliable 
connectivity, and ensures delivery for traffic and services.
Critical infrastructures and industries are increasingly the primary target of cyber 
crime, cyber espionage, and, most recently, serious cyber attack. Their electronic 
defences have been punctured and the potential costs of these activities are 
considerable. For example, the theft of intellectual property (which includes cyber 
espionage activity) is said to have cost the UK economy up to £9.2 billion in 2010.139 
Some adversaries have ambition to destroy or, perhaps worse, deliberately insert 
erroneous data to render systems inoperable and information unusable. The costs of 
these activities against the critical infrastructure are difficult to estimate, however, 
one industry report claimed that in the US ‘the reported costs of downtime due 
138 Melissa Hathaway, ‘Power Hackers: The U.S. Smart Grid Is Shaping Up to Be Dangerously Insecure,’ 
Scientific American, 5 October 2010, 16.
139 Detica, The Cost of Cyber Crime. A Detica Report in Partnership with the Office of Cyber Security 
and Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office, (London: UK Cabinet Office, 2011), http://www.
cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/the-cost-of-cyber-crime-full-report.pdf.
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to cyber attacks exceed $6 million a day’.140 In April 2009, the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) issued a public notice that warned that the 
electrical grid is not adequately protected from cyber attack: ‘facilities, systems, and 
equipment which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable, would 
affect the reliability or operability of the Bulk Electric System.’141 Some observers 
have warned that a serious cyber attack on the US electrical grid could cause ‘over 
$6 billion in damages,’142 and the Commander of US Cyber Command said that, 
between 2009 and 2011, attacks on US critical infrastructures had ‘risen 20-fold.’143
Governments have a clear interest in assisting the private sector in protecting the 
nation’s essential services, wealth and growth potential (e.g., intellectual property 
protection) from these activities, but the ways and means of this assistance 
is fiercely debated. For example, some governments are choosing to regulate 
critical infrastructure providers by imposing minimum standards for technology 
deployment, internal security controls, and disaster recovery and business 
continuity plans. Whereas other government intervention options may include the 
provision of tax incentives, stimulus grants, low-cost or no-cost loans, government 
subsidies, insurance, and even liability protection. These incentives are meant to 
encourage industry participation in meeting the desired infrastructure objectives 
– to be both secure and resilient.
Either one of these options usually is supported by information exchanges, sometimes 
also referred to as the private-public partnership, that draw on combining the best 
of both party’s understanding of the environment to support operational cyber 
security. For example, in some cases this includes pooling knowledge of tactics, 
techniques and procedures used to probe and successfully breach corporate and 
government networks.144 Other information exchanges share counter-measure 
technologies and solutions to deny or investigate the cyber perpetrator.145 Some 
governments even offer to help protect their critical infrastructure directly, by 
deploying sensors in the networks to (supposedly) detect the most advanced 
140 Stewart Baker, Shaun Waterman, and George Ivanov, In the Crossfire. Critical Infrastructure in the Age 
of Cyber War, (Santa Clara, CA: McAfee, 2010), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-in-
crossfire-critical-infrastructure-cyber-war.pdf.
141 Michael Assante, Critical Cyber Asset Identification [Letter to Industry Stakeholders], (Princeton, NJ: 
NERC, 2009), http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/News/CIP-002-Identification-Letter-040709.
pdf.
142 John O. Brennan, ‘Time to protect against dangers of cyberattack,’ The Washington Post, 16 April 2012.
143 Jasmin Melvin, ‘White House lobbies for cybersecurity bill amid worries it may stall,’ Reuters, 1 August 
2012.
144 See Critical Infrastructure Protection Initiative (CPNI): http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about.
145 INTERPOL, ‘INTERPOL and ICANN advance cooperation on Internet security after historic first 
meeting,’ Media Release, 23 May 2011.
39 Preliminary Considerations: On National Cyber Security
threats.146 These can be accompanied by encouraging the developments of voluntary 
codes of conduct, creating repositories of best practices, and encouraging private-
sector initiatives to regularly test their systems’ security posture and practice their 
recovery processes and procedures. Each of these initiatives helps build trust and 
understanding among and within the partnership and, perhaps more importantly, 
begins to promote education and awareness-raising across the nation.
While it remains unclear to what extent these measures actually help protect 
private business and the nation’s networks, an equally contentious debate is being 
waged around the governmental approach to intervention in the private sector: 
either seeking voluntary cooperation or ‘mandated’ (i.e., prescribed by law or 
regulation). Understandably this involvement of the state in private affairs is a deeply 
ideological question in many nations. According to one 2009 study on European 
CIIP programmes,147 of 16 EU Member States examined, around half favoured 
more voluntary than mandatory principles in their programmes, approximately six 
balanced voluntary and legal measures, and only two Member States seemed to 
largely or completely dependent on regulation. It is however very likely that this 
number has changed, given the recent European trend for applying legislation to 
the issue.
Most nations, however, agree that cyber security is a shared responsibility. The 
Director of the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) recently 
argued that it is this ‘holistic approach to cyber security that makes UK networks 
intrinsically resilient in the face of cyber threats.’148 He went on to explain that this 
enhanced security posture would lead to a more competitive, economic posture for 
the nation.
1.5.4. Data Protection vs. Information Sharing
Another barrier to realising the full economic benefits of the internet economy 
involves the natural conflict between citizens’ expectations and government policy 
for data protection and preserving privacy vis-à-vis the need to share information 
across boundaries and borders (e.g., government to industry, government to 
government, industry to industry) with the intent to enhance security. Enterprises 
of all kinds rely on the willingness of consumers and business partners to entrust 
them with private information. These constituents, in turn, expect that this 
information will stay both private and secure. Citizens expect protection from 
146 Warwick Ashford, ‘BT extends cyber security agreement with MoD,’ ComputerWeekly.com, 4 July 
2012.
147 Booz & Company, Comparison and Aggregation of National Approaches (JLS/2008/D1/019 – WP 4)
(2009). 28.
148 BBC, ‘UK infrastructure faces cyber threat, says GCHQ chief,’ BBC News, 12 October 2010.
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intrusions by both private and governmental actors. In 1980, the OECD issued a 
‘Recommendation Concerning and Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.’149 The OECD guidelines influenced 
international agreements, national laws and self-regulatory policies.
This document sparked discussion around the world and, over the next three 
decades, different approaches to privacy policy and regulation emerged for reasons 
ranging from enhancing national security to negatively impacting economic 
growth. As one industry expert noted, ‘providing seamless privacy protection for 
data as it flows through the global internet requires a careful reconsideration of the 
business community’s interest in promoting commerce, the government’s interests 
in fostering economic growth and protecting its citizens, and the interest of 
individuals in protecting themselves from intrusive overreach by government and 
the private sector.’150 Today, many governments have established privacy rights for 
individuals, developed data protection frameworks and mandated privacy policies 
to preserve this notion of confidentiality.
Yet, countering crime, espionage, and other illicit activities in cyberspace demands 
timely exchange of warnings and follow up information among and between 
private and public entities, often exchanging sensitive data that may fall within the 
remit of these privacy and data protection laws. A major example of this dichotomy 
could be seen in Europe, where the ‘European Data Retention Directive’ (EDRD)151 
was in some ways the one of the most controversial pieces of EU legislation ever 
passed, and indeed is still being resisted by some EU Member States. Computer 
incident response centres and industry information security specialists argue that 
they need an information sharing mechanism that swiftly delivers alerts regarding 
tactics, techniques, and procedures used to probe and successfully breach victim 
networks. For some countries, this falls within the private-public partnership 
cooperation models where industry and government share the responsibility 
for security and resilience objectives. For example, the United States, the United 
Kingdom and other governments are providing actionable information and analysis 
regarding current threats to their industry. While not robust, these initiatives are 
trying to establish bi-directional information sharing architectures to accelerate 
better understanding or situation awareness about how industry or the nation 
overall is being targeted, what information is being lost, and the methods they 
149 OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Paris: 
OECD, 1980).
150 CDT, ‘Chapter Three: Existing Privacy Protections,’ ed. CDT, CDT’s Guide to Online Privacy (Washington, 
DC: CDT, 2009), https://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide.
151 The EDRD was adopted in 2006 and requires, among other things, that all ISPs keep their customer 
logs six months to two years to support criminal prosecution. 
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(industry and government) can use to defend their information assets, and respond 
to, and recover from significant incidents.
National laws may be insufficient, on their own, to provide citizens with privacy 
protections across borders while at the same time allowing for the timely exchange 
of threat information. This inherent tension lies at the heart of the cyber security 
debate.
1.5.5. Freedom of Expression vs. Political Stability
Recent news reports have illustrated how ICT and innovative use thereof can 
enhance or constrain the power of politicians and the general public. For some, 
ICT allows for widespread participation by citizens in day-to-day policy decisions. 
For example, in January 2012, US politicians faced widespread outrage regarding 
the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), a bill that was introduced and debated before 
Congress.152 Opponents to the bill stated that the proposed legislation threatened 
free speech and enabled law enforcement to block access to the internet due to 
copyright infringing (anti-piracy) content posted on web pages or blogs. On January 
18, 2012, Wikipedia, Reddit, TwitPic and an estimated 7,000 other smaller websites 
coordinated a service blackout to raise awareness. The bill was quickly postponed 
for consideration due to this public pressure. In August 2011, during the England 
riots, some rioters used Blackberry Messenger to organise their activities and 
others utilised Twitter and Facebook to coordinate clean-up operations.153 British 
officials used facial recognition software with social networks like Facebook to 
allow citizens to report rioters to authorities. In addition, social networking helped 
identify suspects and apprehend them for criminal damage, burglary, and violent 
disorder. A wider ‘crackdown’ on social media was narrowly avoided.154
ICT innovations also raise privacy concerns because governments and corporations 
can use ‘digital surveillance technologies, such as networked webcams, location 
tracking, digital identification (ID) devices, data mining and analyses of 
communication traffic and search engine queries’ to create digital dossiers of our 
citizens.155 Activist groups such as Anonymous, LulzSec and WikiLeaks, expose 
victim’s data to embarrass or achieve other objectives. However, the United States 
continues to push for equal access to knowledge and ideas across the digital 
152 Ned Potter, ‘Wikipedia Blackout,’ SOPA and PIPA Explained,’ ABC News, 17 January 2012.
153 BBC, ‘England riots: Twitter and Facebook users plan clean-up,’ BBC News, 9 August 2011.
154 See, for instance, Peter Apps, ‘Analysis: UK social media controls point to wider ’info war’,’ Reuters, 18 
August 2011.
155 Walter S. Baer et al., Machiavelli Confronts 21st Century Digital Technology: Democracy in a Network 
Society (Working Paper), (Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1521222. 5.
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frontiers of the 21st century: ‘This freedom is no longer defined solely by whether 
citizens can go into the town square and criticise their government without fear of 
retribution. Blogs, e-mail, social networks and text messages have opened up new 
forums for exchanging ideas – and created new targets for censorship.’156
New technologies are being used to change the outcomes in the struggle for freedom 
and progress. The internet can be co-opted as a tool to target and silence citizens 
and it can be used to deny access to and use of key applications. For example, 
in early April 2012, the Iranian minister for Information and Communications 
Technology announced that Iran will field a national Intranet and begin blocking 
services like Google, Gmail, Google Plus, Yahoo and Hotmail, in line with Iran’s plan 
for a ‘clean internet.’ These ‘Western’ services will be replaced with government 
internet services like Iran Mail and Iran Search Engine.157
In addition, during the early days of the social uprising that ultimately lead to the 
ousting of President Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian telecommunications authority 
received an order from the security services to shutdown internet access. 88% 
of Egyptians lost access to the internet during this episode.158 Other states in the 
region (e.g., Libya and Syria) implemented similar measures to try to maintain social 
stability as the ‘Arab Spring’ continued. While the acts of authoritarian regimes 
fighting for their political lives may seem extreme to many in the Western world, 
what these episodes demonstrate is that the very interconnectedness that people 
around the globe enjoy because of improvements in ICT can be swiftly denied, and 
that freedom of communication and political freedom are clearly linked.
1.6. CONCLUSION
Addressing a nation’s cyber security needs is no easy task. Indeed, it is not even 
always apparent what those needs exactly are, or what protecting (or not protecting) 
a nation’s cyber environment actually entails. Quite often there are different and 
competing considerations within each nation’s approach. Yet each nation is faced 
with a steadily increasing level of cyber threat, and thus requires the nation’s 
leadership to recognise the strategic problem and set forth goals and strategies 
to address it. In this section we have defined NCS as ‘the focused application of 
specific governmental levers (which includes both incentives and regulation) and 
information assurance principles to public, private, and relevant international 
156 Hillary R. Clinton, ‘Internet Freedom [Speech at Newseum in Washington, DC],’ Foreign Policy, 21 
January 2010.
157 Amrutha Gayathri, ‘Iran To Shut Down Internet Permanently; ‘Clean’ National Intranet In Pipeline,’ 
International Business Times, 9 April 2012.
158 Christopher Williams, ‘How Egypt shut down the internet,’ The Telegraph, 28 January 2011.
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ICT systems, and their associated content, where these systems directly pertain 
to national security.’ As nations and intergovernmental organisations set about 
developing and implementing measures to establish NCS strategies, they must 
balance the economic and social importance of free flow of information to the 
security needs of government, industry, and citizens. The conceptual prism set 
forth in this section is designed to assist in this development and debate.
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2. POLITICAL AIMS & POLICY METHODS
Gustav Lindstrom, Eric Luiijf
Section 2: Principal Findings
• There is growing convergence across national security strategies (NSS) 
with respect to identified threats and challenges (e.g., proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state failure, etc.).
• Most NSS include non-traditional threats, including a cyber security 
dimension. The cyber dimension is frequently recognised as cross-
cutting a variety of critical infrastructure sectors and other sectors 
important to society (e.g., energy security). 
• There are suggestions that political will (and understanding) is still 
limited when it comes to tackling cyber security risk factors. 
• National cyber security strategies (NCSS) are used to provide guidance 
to policy-makers and other stakeholders regarding cyber security 
policy priorities and potential resource allocations. They can also form 
an important part of a nation’s declaratory policy.
• Among the principal categories subject to cyber threats as identified 
in existing NCSS are critical infrastructures, economic prosperity, 
national security, and societal well-being.
• An examination of 19 NCSS suggests there are diverging understandings 
of cyberspace. Some equate it closely to the internet while others 
embrace a broader definition.
• Less than half of the NCSS examined define terms like ‘cyber security’.
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Concepts of national and international security have changed considerably since 
the end of the Cold War. In particular, there has been a noticeable shift from the 
concept of combating specific threats to reducing and mitigating risk factors to 
society as a whole. As noted by NATO in its 1991 Strategic Concept:
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‘The primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and 
territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. But this role must 
take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and 
global threat has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks.’159
Starting in the mid-1990s, the notion of ‘Comprehensive Security’ (originally put 
forward by the OSCE160 in 1990) became more prominent. This concept facilitated a 
broader and deeper interpretation of security needs and requirements, and helped 
inform the idea of ‘enhanced’ or ‘expanded security’ that identified security policy 
dimensions in other domains such as food, health and the environment.161 The 
recognition that security was fundamentally more than the territorial integrity of 
the state led to an even more radical shift. The Human Security concept (developed 
mostly under the aegis of the UN)162 directly questioned the ‘state-centric’ approach 
to security, and put the needs of the individual first. The rise of Human Security 
as a concept had a direct influence on the more ‘state-centric’ approaches of 
Comprehensive or Expanded Security as well.163 On the one hand it helped launch 
the notion of ‘individual’ or ‘societal’ needs, and how national security could be re-
conceptualised as being primarily orientated to help meet the satisfaction of these 
needs through variously defined ‘services’. On the other hand, it was increasingly 
recognised that threats and risks to these societal needs were not easily categorised 
as being primarily an ‘internal’ or ‘external’ security issue.
The need to create a more unified approach to meet a variety of security challenges, 
coupled with the need to do so with limited resources, was a principal driver for the 
introduction of national security strategies in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.
2.1.1. Aims of National Security Strategies
The formulation of national security strategies (NSS) is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Presently, a majority of countries possessing a national security 
strategy can trace their initial security strategy to the late 1990s or early 2000s. 
In the United States, one of the earliest developers of a NSS, initial concepts and 
159 NATO, The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (London: NATO, 1991).
160 OSCE, The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security. An Overview of Major 
Milestones (SEC/CPC/OS/167/09) (Vienna: OSCE, 2009).
161 For a discussion on the development of various security concepts in Europe and the Mediterranean Area, 
as well as the role of NATO, see: Hans G. Brauch et al., Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: 
Conceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts(Berlin et al.: Springer Verlag, 2003).
162 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994. New Dimensions of Human Security, (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994.
163 For a discussion on the development of expanded security and Comprehensive Security concepts 
during the early 1990s, see Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security 
Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 136-37.
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policy statements were already formulated in the late 1940s.164 A facilitating factor 
was the signing of the 1947 National Security Act which, among others, set up the 
National Security Council. In 1986, through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act, the US made the formulation of a NSS a requirement.
Outside of the United States, the introduction of NSS has been a fairly recent 
development. Establishing a NSS has substantial appeal because it encourages 
policy-makers to identify strategic objectives (‘ends’), to pinpoint the resources 
available to reach those objectives (‘means’), and to provide a guide on how such 
resources are to be applied to reach stated objectives (‘ways’). Ideally, a NSS contains 
strategic objectives that are consistent with national values and interests. As an 
overarching strategic document, a NSS often includes political, internal security, 
foreign policy, defence structures and economic dimensions.
A well-formulated NSS should do at least three things. Firstly, it should enable 
government departments and ministries to translate a government’s national 
security vision into coherent and implementable policies. It should also facilitate 
the production of ‘sub-strategies’ across different domain areas that are consistent 
with the overarching NSS (e.g., a strategy for combating terrorism). Since most NSS 
highlight resources needed to achieve national security objectives, they should 
likewise provide guidance on R&D in new security capabilities, future procurements, 
investments, and budget decisions. Ultimately, a NSS is the ‘peak’ national security 
document for a government, sited at the apex of a whole set of different policy 
documents that – ultimately – should refer back and get their guidance from the 
NSS.165
Secondly, a NSS should clarify how the state might act in international affairs – 
enabling a more proactive rather than reactive foreign policy. To illustrate, a NSS 
could be helpful in determining what elements of national power (e.g., diplomatic, 
information, military, economic) are most likely to be employed to reach specific 
international objectives. Besides informing international policy making, a NSS 
should serve to communicate strategic thinking to other states and the international 
community at large.
164 See, for instance, US National Security Council, NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for 
National Security (Washington, DC: FAS, 1950). This document was declassified in 1975. As a de facto 
NSS, NSC 68 shaped US foreign policy substantially during the Cold War era.
165 Although the hierarchies can be relatively difficult to establish, one example of such a document 
progression would be from the UK: The UK Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom. Security in an interdependent world. informed the UK Cabinet Office, Cyber Security Strategy 
of the United Kingdom. Safety, security and resilience in cyber space., which, in turn, provided the 
frame for the UK Home Office, Cyber Crime Strategy (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010).
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Thirdly, a NSS should not exist in a strategic vacuum. On the contrary, it should 
be linked to existing national and international strategies to the extent that it is 
feasible to encourage a harmonised set of policies that are shared with likeminded 
partners. The linking of a NSS with other strategies may also be helpful to promote 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration. At the international level, it may 
also serve to facilitate a Whole of System approach (examined in greater detail in 
Section 3). 
A NSS usually contains both explicit and implicit elements. Most current documents 
tend to be fairly explicit with respect to perceived threats and challenges, even if the 
understanding of the term ‘national security’ may differ from country to country or 
evolve over time. While strategies typically outline threats and challenges, they may 
be less forthcoming on which threats are of greatest concern. Likewise, strategies 
are usually less explicit when it comes to how the government may address identified 
threats and challenges, including resources that may be necessary or questions 
about which departments should take the lead in response.166 This is not altogether 
surprising since a NSS usually serves to provide strategic guidance to government 
ministries and agencies. Ambiguity concerning policy responses may also be useful 
to discourage potential adversaries from engaging in certain behaviours or actions.
2.1.2. Trends in National Security Strategy Formulation
An examination of current national security strategies suggests four trends. First, 
there seems to be a growing convergence among policy-makers with respect to the 
key threats and challenges facing states. As shown in Table 4, examples of oft-cited 
threats and challenges include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
terrorism, state failure, and organised crime, besides, of course, cyber security 
threats. 
There may be several explanations for this trend. For example, convergence with 
respect to threats and challenges across countries’ NSS may arise when policy-
makers are formulating a NSS to analyse existing strategies and use elements of 
those strategies as a basis for their own strategic reflection. Another factor may be 
the global impact of events such as terrorist attacks (the 9/11 attacks in New York 
and Washington D.C., the Madrid train bombings in March 2004, and the London 
transport attacks in July 2007, etc.) that have led policy-makers to converge on a 
shared set of security threats and challenges.
166 Catherine Dale, National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations 
for Congress, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/106170.pdf.
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Table 4:   Comparison of Threats and Vulnerabilities: Select NATO Member States 









‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (WMD); terrorism; ballistic mis-
sile proliferation; cyber attacks; espionage; criminal networks; 





International terrorism; proliferation and military build-up; re-
gional conflicts; illegal arms trade; fragile statehood; transporta-






Terrorism; proliferation of WMD; unstable regions/failed states; 
illegal migration; economic instability; challenges to informa-
tion society; global natural, man-made and medical sources of 





Breaches of international peace and security; ‘chemical, biologi-
cal, radiological, and nuclear’ (CBRN); terrorism; international 
organised crime; social vulnerability; digital lack of security; 
economic lack of security; climate change and natural disasters; 





Organised international terrorism; organised international 
crime; energy security; illegal migration; weakened transatlantic 
links; frozen and regional conflicts; weak levels of integration 
of economic life and financial markets; environmental threats; 






Armed conflicts; terrorism; organised crime; financial and eco-
nomic insecurity; energy vulnerability; proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction; cyber threats; uncontrolled migratory 







International terrorism; hostile attacks upon UK cyberspace; 
major accident or natural hazards; an attack on the UK or its 
overseas territories; risk of major instability; organised crime; 
severe disruption to satellite communications; disruption to oil 
or gas supplies; short to medium term disruption to interna-






WMD; space and cyberspace vulnerabilities; energy depen-
dence; climate change; pandemic disease; failing states; global 
criminal networks
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A related development explicit in some NSS (e.g., the United States and the United 
Kingdom) is the recognition that a diverse set of threats and challenges requires an 
integrated all-hazards risk management approach.167 Taking a broader perspective, 
policy-makers and analysts embracing this concept are more inclined to examine 
national vulnerabilities, gauge the possible consequences of a threat, and seek 
innovative ways to protect society as a whole. Reinforcing the trend towards risk 
management is the realisation that national means are not unlimited, requiring a 
more careful analysis of where and how finite means should be employed.
The shift to a national risk management paradigm is visible in those NSS that 
highlight the need to enhance national resilience or underscore the importance of 
incorporating an ‘all-hazards’ approach. While the overarching goal of achieving 
comprehensive security remains (and some might argue is promoted), this 
development acknowledges that achieving a 100% protection level is neither feasible 
not realistic. Thus the need to identify new defensive and mitigating measures to 
provide security.
A second trend, related to the first point, is that national security strategies are 
identifying ‘new’ threats and challenges. As noted earlier, a broader understanding 
of the term ‘security’ is likely contributing to this trend.168 Table 4 provides some 
illustrations such as climate change, energy supply, health risk, and cyber security. 
The inclusion of these challenges is often accompanied by the recognition of their 
complexity and far-reaching implications. The case of climate change, for instance, 
is considered a long-term challenge whose impact may not be felt for several 
decades. However, addressing it requires action today, preferably in a collective 
manner at the international level. Complicating these efforts is the perception that 
the effects of climate change may be more severe on some parts of the world than 
in others, leading to more disparate cooperation. With respect to cyber security, 
it is frequently included in new NSS as a ‘new’ threat. Its inclusion or perceived 
importance, however, does not necessarily translate to increased awareness at the 
senior policy level of the scope of the challenge. While there is no authoritative 
international survey of government decision-makers and senior policy-makers with 
respect to their perception of the cyber security challenge, there are suggestions 
that political will is still limited when it comes to tackling cyber security risk factors. 
For example, while policy-makers agree that international cooperation is necessary 
167 According to the Department of Homeland Security Risk Lexicon, defined as the ‘incorporation and 
coordination of strategy, capability, and governance to enable risk-informed decision making (see 
US Department of Homeland Security, DHS Risk Lexicon, (Washington, DC: Risk Steering Committee, 
2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_risk_lexicon.pdf. 19.).
168 A school of academic thought (the Copenhagen School) has forwarded the concept of ‘securitisation’ to 
reflect the tendency of a broader understanding of the concept of security. For more, see Barry Buzan, 
Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework For Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 1998).
50Introduction
to mitigate cyber challenges, a 2010 survey of policy-makers, specialists, business 
executives, community leaders and journalists carried out by the EastWest Institute 
indicates that little is being done: ‘Track 1 diplomacy on worldwide cybersecurity 
cooperation is not working well on the tactical level and practically non-existent on 
the strategic level.’169 Underscoring the importance of political will, 36% of those 
surveyed saw political/policy as the key ingredient to address principal cyber 
challenges, followed by 27% identifying technical solutions, 16% listing business 
and legal measures (for each), with the remaining 5% singling out legal means.170
It is important to note that decision-makers’ and policy-makers’ perceptions can 
change quickly. This was most visible in the aftermath of the distributed denial 
of service (DDoS) attacks on Estonia in April/May 2007, after which cyber 
security issues increasingly entered the political agenda. The release of national 
cyber security strategies (many of which came out in 2009-2011) also point in 
the direction of a greater acknowledgement of the relevance of cyber security. A 
2012 report by McAfee and the Brussels based Security & Defence Agenda171 that 
surveyed policy-makers in several countries found that 45% of respondents believe 
cyber security is as important as border security.172
A third trend with respect to the formulation of a NSS is a greater awareness of the 
link between internal and external security. In the aftermath of 9/11 and coupled 
with the identification of new threats such as pandemics, it became increasingly 
evident that internal and external security should be considered more in tandem, 
especially as risk factors and challenges from the outside do not necessarily stop 
at external borders. The reverse may be true as well. For example, a set of cartoons 
in a local newspaper in Denmark led, over time, to major internal security events in 
several other nations external to Denmark. It included, for instance, arson attacks 
on a Danish embassy and people rioting in other nations.
A stronger, more dynamic link between internal and external security in existing 
NSS has wide-ranging implications for policy-makers. Among others, it highlights 
the need for greater cooperation across government departments, especially 
those that deal with internal security (interior and justice) and those that handle 
external security (foreign affairs and defence). It also requires policy-makers to 
169 EastWest Institute, International Pathways to Cybersecurity. Report of Consultation, (Brussels: 
EastWest Institute, 2010), http://www.ewi.info/system/files/CyberSummaryReport.pdf. 1.
170 Ibid., 3.
171 Brigid Grauman, Cyber-security: The vexed question of global rules. An independent report on cyber-
preparedness around the world, (Brussels: Geert Cami, 2012), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/
reports/rp-sda-cyber-security.pdf.
172 Specifically, the survey included in-depth interviews with 80 policy-makers, cyber security experts 
in government, business and academia in 27 countries. Also surveyed were 250 ‘world leaders’ in 35 
countries. For more information, see ibid.
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think carefully about how resources might be allocated to satisfy internal and 
external security objectives. For some, a stronger connection between internal and 
external security may translate into a more active foreign policy (‘best defence is 
a good offence’). Others may perceive the need to strengthen internal security and 
resilience to better withstand external security challenges. For all these reasons, 
the establishment of a NSS is increasingly becoming an interagency project that 
can provide a holistic vision for national security.
A fourth point is that, while most NSS traditionally include a security, political and 
economic dimension, present-day NSS go a step further by clearly recognising the 
need to combine traditional security policies, development cooperation policies, 
and economic tools at large to promote security and development. The combination 
of civilian and military assets is also encompassed in new concepts such as civil-
military coordination (CMCO) and the ‘Comprehensive Approach’.173
This trend underscores the dynamic and changing nature of NSS. It also points to 
a greater recognition that a combination of different tools is required to address 
21st century threats and challenges. To a certain degree, this development is not 
surprising given the inclusion of both traditional and non-traditional security 
threats in NSS. Over time, capturing the complexity of the international security 
landscape is likely to strengthen the role of having a NSS as a strategic platform to 
derive follow on strategies and policies.
2.1.3. Integrating Cyber Security in National Security 
Strategies
As noted in Section 1, several NSS include a cyber security dimension. The references 
made to the cyber domain can take several forms. A majority of the NSS identify 
cyber threats as a new security challenge that policy-makers should be aware of. 
Many also highlight that the cyber domain can impact other sectors or domains, 
e.g., energy, health and environment. As a cross-sector issue, it is important to 
discern both the enabling characteristics of cyber across different domains as well 
as potential risk factors.
Some strategies go a step further by identifying a particular cyber security 
dimension that is of concern. An example that is visible in some strategies is the 
need to protect ‘critical infrastructures’ (CI) – i.e., those utilities and services that 
are necessary to maintain societal needs, such as electric power, communications, 
but also banking. Countries such as France and the UK integrate a cyber dimension 
173 Some analysts also like to include concepts such as ‘Civil-Military Cooperation’ (CIMIC) which focuses 
on how deployed military elements best interact with civilian counterparts to achieve desired effects.
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more extensively into their overall security planning, for example by providing 
details on major cyber attacks and their application for espionage (France)174 as 
well as the benefits cyberspace offers to industry, government and the general 
population (UK).175 The UK NSS also notes that cyber attacks are considered among 
the four high priority risk factors over the next five years. In the case of the Spanish 
NSS, an entire section is dedicated to cyber threats which also describe specific 
lines of action that can be considered in response to a cyber threat.176
As noted earlier, in the aftermath of the distributed denial of service attack on 
Estonia in April 2007, the cyber dimension took on a more prominent role. The 
media coverage of specific supposed state-sponsored malicious software (such 
as Stuxnet, Duqu and Flame) and cyber espionage attacks on various nations and 
international organisations is likely to further attune countries to the importance 
of cyber security, especially with respect to critical information infrastructure 
protection (CIIP).177 Looking ahead, the cyber security dimension will increasingly 
be covered in stand-alone NCS strategies.
The overall trend can be summarised as follows: most recent NSS documents 
acknowledge the need to address cyber security, and give this issue the highest 
priority compared with other risks. Sometimes, as in the United States NSS of 2010, 
they will deal with cyber security both as its own discrete element, but also as a 
horizontal issue that crosses a number of other NSS goals.178 In nearly all cases 
there will be subsequent and subordinate documents that deal specifically with 
the threat to national cyber security and, subordinate to that, specific documents 
addressing specific cyber threats, such as within a military or law enforcement 
environment.
174 French Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security, Information systems defence and 
security. France’s strategy.
175 UK Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world.
176 Spanish Government, Spanish Security Strategy. Everyone’s responsibility (Madrid Spanish 
Government, 2011). 60-4.
177 Sometimes abbreviated as CI(I)P. Some countries use CIIP as a clear sub-category to overall CIP; while 
other countries equate CIIP to NCS. 
178 Within the US NSS 2010, one specific goal is mentioned: ‘Secure Cyberspace’. However, ‘cyber’ is 
mentioned at least as often among other NSS goals as within the specific ‘Secure Cyberspace’ goal (see 
White House, National Security Strategy.).
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2.2. THE NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY DIMENSION
2.2.1. Themes in National Cyber Security Strategies
To date, over 20 states have released a national cyber security strategy (NCSS) or 
national information security strategy, many of them unveiling one in 2011.179 With 
respect to NATO members, nearly half have produced a NCSS that details national 
visions, guiding principles, perceptions of the threat, and strategic objectives.180
Table 5:  Examples of National Cyber Security Strategies
Nation Issued Lead Agency English version
Other 
languages
Australia Nov 2009 Attorney-General Cyber Security Strategy181 -
Canada Oct 2009 Public Safety Canada
Canada’s Cyber Security 





Jul 2011 Ministry of Interior
Cyber Security Strategy of the 
Czech Republic for the Period 
2011-2015183
Czech
Estonia Sep 2008 Ministry of Defence Cyber Security Strategy184 Estonian
France Feb 2011
General Secretariat for 
Defence and National 
Security
Information systems defence 
and security. France’s 
Strategy185
French
Australia181 Canada182 Chezh183 Estonia184 France185 
179 Among these are Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Japan, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Spain, Switzerland, Uganda, the United Kingdom and the United States. Countries in the process of 
finalising their NCSS include Austria, Finland and Turkey.
180 For an overview of these see Eric Luiijf, Kim Besseling, and Patrick De Graaf, ‘Nineteen National Cyber 
Security Strategies,’ International Journal of Critical Infrastructures (forthcoming).
181 Australian Attorney-General’s Department, Cyber Security Strategy.
182 Canadian Department for Public Safety, Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy. For a Stronger and More 
Prosperous Canada.
183 Czech Ministry of Interior, Czech Cyber Security Strategy for the Period 2011–2015 (Prague: ENISA, 
2011).
184 Estonian Ministry of Defence, Cyber Security Strategy (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2008).
185 French Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security, Information systems defence and 
security. France’s strategy.
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Federal Ministry of 
the Interior













Information Security Strategy 
for Protecting the Nation188
Japanese
Lithuania Jun 2011
Government of the 
Republic of Lithuania
Programme for the Develop-
ment of Electronic Informa-




Government of the 
Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg
Not available online French190
Netherlands Feb 2011
Ministry of Security 
and Justice
The National Cyber Security 






Ministry of Economic 
Development







Not available online Romanian193
Germany186 India187 Japan188 Lithuania189 Luxembourg190 Netherlands191 Newzealand192 
Romania193
186 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany.
187 Indian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Discussion Draft on National Cyber 
Security Policy (New Delhi: Government of India, 2011).
188 Japanese Information Security Policy Council, Information Security Strategy for Protecting the Nation 
(Tokyo: National Information Security Center, 2010).
189 Lithuanian Government, Resolution NO 796 on the Approval of the Programme for the Development of 
Electronic Information Security (Cyber-Security) for 2011-2019 (Vilnius: Information Technology and 
Communications Department, 2011).
190 Luxembourg Government, Stratégie nationale en matière de cyber sécurité (Luxembourg: Government 
of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2011).
191 Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, ‘The National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS). Strength through 
Cooperation.’
192 New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy (Wellington: 
New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, 2011).
193 Ministry of Communications and Information Society, Strategia de securitate cibernetica a României 
(Bucharest: Ministry of Communications and Information Society, 2011).
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Nation Issued Lead Agency English version
Other 
languages
Slovakia 2008 Ministry of Finance







Department of State 
Security
Notice of Intention to Make 
South African National Cyber-
security Policy195
-




Spain May 2011 Spanish Government





Federal Department of 
Defence, Civil Protec-
tion and Sport
National Strategy for Protec-













Nov 2011 Cabinet Office
The UK Cyber Security Strate-
gy. Protecting and promoting 




Feb 2003 White House
The National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace202 (also 
CNCI, HSPD-7, 60 day 
Review) 
-
Slovakia194 SA195 SK196 Spain197 Swiss198 Swiss2199 Uganda200 UK201 US202
194 Referenced by: http://www.webcastlive.es/4enise/archivos/T14/T14_Daniel_Olejar_
CominiusUniversity.pdf.
195 South Africa Department of Communications, Notice of Intention to Make South African National 
Cybersecurity Policy (Draft approved 11 March 2012) (Pretoria: South Africa Government, 2010).
196 Not available online.
197 Spanish Government, Spanish Security Strategy. Everyone’s responsibility.
198 Publication expected second half of 2012.
199 Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sports, Nationale Strategie zum Schutz der 
Schweiz vor Cyber-Risiken (Bern: Swiss Confederation, 2012).
200 Uganda Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, National Information Security 
Strategy (NISS Final Draft) (Kampala: Uganda Ministry of Information and Communications 
Technology, 2011).
201 UK Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world.
202 White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
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The analysis of 19 NCSS by Luiijf et al. shows that several key themes and visions 
are highlighted across those strategies. Among the most recurrent are:
• Maintaining a secure, resilient, and trusted electronic operating environment,
• Promoting economic and social prosperity/promoting trust and enable 
business and economic growth,
• Overcoming the risk of information and communications technologies, and
• Strengthening the resilience of infrastructures.
The visions are translated into strategic objectives which are broken down further 
into a wide variety of priorities. With respect to the vision of maintaining a secure 
cyberspace, some countries express the need to raise awareness of the cyber risk, 
secure government systems, adopt an appropriate regulatory framework, modernise 
the legal framework, tackle cyber crime, or reinforce critical infrastructures. These 
and related objectives are also thought to contribute to economic prosperity by 
promoting trust and resilience.
There are differences in how states translate their visions into strategic objectives. A 
principal explanatory factor behind this may be countries’ diverging understanding 
of cyberspace. Some countries take a broad view of cyberspace that includes 
infrastructures (such as control systems in critical infrastructures) and others take 
a much narrower view of cyberspace, equating it more closely to the internet. To 
illustrate, the United States is at one end of the spectrum with a broad definition 
of cyberspace, even implicitly acknowledging the importance of social networks.203 
In the Dutch NCSS, cyberspace is likewise defined broadly, including chip cards 
and in-car systems.204 On the other side of the spectrum, countries like Australia, 
Canada, Germany, New Zealand and Spain place an emphasis on the internet and 
internet connected information technologies (additional details are provided in 
Section 2.3.1).
Beyond diverging perceptions of key concepts such as cyberspace, existing NCSS 
tend to have varying views on cyber threats. Among the principal cyber threat 




203 See Section 1.
204 Luiijf, Besseling, and Graaf, ‘Nineteen National Cyber Security Strategies.’
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• Societal well-being,
• Public confidence in information and communication technologies,
• Economic prosperity, and
• Globalisation.
While some of these categories are acknowledged in all or most NCSS (e.g., cyber 
threats to critical infrastructures) some categories – such as threats to globalisation 
or societal well-being – are described explicitly or implicitly in few strategies.205
Existing NCSS also identify the sources of cyber threats. Among the principal 
dimensions identified are cyber threats via large-scale attacks, terrorists, foreign 
nations, espionage, organised crime, or political activism against ICT-based 
services. Some threat categories – such as cyber threats from organised crime – 
are highlighted in most NCSS. Other dimensions, such as threats from activists 
or extremists, figure in a couple of NCSS. The four categories referenced most 
frequently across the examined NCSS were organised crime, cyber threats 
from foreign nations (cyber war), cyber threats associated with terrorists, and 
espionage.206
Overall, roughly half of the NCSS examined demonstrate a direct link with the 
states’ NSS. Most often, this takes the form of a reference to the NSS’ identification 
of cyber as a potential security challenge or an acknowledgement of security 
objectives outlined in the NSS. It is, however, more difficult to gauge the different 
NCSS’ relationship with other strategies and policies of importance. It is expected 
that such linkages become more reinforced over time. Factors that might expedite 
such a process range from refining the definitions of key concepts used in NCSS 
to strengthening the potential for public-private cooperation in the cyber domain.
An issue for future consideration is how existing NCSS can cope with rapidly 
changing threat dynamics. In other words, with no formal review mechanism in 
place, many NCSS may become irrelevant or unable to provide guidance when 
facing a new type of cyber challenge. Only a few countries have released more 
than one NCSS.207 For example in the United States, several NCSS-type documents 
have been released.208 In light of this limitation, it is interesting to note that some 
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Japan, for instance, has released a second version of a NCSS, but it mainly represents a refinement of 
the initial strategy. The UK revised its 2009 NCSS after a political signature change.
208 For a complete overview, see Rita Tehan, Cybersecurity: Authoritative Reports and Resources, 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42507.
pdf.
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countries such as Germany and Japan indicate in their NCSS that there is a risk of a 
mismatch between technology development and security policy.209
2.2.2. Aims and Addressees
Consistent with other sub-strategies developed in support of a NSS, a NCSS aims to 
provide guidance to policy-makers regarding cyber policy priorities and potential 
resource allocations. However, these NCSS can also have other roles as well: they 
can play an active role in shaping the international image of a nation, and indicate 
where it thinks future collaboration would be possible. Within this context, a 
NCSS is a vital document for international partners to discern what the actual 
administrative responsibilities and whom the likely interlocutors are. A NCSS – or, 
indeed, a subordinate document focusing on the international cyber issues210 – is 
a prerequisite to be actively able to engage with a nation’s friends and allies on the 
issue.
In addition, a NCSS can form an important part of a nation’s declaratory policy – 
indicating to potential adversaries where red lines may be drawn before retaliation 
can be expected, and what capabilities exist, or are being developed, to execute 
this type of policy. For instance, the United States has repeatedly warned that it 
would consider a serious cyber attack an ‘act of war’.211 The Russian Information 
Security Doctrine of 2000 makes it clear that ‘an information attack’ is not confined 
to cyber attack, but indeed can mean any kind of severe criticism of the Russian 
government.212
There are also less obvious components of a NCSS that are often intended purely 
for specialist observers. While these often depend on interpretation, they can be 
among the most significant. For example, one recent NCSS implied that a particular 
state had achieved a breakthrough in signal intelligence decryption technology, 
which facilitated real time cyber attribution. Although this statement is open to 
interpretation, if accurate, it would have significant implications for the entire 
nature of inter-state cyber conflict. In a related vein, many NCSS and associated 
documents are used to specify declaratory policy on cyber retaliation.213
209 Ibid.
210 One such example is: White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security, and 
Openness in a Networked World.
211 Most recently in the US DoD Cyber Strategy, commented on in the Wall Street Journal (see Siobhan 
Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, ‘Cyber Combat: Act of War,’ The Wall Street Journal, 30 May 2011.).
212 See, for instance, Alexander Klimburg, ‘Mobilising Cyber Power,’ Survival 53, no. 1 (2011): 41-60.
213 For some further notes on this, see Jason Healey, ‘Bringing a Gun to a Knife Fight: US Declaratory Policy 
and Striking Back in Cyber Conflict,’ Atlantic Council Issue Brief, September 2011.
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With respect to cyber threats, vulnerabilities and measures, existing NCSS target 
a number of stakeholders. Principal among them, in terms of explicit mention in 
different NCSS, are government/national security officials, critical infrastructure 
operators, and citizens. Given the important link between the public and private 
sectors vis-à-vis cyber security, other stakeholders addressed in NCSS tend to be 
large organisations and small- and medium-sized enterprises. Both are mentioned 
explicitly in the NCSS by 11 out of the 19 nations examined by Luiijf et al.214 A 
final stakeholder category, the Internet Service Providers, is acknowledged in one 
third of existing NCSS, perhaps somewhat surprising given their potential role in 
addressing cyber threats and vulnerabilities.
2.3. IMPLEMENTING CYBER SECURITY 
STRATEGIES
2.3.1. The Use of Terms
One of the findings by Luiijf et al.,215 in studying 19 NCSS is that less than half of the 
nations explicitly define terms such as ‘cyber security’ in their NCSS. Some of the 
other nations explain cyber security in a descriptive text. One third of the nations, 
however, discuss cyber security without defining the term at all. The European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) observed the same lack of 
definitions, and presents recommendations to remediate that in the Member States 
of the European Union.216
Early in 2011, the Russian-US bilateral working group of the East West Institute 
(EWI) and Moscow University drafted an international cyber terminology 
framework. They defined cyber security as ‘a property of cyberspace that is an 
ability to resist intentional and unintentional threats and respond and recover’.217 
The term ‘cyber crime’ is defined by only three of 19 NCSS studied by Luiijf et al., 
neither does the Convention on Cybercrime, ratified by many nations, define it.218 It 
would appear that only Romania defines all cyber-related terms in its NCSS.
214 Luiijf, Besseling and Graaf, ‘Nineteen National Cyber Security Strategies.’
215 Ibid.
216 ENISA, National Cyber Security Strategies. Setting the course for national efforts to strengthen security 
in cyberspace, (Heraklion: ENISA, 2012), http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/
national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/cyber-security-strategies-paper/at_download/fullReport. 
12-3.
217 EastWest Institute and Moscow State University, Russia-U.S. Bilateral on Cybersecurity: Critical 
Terminology Foundations, (Brussels and Moscow: EastWest Institute and Moscow State University, 
2011). 31.
218 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185).
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In general, a national strategy may have different objectives: (1) to align the 
Whole of Government, (2) to coherently focus and coordinate public and private 
planning, and to convey the envisioned roles, responsibilities and relationships 
between all stakeholders, and (3) to convey one’s national intent to other nations 
and stakeholders.219 Examples of (3) are power projection and posing the national 
strategy as intent to become the lead nation or global player in the specific domain, 
or in global cyber security in the case of a NCSS.
The lack of properly defined cyber-related terms can lead to a significant level of 
confusion within one’s own country. Moreover, as the cyber threat is global, proper 
definitions assist in understanding the cyber security approach of other nations, 
alliances, and international organisations and vice versa. For that reason, a NCSS 
without a properly defined, and, if possible, internationally harmonised cyber 
terminology framework, fails to meet any of the three objectives. The best approach 
is, therefore, to align one’s national definition to the harmonised understanding of 
other nations.
2.3.2. The Role of Transparency
Depending on the political objective behind the NCSS, the NCSS may be largely 
strategic, or may include a list of operational and even tactical objectives to be 
accomplished.220 To date, many of the strategies that have included a specific 
task listing have assigned a classified status to most of the document – this, for 
instance, was originally the case in the UK and the US examples. As far as relatively 
detailed NCSS are concerned, only the Netherlands’ NCSS provides a fairly detailed, 
unredacted view of the activities proposed. Sometimes specifics are released after 
a short period of time: the US Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 
(CNCI) featured a list of 18 initiatives initially and only 12 of those have been made 
public.221
Transparency within cyber security, however, means more than listing the goals 
of the strategy. In an optimal case it would disclose the process behind a strategy, 
allowing outside observers to take stock of the individual steps involved, and 
potentially remove any doubt about the specifically stated aims within the strategy.
Another form of transparency is to make the NCSS online and available to one’s 
own population and globally by providing an English-language version. As Table 5 
219 Luiijf, Besseling, and Graaf, ‘Nineteen National Cyber Security Strategies,’ 2.
220 Ibid., 15.
221 See White House, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (as codified in NSPD-54/HSPD-
23).
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shows, most nations except Slovakia and South Korea provide an online version of 
their NCSS. Luxembourg and Romania do not provide an English translation.
2.3.3. Addressing Stakeholders
Nations use different structuring, types of wording, and layouts in their NCSS 
depending on the intended audience. Accessibility, therefore, ranges from large 
blocks of text for the purpose of aligning the Whole of Government, to a layout with 
photos and explanatory call out boxes to make the NCSS accessible for the general 
public, SMEs (Small and Medium Size Enterprises) and other businesses. Also, the 
historical, cultural, legal, organisational and political structure of a nation can lend 
to significant differences in working with stakeholders, ranging from a cooperative 
approach, public-private partnership, to mandatory legislation and regulation. 
Therefore, it is not just a simple copy and paste of policies, organisational structures, 
procedures and processes. A transposition to one’s own national frameworks is 
required.222
Internal stakeholders such as critical infrastructure operators are often addressed 
through specific (traditional stovepiped) legislation and regulation mechanisms of 
bodies like the European Union, and specific regulators/regulatory commissions in 
various countries. Most liberal-democratic nations depend upon varying degrees of 
a stick-and-carrot approach where, through public-private partnerships, the private 
sector is allowed to regulate its own security posture as long as the public sector 
perceives there to be a good overall cyber governance structure. If the private 
sector fails to accomplish this on its own, the government steps in and tightens its 
cyber security legislative and regulatory frameworks.
An important factor in encouraging the private sector is the overall level of cyber 
security literacy and awareness. The importance of this issue is explicitly recognised 
by most NCSS. However, NCSS often have difficulty addressing the amorphous 
groups concerned and mostly simply state that organisations and individual citizens 
are responsible for a proper level of cyber security without going into detail. More 
significantly, there is often no particular government stovepipe that is responsible 
for following-up with detailed sub-strategy on this issue. Either the issue is treated 
only within CIP programmes and therefore not communicated to the public at 
large, or it is done on a mass scale, usually missing the more specialised audience 
in the critical infrastructure entirely. Therefore, the coherent spreading of cyber 
security awareness – probably one of the most significant factors influencing a 
222 Marieke Klaver, Eric Luiijf, and Albert Nieuwenhuijs, The RECIPE Project: Good Practices Manual for 
CIP Policies. For Policy Makers in Europe, (Brussels: European Commission, 2011), http://www.tno.nl/
recipereport. 10-1.
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nation’s overall level of cyber security – is often a lost agenda, abandoned between 
governmental stovepipes.
Companies involved in aspects particularly related to national cyber security – in 
particular ICT hardware and software companies – usually play particularly close 
attention to NCSS, sometimes also seeking to be involved in the drafting process 
itself. This can be helpful in appraising policy-makers of the actual technological 
state as seen from an industry perspective, and also serves the purposes of 
adjusting possible budgetary guidelines for major future projects. When the NCSS 
is directly connected to the national CIP programme this can indeed be vital step of 
the process. However, it is notable that very few governments make cyber software 
and hardware manufacturers, as well as ICT service providers, responsible for 
cyber security deficiencies in their products and services. Simultaneously, in 
more advanced nations, the cyber threat emanating from suspect hardware and 
software products (usually referred to as the need for ‘ensuring security to the ICT 
supply chain’) is increasingly becoming the focus of government action. What is 
often missing is a considered understanding of how the global internet hardware 
and software infrastructure, as well as the underlying operating principles such 
as packet routing, directly influences a nation’s NCSS. As the vital components 
(both hardware and software) are often not only outside of the particular country’s 
jurisdiction but (e.g., in the case of software protocols) outside any jurisdiction, 
most NCSS have few perspectives on how to engage on this issue.223
When it comes to communicating a ‘national intent’ to other countries, governments 
are on more familiar ground. Besides the exact language used in a NCSS, as well as 
the individual classification or release requirements that effectively ‘set the scene’, 
governments will of course initiate individual international actions or initiatives that 
underline some of messages communicated in the strategy. Within diplomatic fora, 
the possibilities for multi-tracked diplomacy224 are considerable, and indeed the 
need to engage widely may present a challenge to traditionally-conceived foreign 
ministries or similar. Track 2 and Track 1.5225 discussions are increasingly critical 
in building transparency between nations and increasing mutual understanding. 
They fulfil a real operational function – bringing senior government officials in 
touch not only with other government officials, but with the non-state actors that 
actually build and run most of what is considered cyberspace. Communicating with 
223 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Section 3. 
224 There are numerous definitions associated with the term ‘multi-tracked diplomacy’. However, the most 
common and basic differentiations are between ‘formal’ diplomacy by diplomats (Track 1), ‘informal’ 
diplomacy by academics, experts and others (Track 2), and ‘quasi-formal’ diplomacy by a combination 
of the two actors (Track 1.5).
225 One particular Track 1.5 series of talks between China and the United States has been ongoing since 
2006.
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these international (or transnational) non-state actors is an activity that virtually 
no NCSS has yet managed to accomplish effectively. 
2.4. POLITICAL PITFALLS, FRICTIONS AND 
LESSONS IDENTIFIED
There are a number of political pitfalls and frictions that policy-makers should be 
aware of when formulating a NSS or NCSS. In no particular order, these are:
Adopt a ‘one size fits all’ strategy: when formulating a NSS or NCSS, policy-makers 
may be tempted to consult other countries’ existing strategies. While this may be 
helpful to gauge possible strategy formats and identify national interests, policy-
makers should be cautious not to leverage content that is inconsistent with national 
requirements. To illustrate, transplanting security threats that appear in other 
strategies but are not germane to the country formulating the strategy may do 
more harm than good by diverting national resources. If there is a desire to have 
consistency with the strategies of neighbours and/or allies, policy-makers can 
mitigate the ‘one size fits all’ risk by prioritising perceived threats or identified 
policy responses. The UK, for example, prioritises its perceived security threats, 
identifying international terrorism, cyber attacks, international military crises, and 
major accidents or natural hazards as ‘the four highest priority risks’ over the next 
five years.226
Neglect links with other national / international strategies: to strengthen the 
relevance of a NSS (or NCSS), it should be consistent with existing and forthcoming 
stand-alone sub-strategies, especially those that provide greater detail on how a 
certain threat or challenge will be managed (e.g., a counter-terrorism strategy). Such 
consistency also makes it easier to identify which resources may be necessary to 
achieve the strategic objectives listed in a NSS. As shown in this section, establishing 
links across a NSS and a stand-alone sub-strategy is not always straightforward; 
about half the NCSS examined did not have a direct link with their states’ NSS.
Lack of an update/review mechanism: some countries, such as the United States, 
have laws or other mechanisms in place to review or update existing NSS and other 
documents of a strategic nature. For countries that do not have such mechanisms, 
the formulation of a NSS or NCSS may become a one-time exercise, dependent on 
political will to be updated and remain valid. Thus, such strategies run a substantial 
risk of becoming irrelevant with the passage of time. This may be of particular 
concern to strategies where technological developments can quickly outdate 
226 UK Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy: A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: 11.
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portions of the strategy. To illustrate, the implications of recent developments such 
as cloud computing and 3D (three dimensional) printing may not be fully captured 
in NCSS released around 2008.
Lack of a mid-level interagency coordination group: the formulation of a NSS or 
NCSS requires input from a variety of government departments and agencies. This 
input can be solicited in a variety of ways, ranging from written statements to formal 
meetings of relevant stakeholders. In support of this process, the establishment of 
a mid-level, inter-agency coordination group may be useful to harmonise varying 
requirements across government departments. In the case of formulating a NCSS, 
it may also be helpful to translate technical requirements stemming from experts/
users at the working level into policy-relevant language for decision-makers.
Failing to identify critical services (NCSS): the protection of critical infrastructures 
is a common requirement identified in a NCSS. As such, policy-makers have come 
together to identify what constitutes a critical infrastructure and which deserve 
special attention. In this vein, it may also be useful to go a step further and pre-
identify which services are most critical for the well-being of society. Prioritising 
amongst these – either in a NSS or stand-alone strategy – may be beneficial in 
formulating a rapid response in the event of an emergency. To illustrate, the Estonian 
government has pre-identified 42 critical services, ranging for maintaining the 
electricity supply to ensuring an ice-free port of Tallinn during the winter months 
to facilitate the transport of goods and people.
Lack of awareness – especially among policy-makers: the formulation of a 
strategy is a means to an end. A well-developed strategy should provide policy-
makers with guidance of concerning key goals, required resources, and how these 
could be employed most effectively. In the case of a stand-alone strategy covering 
a specific area, raising awareness levels among decision- and policy-makers may 
be particularly important to facilitate implementation. For example, concerning 
NCSS, strategies may suffer from weak follow-through if senior policy-makers have 
limited awareness of cyber issues and their implications, especially if there is a 
perception that the private sector should play the principal role in ensuring cyber 
security.
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The German National Cyber Security Council
In the German Cyber Security Strategy (2011), it was announced that 
a National Cyber Security Council (NCSC) would be established to help 
monitor the implementation of the Strategy and be able to react to new 
developments and threats as they occurred. The NCSC was clearly in-
tended to be a ‘political supervision’ body that would not replace two 
other strategic and operational level government coordination bodies 
that were responsible for facilitating the regular day-to-day activities. 
Instead, this body is directly advised by the ‘National Cyber Response 
Centre’, a cyber intelligence fusion centre and cyber crisis management 
body, and makes decisions on addressing ‘structural weakness’ in Ger-
many’s national cyber security. Voting members of the NCSC include 
representatives of the Federal Chancellery; a State Secretary from the 
Federal Foreign Office; the Federal Ministries of the Interior, Defence, 
Economics and Technology, Justice, Finance, Education and Research; 
and representatives of the federal Länder. On specific occasions, addi-
tional ministries or agencies can be included. Business representatives 
are invited as associated members. Representatives from academia can 
be involved as required but, similar to the associate members from the 
private sector, they do not have any voting status or similar. Between 
April 2011 and September 2012 the NCSC met three times and published 
extracts of their deliberations online.
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3. STRATEGIC GOALS & STAKEHOLDERS
Alexander Klimburg, Jason Healey
Section 3: Principal Findings
• A national cyber security strategy (NCSS) must take into account 
the various stakeholder categories and their respective roles in both 
offensive and defensive cyber activities. 
• When preparing a strategy, these stakeholders are captured within the 
‘Three Dimensions of NCS’: the governmental, the national (societal), 
and the international actor groups. Accordingly, government must be 
able to coordinate, cooperate and collaborate (respectively) with these 
stakeholders.
• Besides providing challenges, the advent of cyberspace can also 
directly support national security goals.
• Segmentations of offensive (attack) cyber capabilities are contentious 
but usually address the ability to disrupt, deny access to, or destroy a 
system and/or to exfiltrate sensitive information from an adversary. 
• Major tensions can arise between different approaches to NCS, in 
particular between military and civil organisations, as well as law 
enforcement and intelligence. Furthermore, the principal approaches 
of ‘resilience’ and ‘deterrence’ are often presented as being at odds with 
each other.
• A NCSS can be developed through a variety of processes, depending on 
national context and preconditions. 
• A NCSS should be paired with resources and, preferably, also with 
quantifiable goals that can be measured. Metrics, however, are often 
the most difficult goal to achieve of all.
• The staffing requirements in cyber security are higher than often 
appreciated, due to the large number of stakeholders that need to be 
communicated with.
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3.1. INTRODUCTION
This section addresses the strategic view of national cyber security (NCS), 
examining the basic strategic decisions that must underpin any national strategy, 
and identifying the national stakeholder groups with which the strategy will 
need to operate. Effectively, the section addresses the ‘goals’ and the ‘means’ of 
a national cyber security strategy (NCSS), while Section 4 will address the actual 
‘ways’. A NCSS needs to be orientated along not only what needs to be protected (as 
illustrated in Section 1) but also along the actual national security aims that need 
to be advanced. To achieve this goal, a number of different processes provide for 
the actual means, although one factor does stand out: the cooperation with other 
stakeholders.
Unlike most national security topics, stakeholder groups in NCS are not restricted 
to government entities, but include non-state and international actors as well. 
Indeed, the ability of a government to be able to influence NCS without taking 
these stakeholder groups into account is very limited. The strategic goals must, 
therefore, reflect the underlying basics of the cyber security domain. Consequently, 
this section will start with its own introduction: this includes understanding the 
differences between different state and non-state actor groups, absolute advantages 
that information and communications technology (ICT) brings to national security, 
and the types of offensive and defensive cyber activity. Strategic concepts such 
as ‘deterrence’ and ‘resilience’ are introduced as representing essential strategic 
choices in NCS which, however, do not need to be mutually exclusive. Moreover, 
the general tensions that result from strategic decisions (such as focusing on law 
enforcement or intelligence) are examined. The differences in policy development 
processes, and the choices they represent, are summarised as well. Finally, the 
overall engagement with stakeholder groups is explained, and a theoretical 
framework for segmenting these groups is introduced.
3.1.1. National Cyber Security Actors
‘Actors’ is an unpopular category to use in NCS. Defining a particular activity as, 
for instance, cyber crime or cyber espionage is more useful and realistic than 
defining the purported actor behind that activity as being a criminal or a spy. This 
is because accurate organisational cyber attribution is one of the most difficult 
tasks to accomplish in cyber security. However, it can also be misleading. From 
the perspective of a ‘cyber warrior’, cyber crime can offer the technical basis 
(software tools and logistic support) and cyber terrorism the social basis (personal 
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networks and motivation) with which to execute nationally sanctioned attacks on 
the computer networks of enemy groups or nations.227
Despite the apparent perils of classifying cyber actors in cyberspace, it is 
nonetheless necessary to do so, especially when trying to conceptualise the 
strategic environment that a NCS wishes to address. This engagement is more 
complex than the standard multi-stakeholder model that provides equal weighting 
to governments, private sector and civil society. This model obfuscates that, on the 
one hand, some organisations – for instance some think-tanks or other advisory 
groups – can actually be all three types of organisations interchangeably. On the 
other hand, it also ignores the fundamental importance of size and scale that the 
organisation is able to leverage. Finally, it largely only applies to ‘good’ actors, and is 
not necessarily helpful when dealing with, for instance, cyber crime, or ‘hacktivist’ 
gangs.
The following differentiation is not intended to replace the multi-stakeholder 
approach, but to be used as a conceptual aid to understanding the general ‘types’ 
of stakeholders that work in cyberspace. The challenge for government is that it 
usually only has experience in dealing with ‘state actors’, but organised non-state 
actors (i.e., ‘large’ actors) are often multinational and difficult to engage with. Even 
more challenging, however, are non-organised, non-state actors (i.e., ‘small’ actors), 
whose organisation, resources, fundamental outlook and particularly their sheer 
numbers can easily represent a crucial challenge for government to understand. 
Unfortunately, it is particularly this last group that contributes the most to cyber 
security, and also to cyber insecurity. 
State Actors: state actors in cyberspace are, in general, the most sophisticated 
and well-resourced of potential cyber attackers even though some criminal cyber 
organisations can rival many state actors in sophistication. State actors are able to 
leverage large teams of well-managed programmers to design the most advanced 
cyber attack tools, can target them via the most sophisticated intelligence apparatus, 
and are able to utilise the most advanced and expensive hardware in the world. 
Despite media claims of how easy it would be for a single hacker to ‘bring down a 
country’228 with cyber attacks, in reality, the most comprehensive of cyber attacks 
against a nation would be a substantial operation. The simultaneous targeting of 
an entire country’s most crucial government and critical infrastructure networks 
would be enormously complicated, and would likely require the type of resources 
only a state could leverage. A state cyber attack (especially a cyber espionage 
attack) is usually evident through the resources that have been leveraged to go 
227 Klimburg, ‘Mobilising Cyber Power.’
228 Cristen Conger, ‘Could a single hacker crash a country’s network?,’ http://computer.howstuffworks.
com/hacker-crash-country-network1.htm.
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after a specific target, especially targets that have otherwise no obvious criminal 
value (e.g., the correspondence of a foreign ministry, or similar). While some of 
the attacks can be described as ‘blatant’, it can be presumed that state attacks are 
essentially somewhat constrained by legal norms and fear of political repercussions. 
For a state, cyber operations are only one of the options available to accomplish a 
specific political, strategic and operational goal and all of these goals can be directly 
addressed by a defender in various ways. On the defence, state actors have a number 
of advantages but also a critical and overlooked disadvantage. Governments have 
tremendous resources – budget, equipment and trained people – to defend against 
cyber attacks, but often lack agility. It can be very difficult for most government 
agencies to move quickly, especially if a cyber attack crosses agency lines, between 
different mandates, or international borders. And since most attacks affect the 
private sector and cross over private sector networks, governments often must rely 
on the private sector to undertake the actual information security activities needed 
to respond to an attack and restore service.
Organised Non-State Actors: as has been repeatedly pointed out already, cyber 
security is primarily a non-state affair.229 The non-state sector is responsible for 
virtually all of the hardware and software used in cyber attacks, and is most often 
the victim of these activities. They are also probably responsible for executing 
most cyber espionage attacks, either for their own purposes, or to support 
government efforts. While the bulk of petty cyber crime is executed by small 
gangs or individuals, it is enabled by a much more proficient group of true cyber 
crime organisations which provide much of cyber crime infrastructure, and which 
take a large corresponding share of the profits. These can be gigantic: the single 
largest cyber crime organisation, the (former) Russian Business Network (RBN), 
was supposedly responsible for 60% of worldwide cyber crime in 2007.230 These 
criminal groups can also be directly implicated in national security relevant cyber 
attacks. The RBN, for instance, was presumed to be at least somewhat involved 
in the Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008) cyber attacks.231 There are a number 
of other organised non-state actors that play an important role in cyber attacks, 
however. These include dedicated ‘cyber militia’-type and hacker organisations that 
a number of governments, notably China, have been known to support.232 They also 
include a virtual galaxy of security and defence contractors in North America and 
Europe that support the official cyber security efforts of most liberal democratic 
nations. All of these actors play a decisive role in cyber espionage, both as Research 
229 See Section 1.4.1.
230 Peter Warren, ‘Hunt for Russia’s web criminals,’ The Guardian, 15 November 2007.
231 Jon Swaine, ‘Georgia: Russia ‘conducting cyber war’,’ The Telegraph, 11 August 2008.
232 See Klimburg and Tirmaa-Klaar, Cybersecurity and Cyberpower: Concepts, Conditions and Capabilities 
for Cooperation for Action within the EU.
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and Development (R&D) facilities developing ‘cyber weapons’, but also directly 
as agents of a nation’s cyber offensive. A NCSS must pay close attention to these 
actors, as the problems presented by their legally often highly ambiguous role in 
national security is only surpassed by the actual amount of ‘cyber power’ that these 
organisations can, in fact, exert. On the defence side, large non-state actors are 
often vital – indeed most cyber defence can only occur with the cooperation of 
major software companies (such as Microsoft), security firms (such as McAfee) or 
telecom carriers (such as British Telecom). More agile than government but still 
with significant resources, these companies have been inventing new procedures 
to defeat attacks, with limited government assistance, such as the botnet takedowns 
orchestrated by Microsoft along with select non-state collaborators. At the same 
time, the organised non-state sector can include critical infrastructure companies, 
some with very poor cyber defences. These represent a threat not only to themselves, 
but also their wider respective national economies as a whole.
Non-Organised Non-State Actors: on the offense side, most of the low-level cyber 
crime campaigns, hacktivist activity and other minor cyber attacks are conducted 
by small, flat hierarchy groups, or even lone individuals. The Anonymous hacktivist 
network, for instance, is organised is as much as that specialised groups have 
emerged that are responsible for most types of cyber attacks. It is non-organised, 
insofar as that there is not a clear or stable hierarchy of persons that function as a 
command chain – normally a requirement of most definitions of an ‘organisation’. 
Similarly, low-level cyber crime groups will only have the most basic organisation, 
even though outside of their particular core group they might seek to establish 
extensive hierarchical networks (such as via ‘mules’ or other part-time employees).
The scope of damage that these individuals can cause directly is usually limited, 
but in aggregate it probably represents a significant proportion of worldwide cyber 
crime. These small groups are usually not responsible for the most high-value 
cyber crime segment, namely intellectual property theft, and thus seldom play a 
decisive role in a NCSS. When they are mentioned, it usually is in the more generic 
context of hacktivist groups, general cyber crime, and the relevant law enforcement 
measures. At the same time, lone actors have made a hugely positive contribution 
to overall cyber security, in effect, repeatedly saving the internet from itself.233 A 
good NCSS will have to take the activities of these individuals into account as well. 
On the defence side, while small non-state actors do not have the resources that 
governments do, they can be very agile and have considerable technical knowledge. 
Moreover, these ‘white hat’ groups or individuals typically link large organised 
non-state actors and state responders and can greatly facilitate responses to cyber 
attacks, often faster than most governments. Smaller non-state groups, whether 
233 See Alexander Klimburg, ‘Whole-of-Nation Cyber Security,’ in Inside Cyber Warfare, ed. Jeffrey Carr 
(Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media, 2009).
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standing groups like NSP-SEC or ad hoc groups such as the Conficker Working 
Group,234 have been extremely successful in responding to cyber attacks. Without 
the resources of governments, however, the non-organised non-state actors tend 
to lack staying power for long cyber crises: most participants are volunteers, so 
typically cannot sustain their engagement for a prolonged period.
3.1.2. National Cyber Security Advantages
In Section 1 of this publication, the wider context of NCS was explored in depth. 
Using the ‘five dilemmas’ as an example, it was illustrated that NCS would always 
require the right balance to be struck between the protection measures on the one 
hand, and the implicit and explicit costs of that protection on the other. As was said, 
equilibrium needs to be maintained between reaping the benefits of ICT for the 
country at large (in particular within an economic and individual freedom context) 
and protecting the country from the risks associated with ICT.
Correspondingly, the advent of ‘cyber’ within the national security context has 
often been accompanied by mostly negative connotations. To this day, the public 
discussion on cyber security mostly concentrates on the rising vulnerabilities and 
threats imposed by the steadily increasing use of ICT, rather than emphasising 
the benefits society has derived from it. This debate particularly emphasises the 
danger that our networked world is not only directly dependent on ICT, but on the 
supposed fragility of many societal services that need to be connected by it.235 It is 
unsurprising that a security-focused view would rather concentrate on the various 
threats of the expanded use of ICT instead of focusing on the obvious (and less 
obvious) societal and economic benefits this historic development has brought us. 
Indeed, most NCSS try at the least to pay lip service to the importance of protecting 
the ‘productive aspects’ of ICT.236
A much larger facet of NCS that very seldom sees public discussion is the strategic 
advantages it can bring a nation purely within a national security context. These 
advantages are seldom explicitly discussed in public but, in all cases, the new 
possibilities that ICT offers national security as a whole are considerable. When 
considering a NCSS it is, therefore, not sufficient to purely look at the high-level 
234 For further information on both groups, see Section 4.7.1.
235 This is traditionally understood as societal tasks ‘operating at normal capacity.’ Some interpretations 
of the ‘resilience’ approach to cyber defence argue that, in fact, multiple operational states are better 
than only delineating between a ‘crisis’ and a ‘normal’ state.
236 For a wider discussion on the productive aspects of ICT see Section 1.1.
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economic and social ‘Value at Risk’ (VaR)237 that needs to be addressed. Developments 
in ICT in general, and cyber capabilities in particular, are fundamentally having a 
direct impact on a number of national security relevant functions, and are greatly 
enhancing some of their fundamental capabilities. Because militaries are defining 
cyberspace as a ‘domain of conflict’ or an ‘operational domain’, this language 
obscures these societal and economic advantages of cyberspace, a view that can 
militarise policy-making. A more balanced description is that cyberspace is a 
domain, just like air, land, sea and space, that is generally utilised by the private 
sector for social and economic purposes, and in which significant conflict can occur.
What follows is an overall segmentation of this ICT-enabled security increase, 
loosely based around the same five mandate structure introduced in Section 1 and 
expanded upon in Section 4.238
Military: the current revolution in military affairs was fundamentally built upon 
the introduction of ICT. Ever since the total defeat of the Iraqi army in 1991, 
militaries worldwide have increasingly been striving to introduce various ICT-
enabled capabilities to their armed forces. This includes the present paradigm 
of ‘Network-Centric Warfare’ (NCW), which is fundamentally built upon a level of 
communication many magnitudes greater than used by armed forces in the 1980s. 
The integration of these ICT enablers is often directly connected to the respective 
nation’s overall technological development, both in terms of its ability to develop and 
operate some of the new NCW capabilities, be it in intelligence, logistics, or in the 
sensor-to-shooter cycle. Militaries can utilise cyber attack capabilities to perform 
local, operational-level missions (similar, in practice, to electronic warfare), or can 
even develop strategic-level cyber capabilities (similar in purpose to strategic air 
power).239
Intelligence & Covert Operations: the intelligence community has long understood 
the value of cyber espionage. As far back the 1980s it was said that, ‘espionage over 
networks can be cost-efficient, offer nearly immediate results, and target specific 
locations [...] insulated from risks of internationally embarrassing incidents.’240 
237 There are a number of high-level papers that use the term ‘Value at Risk’ within a cyber context. 
See, for instance, John Dowdy, ‘The Cybersecurity Threat to U.S. Growth and Prosperity,’ in Securing 
Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security, ed. Nicholas Burns and Jonathon Price (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
238 The lack of a complete overlap between the ‘five mandates’ and the above segmentation is not 
accidental. While the five mandates cover different facets of NCS, overall the benefits of ICT to cyber 
security accrue differently.
239 That is, cyber capabilities both enable traditional military forces to do their job better through 
interconnectedness (as illustrated by the US information superiority over Iraq in the First Gulf War), 
but might also be used as a form of offensive attack in its own right.
240 Cliff Stoll, ‘Stalking the Wily Hacker,’ Communications of the ACM, Volume 31, Issue 5, May 1988.
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Foreign intelligence gathering has been fundamentally revolutionised through cyber 
capabilities. It is possible to say that cyber capabilities have had a greater impact 
in this field than in any other security area. In essence, three trends are especially 
obvious: the extension of effective ‘Signal Intelligence’ (SIGINT) capabilities 
through direct application of cyber means (e.g., cyber espionage through software 
and hardware); the ability to recruit and manage ‘Human Intelligence’ (HUMINT) 
resources via cyberspace, and the greatly heightened ability to integrate various 
sources of ‘deep data’ and other intelligence into a common intelligence picture, 
including ‘Open Source Intelligence’ (OSINT) as well as information from friends and 
partners. Moreover, some countries may include the ability to wage ‘information 
warfare’241 against their adversaries in a form of covert operation, resident within 
the intelligence and not the military structures. Internal security is probably one 
of the most sensitive issues for democracies. It is, however, far from certain if there 
has been a net increase in domestic intelligence capabilities and, considering the 
additional challenges that internal security services face due to the advent of ICT 
(e.g., due to criminal use of encryption). On the other hand, many countries have 
not published the extent of their true surveillance capabilities on domestic and 
foreign networks. 
Law Enforcement: the considerable efficiency increases in traditional policing 
due to ICT have probably only been partially offset by the advent of entire new 
forms of criminal activity.242 Much media attention has focused on the deployment 
of ‘Closed-Circuit Television’ (CCTV) and similar surveillance technology, but the 
ability to increase the mobility of through information gathering, analysis and 
dissemination tools is probably equally as important. Cyber crime represents its 
own significant challenge to the economic and social basis of a country and is likely 
to increase in the future. Equally, many countries will harbour international cyber 
crime infrastructure without law enforcement being aware of it.
Diplomacy & ‘Soft Power’: the ability to define international norms and standards 
relevant to international behaviour in cyberspace represents its own form of ‘soft 
power.’243 Even small countries can exert particular influence in this area if they 
are seen as being credible partners due to their overall level of cyber security 
development or ICT literacy.244 Other countries may represent particular legal 
facets of relevance to cyber (e.g., focusing on human rights or an overall ‘internet 
Freedom’ agenda). It is certainly possible to leverage overall issues in diplomatic 
241 For various definitions of Information Warfare see Section 1.
242 For a list of trends of ICT in policing see Sebastian Denef et al., ICT Trends in European Policing, 
(Sankt Augustin: Fraunhofer-Institut für Angewandte Informationstechnik FIT, 2011), http://www.fit.
fraunhofer.de/content/dam/fit/de/documents/composite_d41.pdf.
243 See Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011). 81-109.
244 One notable example being Estonia, but also Finland and Sweden can be named here.
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cyber security forums to further other political, economic or indeed security 
agendas.
Emergency Services: this vast category includes all ICT that facilitates the work of 
the emergency services besides law enforcement. This can range from improved 
communication and analysis tools for first-responders, national crisis management 
and continuity of government systems to comprehensive critical infrastructure 
protection programmes and their associated information exchanges. Overall, these 
systems deliver a greatly increased level of security for specific risks.
The first three points of the above list – the military and intelligence capability 
gains because of ‘cyber’ – are very seldom discussed or even touched upon in 
public. What exactly these capabilities are can sometimes be inferred from various 
secondary sources or geopolitical events and has been speculated on elsewhere.245 
In particular, in countries with a highly engaged foreign policy, these capability 
increases are very significant, and have significantly shaped the entire international 
security paradigm. Information warfare, or cyber power246 has the potential to be 
a decisive form of national power, able to inflict strategic blows on the adversary 
without ever having to resort to kinetic means. It is even possible to wage a ‘war’ 
without the adversary ever knowing that a war has been started.
As was remarked upon in Section 1.4, there is a clear difference between those 
advanced cyber nations that have a high level of ambition in integrating cyber 
security within their overall international policy and foreign posture, and those 
who address NCS more as an internal security task. In essence, some nations will 
seek to purely mitigate against cyber risks, while other nations might seek to 
exploit those same risks. Overall, however, both types of nations will first need to 
work within the basic technical realities of attack and defence within cyberspace, 
and decide which type of strategic concept would best fit their needs.
3.1.3. Offensive Actions in Cyber
One of the most fundamental dichotomies in national cyber policy is between cyber 
offence and cyber defence, more often generally framed as ‘attack’ and ‘defence’. 
The goals of cyber offensive capabilities vary. Non-state actors will attack in order 
to steal monetisable information (such as credit card numbers), or to increase their 
status with their peers. State actors may choose to use offensive cyber capabilities 
to spy on their neighbours or steal their industrial secrets, to disrupt attacks against 
245 See, for instance, Klimburg and Tirmaa-Klaar, Cybersecurity and Cyberpower: Concepts, Conditions 
and Capabilities for Cooperation for Action within the EU.
246 See Klimburg, ‘The Whole of Nation in Cyberpower.’
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themselves (often known as ‘active defence’), employ cyber weapons in lieu of more 
traditional kinetic weapons during an armed conflict, or as covert actions against 
adversaries during a strained peace. Put otherwise, each of the five mandates of 
national cyber security will have their own relevant definitions of cyber attack, and 
each definition will need to be accounted for in a comprehensive strategy.
The term ‘cyber attack’ is not internationally defined – there are substantial 
differences between, for instance, the US definition and most others.247 Furthermore, 
there may be significant differences of definition even within a single country, in 
particular across the different NCS mandates.248 The most general definition of 
a cyber attack is a malicious premeditated attempt to disrupt the confidentiality, 
integrity or availability of information residing on computers or computer 
networks.249 In order of severity, these attacks include the adversary seeing 
information they are not supposed to (e.g., spying), disrupting the legitimate use of 
that information to others (e.g., blocking a transmission, or shutting down a service), 
or changing information without authority (which can range from manipulating 
personal data to interfering with the control systems of industrial facility, with 
catastrophic results).250 This segmentation has also be used in studies of (military 
relevant)251 cyber attacks and has been quoted by senior defence officials.252 The 
segmentation is not only a result of the ‘effects’ accomplished by a cyber attack but 
also of the extent of how directly the cyber attack was responsible for those effects. 
Within this context, three levels of severity can be distinguished:
Background Noise: the first level has been called ‘network wars’, or also ‘system 
administrator versus system administrator.’ This includes mobile malicious logic, 
trojan attacks, basic phishing attempts, common exploits, and the sum total of 
attacks that many organisations are constantly facing – often simply referred to as 
the ‘background noise’ of information security. Some governments have defined this 
as the Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) level, implying that most conventional 
cyber crime and all of cyber espionage is limited to this level, regardless of severity, 
247 See Section 1.2.4.
248 To give a hypothetical example, a counter-cyber crime definition might read: ‘an act of trespass on a 
personal computer system represents a cyber attack’ while a military definition might read ‘a cyber 
attack is a hostile military act conducted through cyberspace.’
249 See Kevin O’Shea, ‘Cyber Attack Investigative Tools and Technologies,’ in HTCIA (Hanover, NH: 
Dartmouth College, 2003).
250 It is important to avoid the general implication here that, in all cases, ‘confidentiality’ is ranked beneath 
‘availability’ which is ranked beneath ‘integrity’. In fact, every system will prioritise C-I-A based on its 
own unique requirements.
251 Based on a study by the US Air Force Science Advisory Board (AF-SAB), quoted from Raphael S. Mudge 
and Scott Lingley, ‘Cyber and Air Joint Effects Demonstration (CAAJED),’ (AFRL/RIGB, 2008), 1-2 and 8.
252 See, for instance, John D. Banusiewicz, ‘Lynn Outlines New Cybersecurity Effort,’ American Forces 
Press Service, 16 June 2011.
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unless it modifies or destroys data. The (by no means uncontroversial) assertion 
is that all of these attacks should be considered ‘routine’, and can be lowered to a 
reasonable level by proper cyber security procedures. On the other hand, many 
nations would not agree with the view that CNE comprises only the lowest level 
of cyber attack severity. In some cases, it can be argued, a successful CNE attack 
could have catastrophic implications for national security. Further, a CNE attack 
would often be a prerequisite for a ‘kinetic equivalent’ cyber attack. Detractors 
would therefore argue that cyber espionage should not be treated as a ‘gentlemen’s 
misdemeanour’, as the technical nature of some cyber espionage attacks could be 
misconstrued as a more serious attack, thus leading the way to a loss of escalation 
control between the parties.
Cyber Adjunct to Kinetic Combat: this attack is one where the intent is to achieve 
a ‘kinetic effect’ through a cyber attack (e.g., the denial of function of an IT-based 
system, such as radar or communications facility) to facilitate a conventional attack 
on a secondary target. The use of malicious logic to disable an air defence network 
in context of a wider air strike is an example of such an attack.253 However, under 
specific circumstances (such as a simultaneous ground invasion) this could equally 
apply to a particularly devastating distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.254 
The underlying notion is that a cyber attack can rise to the level of a physical attack: 
a ‘use of force’ in legal terms. This interpretation implies that the actual damage is 
not necessarily caused by the cyber attack itself: rather, the cyber attack simply 
enables the actual destruction to occur with other means.
Malicious Manipulation of Data: unlike in the previous example, here the cyber 
attack itself is the actual destructive agent. By directly changing the programmed 
parameters of a system or database, it can cause wide-scale death or destruction. 
One view is that these attacks are ‘the ones to be feared, they are covert, they are 
planned, they are orchestrated, and they can cause widespread havoc and disruption 
without the victims realising their problems are cyber related.’255 Essentially, 
these attacks refer to both invisible and wide scale manipulations of systems with 
potentially obvious catastrophic results (e.g., for a gas pipeline, a power generator, 
or a transportation facility)256 or a less visible but equally dangerous manipulation 
253 Such a cyber attack against an air defence system is said to have occurred within the context of the 
Israeli Operation ORCHARD against a purported Syrian nuclear facility in 2007 (see Thomas Rid, 
‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012): 16-7.).
254 The term ‘distributed denial of service’ refers to an attack where an individual computer is flooded with 
information from many other computers, forcing it to slow, shut-down or malfunction.
255 Mudge and Lingley, ‘Cyber and Air Joint Effects Demonstration (CAAJED),’ 1.
256 Catastrophic cyber attacks are rumored to have occurred already on a Soviet gas pipeline in the early 
1980s (see Klimburg, ‘Mobilising Cyber Power.’), and has been academically tested in the AURORA 
experiment in 2008 (Tom Gjelten, ‘Stuxnet Raises ‘Blowback’ Risk In Cyberwar,’ npr, 2 November 
2011.).
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of data to degrade the target over time (e.g., at a nuclear enrichment facility257 or 
in personal medical databases). In the most serious of cases, it is possible that such 
attacks could amount  to an ‘armed attack’. 
From one military perspective, a serious cyber attack probably only refers to the 
last two examples: when data is actually denied or manipulated/destroyed. Under 
international law (ius ad bellum) it is possible that these attacks could amount to a use 
of force, or an armed assault, if physical damage or loss of life results.258 Ultimately, 
the actual effects of an attack are more important than whatever segmentation 
is chosen or indeed the actual intent of the attack itself – a ‘manipulation of 
information’ attack that has no significant results could hardly constitute a casus 
belli. On the other hand, it is probably quite relevant to distinguish a cyber attack 
as either a facilitator, or the actual destructive agent, as the above segmentation 
tries to do.
The above model of cyber attack has one particular implication: the level of a cyber 
attack is not a reflection of the intent of the attacker, but rather the measure of the 
failure of the defender. Consequently, in cyber security, the onus may be shifting 
towards the responsibility of the defender to adequately secure their systems. Put 
differently: if a 15-year-old teenage hacker tries to execute a devastating malicious 
manipulation of data attack on a critical infrastructure ‘ just for laughs’, and the 
company in question has clearly failed to provide for a minimum level of cyber 
protection, then the possibility of the company being culpable in facilitating the 
attacks can be raised. Recent European Parliament legislative proposals indicate 
that there is increasing support for expanding the duty of care concept to include 
cyber attacks.259
A different segmentation could be to look at the relevance of a particular cyber 
attack for one of the five NCS mandates. This is segmentation based on the kind 
of activity undertaken by the attacker, either to steal information (confidentiality 
attack) or disrupt systems, or the information on or passing through those systems 
(integrity or availability attacks). The national impact of these attacks can be 
either low (being a crisis for a particular person or company but not a national 
issue) or high (which gets escalated to elected officials as a national security issue). 
257 The ‘Stuxnet’ cyber attack on the Iranian enrichment facilities was especially programmed to slowly 
degrade the centrifuges over time, rather than catastrophically destroy them outright.
258 For a discussion on what could constitute ‘use of force’ within a cyber operations context, see Rule 11 in 
the Michael N. Schmitt, gen. ed. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2013).
259 For instance, this view is partially reflected in points 11-12 of the preamble of the 2012 Revision of the 
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Figure 2:  Parsing Cyber Offense
 
Obviously, a cyber strategy that focuses most on national security should focus 
most on the right-most column. If protection of citizens and companies is the focus, 
then the left-most column may be more important, as low-impact attacks form the 
vast bulk of cyber incidents.
From one military perspective, a serious cyber attack only refers to the bottom 
right quadrant: when data or systems are actually denied or destroyed on a large 
enough scale to be nationally significant. Under the Law of Armed Conflict it is 
possible that these attacks could amount to a use of force, or an armed assault, if 
physical damage or loss of life results.
3.1.4. Defensive Actions in Cyber
For decades, it has been far easier to attack than to defend. Attackers can hide 
their identity with impunity, computers and networks are complex and difficult to 
adequately defend, and weak international governance has allowed some nations 
to become sanctuaries for insecure computers and nests of criminal attackers. 
Therefore, all NCSS have at their core a ‘defensive’ mission.
Typically, defensive actions are taken entirely within one’s own networks but 
there are exceptions. Law enforcement organisations have authority to arrest 
perpetrators in response to cyber intrusions while militaries might retaliate with 
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cyber attacks or even use lethal force for a particularly disruptive cyber attack. In 
essence, cyber defence is often broken into four actions:260
Protect: this action is usually defined as ‘getting the bare basics right’. This means 
having up to date antivirus software(s) for the most primitive threats, having 
appropriately configured firewalls, and ensuring that all applications are constantly 
updated. Colloquially, actions to protect information systems are sometimes 
considered as ‘information assurance’, a more extensive business process-orientated 
paradigm than computer network defence (CND). The concept of information 
assurance goes beyond CND in that it treats all information – irrespective of the 
medium upon which it is stored – according to various protection principles. This is 
helpful in as far as the data not stored in a computer (for instance stored on paper, 
or indeed in a conversation) can be vital in enabling an attack on a secure computer 
network. A ‘protection’ system that only takes into account technical measures and 
ignores the business processes that they are supposed to support, will fail in its 
purpose.
Detect: in this phase it is already presumed that something untoward is happening 
on the system, and depends on automated systems such as Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) as well as numerous more intrusive technologies such as Deep 
Packet Inspection (DPI) to find the evidence, usually in the form of unauthorised 
data leaving the system. This is paired with the necessity of ‘hunting on one’s own 
networks’ to proactively (and manually) root around possible file locations where a 
hacker may have established access.
Respond: once a breach has been discovered it is time to respond. This can take a 
great many different forms. On the simplest level, this can mean just deleting a file 
or closing a firewall port. But at the more advanced level this can mean shutting 
down an entire network, replacing hardware and rebooting from the backups, 
if these themselves are not contaminated. Following a cyber attack on the Swiss 
Foreign Ministry in 2009, large parts of the ministry system (including e-mail) had 
to be shut off for a number of days.261 Even more dramatic are potential situations 
involving possible nation-wide cyber attacks which, in theory, could require 
disconnecting internet connections entirely. Within most operational contexts, this 
responsibility will reside with the national or governmental Computer Emergency 
260 See US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 5.71. Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear 
Facilities (Washington, DC: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2010). There are other variations of 
this model. The FIRST/CSIRT community talks of ‘Protect, Detect, Respond and Sustain.’ See FIRST, 
‘Best Practices Contest 2008: Project,’ http://www.first.org/conference/2008/contest.html. Others, 
however, add ‘defend’ to this category as well, usually in the context of advocating ‘active defence.’ 
(See NSA, Defense In Depth. A practical strategy for achieving Information Assurance in today’s highly 
networked environments. USA. http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/support/defenseindepth.pdf).
261 Christopher von Eitzen, ‘Online attacks on Swiss foreign ministry,’ The H Security, 27 October 2009.
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Response Team (CERT).262 A CERT has been defined as ‘a team that coordinates and 
supports the response to security incidents [any adverse event which compromises 
some aspect of computer or network security] that involve sites within a defined 
constituency [the group of users, sites, networks or organizations served by the 
team].’263
Recover: the process of recovery starts during the actual mitigation of the cyber 
attack. To ensure that the end-user suffers as little disruption as possible, so-called 
Business Continuity Management (BCM) systems depend on external and spare 
resources, or altogether different means, to limit the downtime to the system. 
Similarly, all systems require a set of backups or Disaster Recovery (DR) systems 
in order to replace corrupt or lost data. The infrastructure requirements for this 
recover stage are often immense, with spare data centres and bunkered repositories 
for information being the norm for most government systems.
More recently, the nature of defence has been shifting. While ‘passive’ defence is 
still considered the priority, very influential voices – including the former second 
most senior responsible military commander in the United States – have been 
clamouring for counter cyber attacks. This trend towards ‘active defence’, to use 
some types of offensive capabilities to disrupt incoming attacks, has become US 
Department of Defense (DoD) policy.264 While some European NATO nations have 
provided indications that they may consider the general approach of ‘active defence’ 
a valid one, it is not clear if all the ramifications of these types of automated counter-
attacks are understood, and if the threat of inadvertent and unintended escalation 
has been fully addressed. Still, the attractions of active defence are obvious: with 
the securing of networks being a seemingly endlessly expensive task, active defence 
seems to provide a cheaper method to defend – or to ‘deter’ – against potential 
cyber attacks. This is an influential argument but is still unproven.
262 A CERT is a specific organisation designed to address information security threats. In general, it is 
defined by five tasks: ‘1. Provide a reliable, trusted, 24-hour, single point of contact for emergencies; 2. 
Facilitate communication among experts working to solve security problems; 3. Serve as a central point 
for identifying and correcting vulnerabilities in computer systems; 4. Maintain close ties with research 
activities and conduct research to improve the security of existing systems; 5. Initiate proactive 
measures to increase awareness and understanding of information security and computer security 
issues throughout the community of network users and service providers’ (Carnegie Mellon University, 
‘About Us,’ CERT, http://www.cert.org/meet_cert.). Also see Section 4.2.1.
263 IETF RFC 2350, ‘Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response,’ June 1998, http://tools.ietf.
org/html/rfc2350.
264 US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.
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3.1.5. Collective Cyber Defence
In essence, all real cyber defence is ‘collective’.265 Short of disconnecting from the 
internet (and not even that can be sufficient), organisations are nearly always reliant 
upon other organisations, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or countries to help 
them stop a significant cyber attack. Within NCS, however, the notion of ‘collective 
cyber defence’ is increasingly having a more specific international connotation. 
While no standard definitions exist, collective cyber defence can be said to be ‘the 
operational cooperation of various (international) actors to defeat specific cyber 
attacks directed against one or more of the respective actors’. There are a number 
of operational methods that can be utilised for collective cyber defence. These 
can range from the simply sharing and pooling of intelligence resources, human 
resources or even actual communication infrastructure. States supporting another 
country in collective cyber defence can also physically interfere or manipulate 
internet traffic transiting through their respective country, or ultimately use their 
own deployed cyber capabilities to offensively engage in cyber operations against 
the attacker. Essentially, collective cyber defence can not only play a role with 
the ‘detect’ and ‘respond’ phase of cyber defence, but could theoretically involve 
offensive and active-defence operations as well. 
Collective cyber defence is overwhelmingly built upon individual and organisational 
trust and this trust can even supersede traditional alliance structures. The United 
States Cyber Storm III exercise included a number of countries as active participants 
but the countries were individually invited. The NATO Cyber Coalition, which 
also conducts regular large-scale collective cyber defence exercises,266 is not only 
composed of Alliance members. Indeed, in recent years a number of Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have initiated direct 
bilateral cyber defence cooperation agreements with each other. While often these 
discussions focus along crisis-prevention information sharing tasks, a real subtext 
is the need to create existing institutional and personal relationships that can be 
activated in a crisis to enable true collective cyber defence. No NCS strategy should 
underestimate the importance of these relationships.
3.2. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS: BALANCING 
DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE
A NCSS can be judged on the basis of whether it has made a nation’s cyberspace 
more secure from attack or not. Optimally, this would involve raising the barriers 
265 For a discussion on NATO cyber initiatives see Section 5.3.
266 James G. Stavridis and Elton C. Parker, ‘Sailing the Cyber Sea,’JFQ 2, no. 65 (2012).
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to attack and lowering the limitations to the defence to such an extent that most 
attacks, both criminal and state, would simply not be cost effective.
The important decision is the balance of how much of a nation’s resources should be 
directed towards defence or offense. While morally it would appear there is a clear 
choice which cyber security aspect a nation should favour, financially the choice 
is not nearly as clear. Cyber defence is enormously expensive; it involves massive 
investment of financial and human resources to adapt organisations, technology 
and processes (and even basic human behaviour traits) to comply with proper 
information security procedures. In the late 1990s, the US DoD made defence the 
clear priority, judging that their traditional military power could coerce any likely 
adversaries without the use of offensive cyber capabilities. But if the DoD’s own 
cyber systems were disrupted, all of those traditional military forces could be left 
deaf and blind.267
Today, however, few nations believe that a complete cyber defence is possible – no ICT 
system is forever completely immune to a cyber attack. It is, therefore, unsurprising 
that there have always been voices which have stated that the strongest protection 
against cyber attack was the threat of counter-attack, in other words: ‘deterrence’. 
Deterrence theory is increasingly countered by those who believe that deterrence 
cannot work due to the anonymous nature of most cyber attacks. They argue that 
it is more important to design operational systems that can withstand serious 
technical disruptions, or can change their standard of operations to adapt to the 
new situation. This approach has often been referred to as ‘resilience’.
Both these approaches are not directly in opposition to each other. For instance, 
deterrence advocates will often insist that resilience is merely part of a good 
deterrence strategy. Also, it would seem that deterrence has a much stronger role 
in advanced cyber nations, in particular, in the United States, while smaller nations 
will always have to be more orientated towards ‘resilience’. Both strategies, however, 
are relevant for countries of various capabilities and, most importantly, have one 
common denominator: they depend on greatly increased cooperation between 
various actors to achieve their goals.
3.2.1. ‘Deterrence’: Cost Imposed
Deterrence can be defined as ‘[d]eterring or preventing by fear.’268 The concept of 
deterrence is not particularly new. As an instrument of classical diplomacy, the 
267 Jason Healey et al., Lessons From Our Cyber Past: The First Military Cyber Units [Transcript], 
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2012), http://www.acus.org/event/lessons-our-cyber-past-first-
military-cyber-units/transcript.
268 Deterrence, Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, 2012).
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threat of war has ever since been applied when states were trying to prevent 
others from behaving in a way that could potentially harm their own interests. 
However, deterrence theory, as it emerged during the early years of the Cold War, 
was remarkably different. While in the pre-Cold War era, the threat of using force 
was repeatedly carried out by the parties involved, in the era of nuclear weapons, 
deterrence ‘must be absolutely effective, allowing for no breakdowns whatever. The 
sanction is, to say the least, not designed for repeat action. One use of it will be 
[one] fatally too many.’269 However, while it is widely accepted today that ‘nuclear 
weapons had become a source of intolerable risk,’270 deterrence through retaliation 
is still a timely policy instrument under study.271 More recently, deterrence strategy 
has also been linked to ‘cyber’. In this context, cyber deterrence was defined as the 
‘capability in cyberspace to do unto others what others may want to do unto us.’272
Cyber deterrence is sometimes based upon so called cross domain response 
abilities.273 For instance, this can include the ability to retaliate against a cyber 
attack in a domain of conflict274 other than cyber, such as when the United States 
declares, ‘[w]hen warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in 
cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country.’275 This means that 
retaliation has many forms, including economic or diplomatic means. Within this 
context, smaller nations may also be able to deter larger aggressors with non-cyber 
means, even if only within the limited remit of international trade and diplomacy.
Deterrence can also be built on responses solely within the cyber domain. One 
excellent example is from General Cartwright, formerly the second most senior 
military officer on cyber security in the United States, who said, ‘[w]e’ve got to talk 
about our offensive capabilities and train to them; to make them credible so that 
people know there’s a penalty to this.’276 More recently, adherents of the deterrence 
model have received additional support from the (mostly US) trend towards active 
defence. Here, there is a more direct cyber response to quickly disrupt inbound 
attacks. The goal is not to inflict a direct penalty on the attackers but to ensure that 
their attacks are fruitless.
269 Bernard Brodie, ‘The Anatomy of Deterrence,’ World Politics 11, no. 2 (1959): 175.
270 The Economist, ‘The Growing Appeal of Zero. Banning the bomb will be hard, but not impossible,’ The 
Economist, 16 June 2011.
271 See, for instance, Amir Lupovici, ‘The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory – Toward a New 
Research Agenda,’ International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 3 (2010).
272 Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2009). 27.
273 John C. Mallery, ‘Models of Escalation and Desescalation in Cyber Conflict,’ in Workshop on Cyber 
Security and Global Affairs (Budapest: International Cyber Center at GMU and CERT-Hungary, 2011).
274 These domains are known, for instance, as Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic (DIME).
275 White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked 
World: 14.
276 Andrea Shalal-Esa, ‘Ex-U.S. general urges frank talk on cyber weapons,’ Reuters, 6 November 2011.
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The cyber deterrence model has, in theory, an obvious cost effective angle to it: 
overall defence-by-deterrence is thought to be cheaper than ‘comprehensive 
hardening’ of one’s systems from all possible attacks.277 However, deterrence 
probably works best against the most damaging attacks, those from nations which 
are equivalent to a traditional military attack. The United States, for instance, 
spends the vast majority of its cyber budget on defensive measures, despite a clear 
deterrence policy, only strengthened by the recent emphasis of active defence. Also, 
there are considerable problems with other aspects of this strategy, in particular 
with attribution, but also with strategic messaging and communication of abilities. 
Irrespective of potential classified advances in technology, it is highly unlikely that 
cyber attribution will ever rise to anything like the level of attribution given for, 
as an example, an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack.278 That poses 
the question: how much attribution is enough? Would, for instance, a 50% cyber 
attack attribution be sufficient in a strategic conflict environment? Furthermore, 
deterrence requires that robust offensive cyber capabilities not only be discreetly 
available, but that the potential adversary also be informed that these capabilities 
exist.
Though today’s crimes and nuisance disruptions may be difficult to attribute, 
this is likely to be a very thin veil if the attacks significantly disrupt economies, 
actually destroy property, or cause casualties. In the end, attribution of large scale 
disruptive attacks may be decided not by technical attribution but which nation 
seems most responsible, such as by being the source of the attacks, encouraging or 
directing its citizens to attack, or repeatedly ignoring requests to cease apparent or 
tacit support of the attacks.
Cyber deterrence as a concept is particularly complicated as, similar to the term 
‘cyber attack’, it is often applied indiscriminately across the different NCS mandates. 
Cyber criminals, spies and foreign militaries generally need to be deterred in 
different, and in sometimes contradictory, ways.
3.2.2. ‘Resilience’: Benefit Denied
Instead of threatening to retaliate in the case of aggression, an alternative view of 
NCS builds upon the idea of system stability, or resilience. ‘We are in the midst of a 
cyber war of words,’ former US Cyber Coordinator Howard Schmidt said: ‘Let’s quit 
277 Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar: 33.
278 Within NORAD (North American Air Defence), a ‘dual phenomenology’ system is employed for missile 
attack-detection. This means that two separate sensor systems (e.g., radar, TELINT, IMAGINT, etc.) have 
to independently register an attack before that attack is confirmed as such. Therefore, ‘attribution’ is 
very high indeed, above 98% certainty.
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pointing fingers and start cleaning up the infrastructure.’279 This quote illustrates 
better than most the central two tenets of the resilience approach to NCS. Firstly, 
they demonstrate that the vast majority of cyber attacks are only possible due to 
the wide scale failure to apply basic cyber security principles. Secondly, they make 
it clear that cyber attacker ‘attribution is very difficult,’280 if not even impossible. 
Therefore, any model based on pursuing the enemy actor in cyberspace is likely 
to fail.
Consequently, the best defence is to raise the costs to the attacker by making the 
systems more secure and resilient, in effect: to ‘deter through denial’281 (against 
both cyber espionage and direct cyber attack) or by ‘raising the work-factor’282 
for the attacker. This approach is particularly attractive to less advanced cyber 
nations, as their technical abilities as well as geopolitical weight are probably more 
limited in any case. However, it is generally also seen as an overall trend in security 
thought: namely, the drive towards ‘resilience’ in many aspects of overall security 
policy.
Historically, the concept of resilience dates back to the early 1970s, and was 
first applied in studies on ecological systems.283 In this context, two contrasting 
aspects of resilience have been identified: one that concentrates on stability near an 
equilibrium steady state (‘engineering resilience’),284 and another one that accepts 
that system stability can also be maintained by changing into an alternative 
equilibrium (‘ecological equilibrium’). While the first aspect of resilience focuses 
on maintaining efficiency of function, the second one concentrates on maintaining 
existence of function.285
279 Glenn Chapman, ‘Too Much Hysteria Over Cyber Attacks,’ Discovery News, 16 February 2011.
280 Tom Espiner, ‘US cyber-tsar: Tackle jailbroken iPhones,’ ZDNet, 24 March 2012.
281 Defense System Staff, ‘Overlapping defense essential to deter cyberattacks: Panel members,’ Defense 
Systems, 8 November 2011.
282 See, for instance, John C. Mallery, ‘International Data Exchange And A Trustworthy Host: Focal Areas 
For International Collaboration In Research And Education,’ in Digital ecosystems network and 
information security and how international cooperation can provide mutual benefits (Brussels: BIC, 
2011).
283 See Crawford S. Holling, ‘Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems,’ (Vancouver: Institute of 
Resource Ecology, 1973). The ‘ecological resilience’ view is slightly different from the ‘engineering 
resilience’ view. Ecological resilience is ‘the amount of resistance to change to shift a system from one 
stable state into another stable state.’ In this context there are many ‘stable operating states’, and some 
of these may be required for the long-term good of the system. The example often given is the need to 
have small fires in a forest in order to prevent a larger fire.
284 Resilience can be defined as ‘the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, 
absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions’ 
(UNISDR, ‘Terminology,’ http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology.).
285 Crawford S. Holling, ‘Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience,’ in Engineering Within 
Ecological Constraints, ed. Peter C. Schulze (Washington, DC: 1996).
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The resilience model has an obvious logical appeal: the ability to manage cyber 
security by concentrating a nation’s efforts internally (e.g., focusing on internal 
processes and products) rather than trying to externally influence nations and 
other actor groups. It also seems to be a ‘quick win’: all that needs to be done would 
be to ‘clean up’ the infrastructure. However, the problem is that this cleaning is 
certainly not a simple task, and can be very expensive. Indeed, it can even cost 
more than the actual damage of the attacks themselves. A (controversial) 2012 
UK study on cyber crime even claimed that cyber security ‘countermeasures’ cost 
four times as much as the actual damage caused by cyber crime.286 Secondly, there 
are technical aspects that make cyberspace inherently insecure and are virtually 
impossible to completely ‘fix’ (in particular the nature of protocol and protocol suits 
such as BGP, DNS and SCADA287). Thirdly, the notion that attacks will decrease with 
the increased work load for the attacker is theoretical. In fact, it is perfectly possible 
that more serious targeted attacks (e.g., those most relevant for national security) 
will simply become more sophisticated themselves. Finally, besides the investment 
in material resources, ‘true’ resilience demands a major change in organisational 
thinking. This is often the most costly change element of them all.
3.3. TWO TENSIONS OF NATIONAL CYBER 
SECURITY
Fundamentally, there are two axes along which a nation’s NCS can be concentrated: 
military and civilian, as well as intelligence and law enforcement. The focus of 
a nation’s NCS will depend on the specific local conditions, as well as the exact 
interpretations of the word NCS, for instance, if it includes offensive capabilities 
as well. Fundamentally, it is possible to say that both of these axes are often 
orthogonally different in goals, organisation and operational culture. This does not 
mean that they are completely mutually exclusive – often a substantial grey area 
will exist, e.g., with domestic intelligence services. However, often the central tenets 
of the respective groups are different to reconcile.
3.3.1. Military vs. Civilian Approaches
In some OECD countries there has been a heated debate as to the role of the 
military in NCS. Largely, the question is one of principle: in the United States, for 
instance, the role of the military in internal security issues is closely circumscribed 
286 Detica, The Cost of Cyber Crime. A Detica Report in Partnership with the Office of Cyber Security and 
Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office.
287 Border Gateway Protocol, Domain Name System, and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, 
respectively.
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by the US constitution. It is also a question of roles, such as where does the primary 
relevant intelligence288 body reside, or what role does the military have in other 
relevant national crisis management tasks. From a similar perspective, the role of 
the military in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is often very contentious.
Overall there are quite different approaches to integrating the military in NCS. In 
the UK and Germany, for instance, the military plays a very small role (if any) in CIP, 
and has a very much subordinate role within the larger context of NCS. In France 
the situation is reversed: while the interior ministry retains control of the actual 
political national crisis management structure, the defining actors in NCS (as well 
as the use of cyber elements abroad) are all subordinate to the Secretariat-General 
for National Defence and Security (SGDSN289). In the United States, the role of the 
DoD, in the wider CIP programme was limited until 2010,290 although the DoD has 
always leveraged the most cyber security resources, both in defence and in attack. 
Since 2010 there has been repeated attempts to bring the DoD (and in particular the 
NSA) closer into the national CIP programme,291 with marginal success. In Europe, 
nations associated with the ‘total defence’ concept often have similar approaches. 
In Switzerland, for instance, the main NCS organisation, the Reporting and Analysis 
Centre for Information Assurance (MELANI), is situated within a civilian ministry 
but the organisation depends on its ability to mobilise resources from the military 
and intelligence community.
3.3.2. The Law Enforcement vs. Intelligence Community 
Approaches
It is important to understand that the interests of the intelligence/counter-
intelligence292 community (IC) are very often in direct opposition to the interests 
of law enforcement (LE) in general. Both the intelligence/counter-intelligence 
and counter cyber crime mandates are clearly separate. Simple phishing attacks, 
for instance, are not normally a matter for the IC. Nonetheless, some attacks, in 
particular those involving intellectual property or those which are conducted with 
a high level of sophistication, such as most Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), will 
288 Exactly which intelligence body is the most relevant is a separate subject and depends on the relative 
focus of the nation in question. In some countries the ability to do signal intelligence and collection 
abroad will be a priority, while in others the role will be defined more in terms of traditional counter-
intelligence.
289 In French: Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale.
290 US Department of Homeland Security, Joint Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano on Enhancing Coordination to Secure America’s 
Cyber Networks (Washington, DC 2010).
291 Known as Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR) Programme.
292 In US parlance this is often described as ‘national security’.
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often involve both the IC and LE, especially where their jurisdictions overlap in 
supporting the CIP mandate. Any attempt at conceiving a NCSS needs to take into 
account that the two parts of government most operationally involved in protecting 
against cyber attacks have fundamentally different world views:
Openness: intelligence agencies will go to great lengths to prevent revealing the 
means and methods of intelligence collection. A result of this is that the over-
classification of cyber intelligence is endemic in many countries,293 and is generally 
considered to be one of the most significant challenges in information sharing,294 
including from IC to LE bodies.295 LE, in contrast, will mobilise all means of cyber 
intelligence, much of which will be commercial or open source, and distribute it 
widely.
Motivation: while LE aims to apprehend and prosecute a culprit, the IC will often 
seek to observe and exploit that actor’s action for a later advantage. While LE can 
also be said to have a prima facie interest in an attacker’s motivation, intelligence 
agencies will assign much more weight to the actor’s motivation and background. 
Discerning intent has always been one of the most important roles for the IC.
Offensive: LE will very seldom seek to conduct a Computer Network Attack (CNA) or 
a Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).296 Therefore, they have no vested interest 
in keeping a discovered attack method or exploit secret. Instead, LE will often see 
it as their direct (organisational) interest to distribute information of the attack 
to as many parties as possible. In an extreme case it might even be to the initial 
victim’s disadvantage to have the information of their attack shared, but might be 
judged by LE as being in the interest of public safety. In contrast, some intelligence 
agencies might actively want to discourage information of an attack tool or method 
from being shared, either to be able to entrap further attacks or indeed to be able 
to carry out their own attacks.
Sharing: information exchange is sometimes viewed as the most important 
component in NCS, especially when it occurs between the private sector and 
the government. In some cases the information can be particularly sensitive – 
293 For the case of the US see Sean Reilly, ‘IG Reviewing Overclassification at DoD,’ Defense News, 8 
February 2012.
294 Frederick Bartell et al., Collaborating with the Private Sector, (Washington, DC: Global Innovation and 
Strategy Center, 2009), http://lsgs.georgetown.edu/programs/CyberProject/STRATCOM%20Report.
pdf.
295 Elizabeth Goitein and David M. Shapiro, Reducing Overclassification Through Accountability, (New 
York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2011), http://brennan.3cdn.net/3cb5dc88d210b8558b_38m6b0
ag0.pdf.
296 In Germany, some police services (illegally) engaged in CNE activity with the help of the so-called 
‘Bundestrojaner’ (‘Federal Trojan’) (see Kai Biermann, ‘CCC enttarnt Bundestrojaner,’ Die Zeit, 8 October 
2011.).
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especially if it is potentially incriminating for the party sharing the information. LE 
and IC have a very different approach to the issue of self-incrimination. While the 
IC could very simply ignore minor illegal acts, most liberal democratic countries’ 
law enforcement agencies have absolutely no choice in the matter: they have to 
investigate breaches of the law. For this reason, most information exchanges related 
to cyber security tend to have a stronger connection to the IC, rather than to the 
police itself.
3.4. STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES
The development of a NCSS, and meeting specific ‘goals’, requires appropriate ‘means’. 
These means include budgets and programmed resources but fundamentally are 
mostly about processes. At a macro-level, most of these processes will be pre-
determined by the local conditions and respective political system: should the 
strategy be developed from the working-level? Or should politics take the lead? 
There are no right or wrong answers – each variant has strong and weak points.
3.4.1. Bottom-Up, Top-Down and Re-Iterative
Unlike nearly all other national security issues, cyber security touches directly on 
nearly every citizen in a country, leading to important decisions regarding how 
much to involve citizens when developing policies. Citizens that are happy to allow 
their government to decide how to combat terrorists or negotiate with neighbours 
can be easily enraged if they feel their own personal computer, their personal 
information, or access to favourite social media sites is put at risk without their 
consent.
Accordingly, there is a fine balance when developing NCSS. How open or closed 
should the process be? Nations have so far chosen one of three paths: top-down, 
bottom-up or a re-iterative combination of the two. The last path is usually only 
available when there has already been substantial prior discussion.
France and the United Kingdom can be said to have embarked on a top-down path. 
National telecommunication champions and other outside voices may have had some 
influence in the development of their NCSS (both launched in 2011). Those central 
governments kept very tight control over the content, message and communication. 
In France, a clear hierarchy of documents aligns with the sequence of events: the 
‘re-framing’ of French security needs in the first ever National Security Strategy 
(NSS) in the Defence White Book of 2008; the creation of a single responsible 
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agency, French Network and Information Security Agency297 (ANSSI), with a clear 
mandate in 2009, and the publication of an ‘Information Systems Security and 
Defence Strategy’ by that organisation in 2011. A similar process is visible in the 
UK. The advantages are an increased focus on the document and the development 
of policies is far more streamlined. However, the document may not have buy-in 
from civil society.
Other nations have taken the opposite approach with a ‘bottom-up’ process, 
building on the evidence and advice of working groups. The German NCSS is 
such an example of a bottom-up process. The 2011 document itself was the last 
deliverable of a longer CIP process: the general National Plan for Protecting Critical 
Information Infrastructure (NPSI) in 2005 and the later specific protection plans for 
the federal government (UP-BUND) and the private sector (UP-KRITIS) in 2007.298 
Another example of this approach was the Austrian government’s ‘National ICT 
Security Strategy’ of 2012, where five working groups, composed of over 20 private 
stakeholders and numerous government departments, delivered recommendations 
on specific areas that were collated in an official document.299
With over a decade of debate on the subject, the United States has tried both 
bottom-up and top-down approaches. It now can be said to have settled into a 
re-iterative, hybrid state of discourse. To develop the National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace,300 the White House led a fully public bottom-up process in 2003 in 
town halls across the nation to hear from citizens, and targeted meetings with 
privacy experts, and technology and cyber security companies. This was a very 
in-depth and often very frustrating (and seemingly fruitless) process, although it 
did ensure more acceptance of the final document. When this document was felt to 
be no longer sufficient, the White House took the opposite top-down approach with 
the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) which was developed 
behind closed doors in classified sessions five years later. It was over two years 
before even a summary of the CNCI was declassified and released.301 Secrecy 
ensured the specific proposals did not become public, though this meant important 
stakeholders were not consulted, leaving some citizens uneasy.
297 In French: Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI).
298 See, for instance, Marc Schober, ‘Aktuelles zu Kritischen Infrastrukturen,’ in SECMGT-Workshop (DB 
Systel GmbH: Gesellschaft für Informatik, 2011).
299 Austrian Federal Chancellery, National ICT Security Strategy Austria. Note that this strategy is not the 
Austrian National Cyber Security Strategy which, as of September 2012, was still being drafted, but 
which will presumably draw heavily on the aforementioned document.
300 White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
301 White House, The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (as codified in NSPD-54/HSPD-23).
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The most recent high level strategy document, the Cyberspace Policy Review of 
2009,302 was a combination of top-down and bottom-up approach that is described 
here as ‘re-iterative’. The White House Cybersecurity Coordinator led an open 
discussion, inviting comments to shape the document but also was in the position 
to reflect back on a long range of previous documents, going back over 10 years. The 
document repeatedly referenced the need to have clear performance metrics for 
cyber security – a result of which was a more standardised collection of FISMA data 
via a specific tool.303 However, the process was clearly not as publicly-orientated as 
the 2003 effort. The final document was influenced by the non-governmental input 
but was undoubtedly the product of the White House staff.
3.4.2. Governmental vs. Societal Approaches
Cyber security policy development is not usually only an issue for government. In 
a number of countries, non-state actors have played an important role in helping 
to define their countries’ NCS posture. NCS is unlike most other national security 
issues in that non-state actors can be said to play a crucial role. A ‘societal’ approach 
to developing a national cyber policy can be said to go beyond the involvement of 
certain crucial private sector companies (such as telecommunication operators or 
defence contractors) and include other non-state actors.
Germany and the ‘Grey Hats’: on the face of it, Germany’s cyber security frameworks 
do not seem to imply a strong societal approach to national cyber policy. While the 
government master plan for improving NCS and Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection (CIIP), called UP-KRITIS,304 often makes reference to the non-state sector, 
the official connections between state and non-state actors are not as extensive 
as in other countries. The German National Cyber Security Council (NCSR305) 
represented one of the main innovations of the German NCSS,306 published in 2011. 
This Council, which met three times 2011-2012, is more of a Whole of Government 
coordination group, especially suited to communicate between the Federal (Bund) 
302 White House, Cyberspace Policy Review. Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and 
Communications Infrastructure. Note that the White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace. 
Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World is considered here to be a subsidiary 
document.
303 The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 regulates government information 
security practices. Although wide-scale reporting of specific metrics was always intended in FISMA, it 
only really could have been said to have started in the fall of 2009, based on a new collection tool (see 
Jason Miller, ‘Agencies must use Cyberscope tool for FISMA reports,’ Federal News Radio, 15 September 
2011.).
304 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Umsetzungsplan KRITIS des Nationalen Plans zum Schutz der 
Informationsinfrastrukturen (Berlin: German Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2007).
305 In German: Nationaler Cyber-Sicherheitsrat.
306 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany.
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and State (Länder) level. While in all the three meetings there were representatives 
of the industry, they are officially only present ‘upon invitation’ and do not 
represent a standing element of the structure. Therefore, officially at least, the 
German version of the Council is primarily governmental307 – even if, unofficially, 
the non-state sector plays a strong role. The strength of the German non-state 
sector can partly be seen in one example: the Chaos Computer Club (CCC). The CCC 
is one of the oldest (founded in 1981) and largest hacker organisations in the world 
and, despite having been often implicated in illegal activity, plays an important 
role in German civil society. They also regularly function as whistle blowers. Here, 
activities of the CCC include, for instance, discovering and reverse-engineering a 
piece of government malware,308 the use and functions of which were explicitly 
curtailed by the German Constitutional Court but nonetheless employed illegally 
by a number of police services. The CCC is also one of the most important cyber 
advocacy groups advising the German legislature: few bills related to the topic are 
considered without CCC being involved at some stage, for instance, when the new 
citizen engagement Web consultation service of the Bundestag threatened to be 
cancelled due to cost overruns, CCC even offered to build a new one from scratch 
for free.309 In German NCS, the role of the ‘grey hat hackers’ in CCC may be indirect, 
but it is certainly measurable, and very likely a unique state of affairs among liberal 
democracies. 
The Netherlands and the ‘Cyber Polder Model’: the Netherlands has always claimed 
a certain spirit of public-private partnerships and consensus decision-making, a 
type of social-partnership known as the ‘Polder Model’. It is, therefore, unsurprising 
that the Netherlands’ NCSS puts much emphasis on a societal approach, looking 
in particular to involve non-state parties in cyber security decision-making. One 
example of this inclusive form of working is the Dutch National Cyber Security 
Council (NCSC), a top-level advisory body. Not only is one of the co-chairs a member 
of the private sector,310 but fully eight of the 14 members of the Council can be 
described as non-state.311 Even for an advisory body (in contrast, the German NCSR 
307 Although the official description of the Council makes it clear that the private sector representatives 
are not full members of the Council, there are other explanations to be considered besides the apparent 
focus on Whole of Government rather than Whole of Nation. As other countries in Europe have 
already discovered, there can be major legal issues in determining which non-state actors (especially 
private companies) can be part of such consultative bodies and which cannot. There is a clear ‘unfair 
competition’ issue to be considered. It is, therefore, easiest to simply say that the private sector is only 
there upon ‘invitation’, and so avoid legal challenges.
308 See, for instance, Chaos Computer Club, ‘Chaos Computer Club analyzes government malware,’ CCC, 
http://ccc.de/en/updates/2011/staatstrojaner.
309 Chaos Computer Club, ‘Chaos Computer Club leistet digitale Entwicklungshilfe für die Enquête-
Kommission,’ CCC, http://www.ccc.de/de/updates/2011/adhocracy-enquete.
310 In June 2012 this was the CEO of KPN – the largest telecom company.
311 Don Eijndhoven, ‘Dutch Cyber Security Council Now Operational,’ Infosec Island, 5 July 2011.
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can be described as a supervisory body), this is a very high proportion of non-state 
actors and clearly represents a ‘societal’ approach. The Netherlands also has a further 
innovation in developing a Whole of Nation or societal approach. The Netherlands 
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)312 is neither state nor private, 
but enjoys a special constitutional status. As neither a government department nor 
a company, the TNO was well placed to run the main public-private partnership 
for a cyber security information exchange hub: the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI.NL).313 The immediate predecessor of the CPNI.NL, 
known as National Infrastructure against Cybercrime (NICC), had owed part of its 
success to the impartiality with which it was able to treat the security services 
(e.g., the ability to enforce a ‘share or quit’ rule within the individual information 
exchanges). It is perhaps doubtful that a government ministry would be similarly 
impartial.
3.4.3. Resources, Budgets and Metrics
In essence, all NCSS-type documents are first and foremost a guideline on how 
resources will be allocated in the future. Similar to a NSS, it is not necessary or 
common practice for a specific allocation of resources to be made within the 
document itself. Many NSS documents are, in fact, produced before such budgets 
have been set, in part to set the framework for the necessary discussions. What does 
have to be understood is that a strategy without assigned resources, in particular, 
a budget, is only of marginal value. It is of secondary importance if this budget is 
simply reprogrammed from existing budgets, or indeed constitutes new funds – 
what is important is that funding is available to carry out the intended activities.
Very few nations publicly disclose their relevant NCSS budgets and, if they do 
so, they are largely classified in detail. The UK was one such example. Despite 
assigning £650 million to the National Cyber Security Programme in the Cyber 
Security Strategy, the vast majority of this funding314 went directly to the single 
intelligence account in the budget. However, despite the lack of clarity as to where 
exactly the additional funding was going (or, indeed, how ‘additional’ it actually 
was), the number of ‘£650 million for UK cyber’ made for an excellent strategic 
communication device and was widely quoted in the media.
The question of how to measure performance in cyber security is still largely 
inconclusive. Most attempts have involved varying attempts at providing a Return 
312 In Dutch: Nederlandse Organisatie voor toegepast-natuurwetenschappelijk onderzoek.
313 At time of writing it was, however, unclear if the CPNI.NL will remain at the TNO.
314 Dave Clemente, Defence and Cyber-security, (London: UK Parliament, 2012), http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/1881/dcs02.htm.
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on Investment (RoI) framework to security, a process that often fails based on 
the difficulty of quantifying the gains with any reliability.315 The collection of 
any metrics to measure any cyber security performance can be a considerable 
challenge. The United States, with a strong tradition in performance management 
indicators, produces a number of metrics at various levels.316
3.5. ENGAGEMENT WITH STAKEHOLDERS
Fundamentally, any approach to NCS will have three different sets of stakeholders: 
governmental, national (societal) and international. As was explained in Section 
1, the approach used here to model the engagement of these stakeholders derives 
from terms that originated within public policy theory at large, and which focus on 
how policy is delivered: via Whole of Government (WoG), Whole of Systems (WoS), 
and, more recently, Whole of Nation approaches (WoN).317 Overall, they focus on 
the principal security challenge of the 21st century: the need for a wide range of 
different actors to work together on a very wide range of security-related themes. 
These concepts first entered security policy language within the context of peace 
building in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and are closely identified 
with related concepts within international security, such as ‘Fragile States’ and 
‘Conflict Prevention’ policies.318 Increasingly, these approaches are being applied 
315 One such attempt of quantifying these gains is ROSI, or Return on Security Investment. There are 
a number of different methods on how to exactly accomplish this but, for an example of integrating 
ROSI with the COBIT risk management system, see ISACA, G41 Return on Security Investment (ROSI), 
(Rolling Meadows, IL: ISACA, 2010), http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/Standards/Documents/
G41-ROSI-5Feb10.pdf.
316 Examples of these metrics include the three high-level CAP metrics for measuring cyber security (see 
US Government, ‘Using Goals to Improve Performance and Accountability,’ Performance.gov, http://
goals.performance.gov/goals_2013.), and the monthly reporting practice in-line with the FISMA 
legislation using the ‘cyberscope’ tool (see Greg Schaffer, Federal Information Security Memorandum. 
FY 2012 Reporting Instructions for the Federal Information Security Management Act and Agency 
Privacy Management, ed. US Department of Homeland Security (Arlington, VA 2012).)
317 For an example of how the Department of Homeland Security is using the ‘Whole-of-X’ terminology 
for cyber security see Janet Napolitano, State of America’s Homeland Security Address [Remarks], 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 27 January 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/
news/2011/01/27/state-americas-homeland-security-address.
318 The WoG approach has been developed particularly in the context of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee’s (DAC) Fragile States Group (FSG). See OECD, Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile 
States, (Paris: OECD, 2006), http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/whole-of-governmentapp
roachestofragilestates.htm. For an overview of these and related concepts see Kristiina Rintakoski 
and Mikko Autti, Comprehensive Approach. Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in 
Crisis Prevention and Management, (Helsinki: Finish Ministry of Defence, 2008), http://www.defmin.
fi/files/1316/Comprehensive_Approach_-_Trends_Challenges_and_Possibilities_for_Cooperation_
in_Crisis_Prevention_and_Management.pdf. For WoN interpretations see, for instance, Michael G. 
Mullen, ‘Working Together: Modern Challenges Need ‘Whole-of-Nation’ Effort,’ JFQ 4, no. 59 (2010).
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to NCS, as they address the most basic issue of NCS: the reality of the increasing 
‘diffusion of power’319 among various actors, most of them non-state.
3.5.1. Whole of Government (WoG)
Originally, the Whole of Government approach (WoG, known in the UK as ‘ joined-
up government’320 and also known as ‘networked government’) was conceived 
primarily as a cost-saving measure: government departments were encouraged to 
pool resources and to deliver ‘more for same.’ At the same time, many policy-makers 
were starting to identify the comprehensive international failure in the Balkans in 
the early 1990s with a complete lack of coordination among all actors. Consequently, 
WoG concepts were developed. The most prevalent of such concepts today is the 
so-called ‘3D Approach’ (for Diplomacy, Development and Defence),321 first applied 
by Canadian forces in Afghanistan in 2004 and used today by many Western 
governments, including the United States.322
Applying this approach to NCS is increasingly viewed as being key to success in 
national cyber security. As was remarked upon in Section 1.4, the challenges for 
NCS extend over a wide number of different specific fields, or mandates. These 
mandates can, for instance, range from military cyber operations to diplomacy and 
counter cyber crime. Each of these mandates is infused with its own strategic goals, 
language and basic philosophy. The fundamental differences mean that, even two 
seemingly closely related approaches such as the IC and LE can approach a subject 
such as cyber crime from very different angles.
In practice, this means that the esoteric nature of the individual mandates naturally 
leads to ‘stovepiping’ in narrowly defined government organisations. In the worst 
case, this means that a number of different organisations and governmental 
departments will work on a similar subject (e.g., cyber crime legislation) and not 
coordinate with each other. This failure at a policy level can also easily be duplicated 
by a failure at the practical, operational level. In countries that are just in the 
process of formulating a NCSS it is quite normal to see a highly fragmented cyber 
defence landscape: each ministry or department will often be responsible for their 
319 Nye, The Future of Power.
320 For an Australian example see State Government Victoria, Victorian approaches to joined up 
government. An overview, (Melbourne: State Services Authority, 2007), http://www.ssa.vic.gov.au/
images/stories/product_files/71_joined_up_government.pdf.
321 See Robbert Gabriëlse, ‘A 3D Approach to Security and Development,’ PfP Consortium Quarterly 
Journal 6, no. 2 (2007).
322 Critics have often remarked that, going by budget allocations, it should really be ‘Defence, Diplomacy 
and Development’, as the money spent on ‘Defence’ in Afghanistan is more than a factor higher than 
spent on ‘Development’.
96Engagement with Stakeholders
own networks. More advanced cyber nations are aware that this highly fragmented 
approach is a losing proposition in the longer term,323 and seek to empower at 
least a central coordinating body within the operational (and often policy) levels of 
government.
Building coordination among government departments is probably one of the most 
important tasks of any grand strategy within NCS. The US DoD, for instance, clearly 
stated in its 2011 ‘Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace’ that one of its five main 
initiatives was ‘to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy.’324 Similar 
goals have been expressed in India,325 New Zealand,326 Canada,327 Australia,328 
Germany329 and other countries. Increasingly, however, countries go beyond the 
emphasis of WoG and are seeking to emphasise the societal or national view: the 
Whole of Nation approach.
3.5.2. Whole of Nation (WoN)
For NCS, the importance of the private sector and the civil society is obvious. The 
private sector is responsible for virtually all of the software, hardware, and services 
which are exploited for cyber attacks, maintains most of the network infrastructure 
over which these attacks are conducted, and often owns the critical infrastructure 
that these attacks are directed against. Furthermore, civil society actors, as distinct 
from the private sector, dominate cyberspace. Civil society actors define the 
programmed parameters (e.g., the software protocols) of the cyber domain, as well 
as executing, researching and, ultimately, publicly speculating on cyber attacks. 
Together, these non-governmental actors account for the bulk of what is termed 
‘national’ cyber security.
323 There is an argument that a highly fragmented governmental cyber defence (e.g., each ministry having 
its own CERT) provides for some ‘resilience’, or defence in depth, through diversity. While this is 
also true, this approach to resilience is enormously expensive and, ultimately, will still have all the 
disadvantages of the small organisation while it is unlikely to implement all the more significant needs 
a true resilience strategy would entail.
324 US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace: 8.
325 Press Trust of India, ‘PM-led National Security Council discusses cyber security,’ Daily News and 
Analysis, 28 June 2012.
326 The term ‘all of government’ is used in New Zealand (see New Zealand Ministry of Economic 
Development, New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy.).
327 Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee, Checks and Balances. Viewing Security Intelligence 
Through the Lens of Accountability, (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee, 2011), 
http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2010-2011-eng.pdf. 18.
328 Australian Government, ‘Cyber Security Policy and Coordination Branch,’ http://www.ag.gov.au/
Organisationalstructure/Pages/CyberSecurityPolicyandCoordinationBranch.aspx.
329 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber Security Strategy for Germany.
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It was the realisation of the importance of non-state actors which provided the 
impetus for developing the Whole of Nation approach (WoN), both in cyber 
security specifically, but also in a number of different security policy fields. WoN, 
as opposed to WoG, goes under many different names but the intent is usually the 
same: improved cooperation between national state and non-state actors, the latter 
including utilities, academia, ICT companies and even private individuals. Exactly 
how the ‘increased cooperation’ is achieved is, of course, subject to different national 
political systems and cooperations. Countries with stronger central government 
seem to view WoN as a legal instrument to enforce compliance from non-state 
actors in situations of national danger. This is not dissimilar to the approach of total 
defence popular among smaller European countries in the Cold War. The majority 
view in liberal democracies is to treat the federal government as the ‘primus inter 
pares’ among a number of different stakeholders; stakeholders that often need to be 
convinced, rather than forced, to cooperate. However, there remains little thinking 
in many countries as to how the military would protect  critical infrastructure under 
determined assault by another nation. Often, the defence ministry is concerned 
with the resilience of the private sector only as far as it ensures continuity of its 
own operations.
The first example of WoN is often within the critical infrastructure protection 
mandate. This encompasses infrastructure that is often overwhelmingly held 
in private hands and NCS has a direct national interest in helping protect these 
companies from cyber attack. The cooperation between the state and non-state 
sector at the very least includes agreeing on basic risk management standards, 
but usually goes much further. Other components include common risk analysis 
frameworks, operational information exchange, and even common operational 
cyber defence structures.330 CIP is, however, not the only focus of a WoN approach 
in the cyber domain. Depending on the focus, this approach can come to include 
diverging concepts such as child safety online and paramilitary ‘cyber militias.’331 
Overall, it is possible to differentiate three different levels of cooperation: the 
defence, security and critical infrastructure level; the commercial cyber security 
level, and the civil society level. Each level is critical – the civil society level, for 
instance, is responsible for not only aspects such as data protection and internet 
freedoms but is, technically speaking, the driving force behind the World Wide 
330 The possible deployment of the US federal EINSTEIN 3 Intrusion Prevention System to members of 
the national critical infrastructure programme is one, hotly debated, example. For an analysis of that 
debate see Steven M. Bellovin et al., ‘Can It Really Work? Problems with Extending EINSTEIN 3 to 
Critical Infrastructure,’ Harvard National Security Journal 3, no. 1 (2011).
331 An example of this is the Estonian Cyber Defence League. See, for instance, Luukas Ilves, ‘Cyber Security 
Trends and Challenges,’ in Cyber Security Trends and Challenges: Latvian and Estonian Perspective 
(Riga: CERT.LV, 2012).
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Web (see Section 3.3.3). This diversity illustrates that WoN is primarily a catch-all 
term, intended to encapsulate all non-state activity relevant to national security.332
Within a few years the term ‘Whole of Nation’ has gone from complete obscurity 
to recognised lingo within the National Security Council333 and other parts of the 
US government – equally, the term ‘Whole of Society’334 is often employed. The 
term has also been used in Australia for a number of years in security policy 
documents.335 The definition of the term ‘Whole of Nation’ varies according to 
its contexts – indeed, there are no accepted universal definitions. In the UK, the 
WoN approach is equivalent to the ‘Comprehensive Approach’, which has also been 
applied to cyber,336 besides numerous other security topics. In the Dutch National 
Cyber Security Strategy, the term ‘network-centred form of collaboration’337 is 
used to discuss the same process. In Germany, the term ‘gesamtstaatlich’ is a close 
equivalent, and often used in the NCS related discourse,338 although the German 
military also talks about using networked security (Vernetzte Sicherheit) as a type 
of comprehensive approach. In most cases, the WoN approach is an attempt to 
facilitate cooperation. When applied to the private sector, it represents the essence 
of the ‘self regulation where possible, legislation where necessary’ approach.339 
Consequently, the most important WoN organisations are wide-reaching advisory 
bodies with strong non-state contributions (e.g., the Dutch Cyber Security Council).
332 In France, there have been a number of documents which illustrate the importance of the private sector 
in general and the critical infrastructure (infrastructure vital) in particular. See, for instance, Roger 
Romani, Rapport d’informations sur la cyberdéfense (Paris: Sénat, 2008). 48-50.
333 See Homeland Security News Wire, ‘GAO: U.S. slow to implement president’s cyber security strategy,’ 
Homeland Security News Wire, 20 October 2010.
334 See, for instance, Mike Anderson, ‘Trojans, Malware and Botnets got you down...?,’ United States 
European Command, 24 January 2012.
335 One of the first mentions of WoN occurred in Australia in 1997.See Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest. Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997). For a more recent analysis see Anthony M. 
Forestier, ‘Effects-Based Operations: An Underpinning Philosophy for Australia’s External Security?,’ 
Security Challenges 2, no. 1 (2006).
336 See UK Home Office, Cyber Crime Strategy. Also see UK Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy 
of the United Kingdom: Update 2009. Security for the Next Generation, (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 
2009), http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm75/7590/7590.pdf.
337 Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, ‘The National Cyber Security Strategy. Strength Through 
Cooperation,’ (The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, 2011), 9.
338 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland (Berlin: German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2011). 5 and 12.
339 As in Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, ‘The National Cyber Security Strategy. Strength Through 
Cooperation.’
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3.5.3. Whole of System (WoS)
With the growth in popularity of the ‘3D Approach’ in so-called Stabilisation 
Operations, such as Afghanistan, there came increased criticism, in particular 
by development and aid organisations. As independent, non-state actors working 
internationally, they certainly did not see themselves as being subject to any type 
of WoG effort to ‘coordinate’ them. Their world was flat hierarchy, international and 
made up of very similar organisations with shared values and organisations (e.g., 
an interconnected ‘system’). To illustrate their independence, these organisations 
started using the Whole of System approach (WoS) to talk about increased 
cooperation among what has become known as ‘like-minded actors’.340 It was not 
only civilian aid groups that liked the implication that they were organisations 
independent from government coordination, but both NATO and the European 
Union also developed their own concepts of WoS which illustrated their international 
mandates.341
In cyber security as well as in ‘Fragile States’ policy, international cooperation does 
not only mean ‘between governments’. Cyber security is overwhelmingly an issue 
addressed by non-state organisations. For instance, the international Forum of 
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) group of accredited CERTs play a 
major role in facilitating international cyber security (also for governments), but is 
itself rooted within academia. Within the field of internet governance, the ‘technical’ 
component is often addressed via organisations such as the IETF and IEEE.342 Being 
composed largely of volunteers and (increasingly) private sector representatives, 
the role of government here is rather limited. Government, especially if it is 
committed to ‘multi-stakeholder governance’,343 cannot claim much direct influence 
on these groups’ work. It can encourage them to self-organise and generally seek to 
provide an open door to possible engagement. Governments have a stronger input 
with policy-focused organisations, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the ITU, but especially within issues of ‘cyber 
340 The 3D of the WoS approach has been called ‘3C’ (for Coherent, Coordinated and Complimentary) 
and was particularly developed by the OECD-Development Assistance Committee. See, for instance, 
OECD, A Comprehensive Response to Conflict and Fragility, (Paris: OECD, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/
development/conflictandfragility/44392383.pdf.
341 The EU WoS approach is often called the Whole of the Union approach. While often used as a shorthand 
for simple agreed-upon action among members, often the term is used to imply the need for directly 
assigned organisational assets (such as helicopters or the like). The NATO WoS approach is more 
operational and was encapsulated as the ‘Comprehensive Approach’. The most recent addition to this 
thinking is the term ‘smart defence’, which seeks to look at a better pooling and sharing of resources.
342 The Internet Engineering Task Force, and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, respectively.
343 As defined in Council of Europe, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on Internet governance 
principles (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2011).
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diplomacy.’344 This rapidly evolving field deals with issues such as norms of state 
behaviour in cyberspace, and discussing confidence building measures between 
states.
 
Table 6:  Differences Between WoG, WoN and WoS
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 - Central Government
 - State Government
 - Local Government
 - Contractors/CIP
 - ICT/Security Specialists
 - Civil Society/Academia
 - Diplomats
 - Internet Governance 
Stakeholders




Mode Coordination Cooperation Collaboration
Cyber Security 
Examples OCSIA (UK) CSC (NL) ICANN
This complicated international dimension of cyber security has not always been fully 
understood. While most early NCS documents pay lip service to the transnational 
nature of cyber, the realisation that it is needed to play a key role in such strategies 
only developed in recent years. A consistent challenge was that, despite having the 
word ‘international’, the WoS approach to cyber security usually goes beyond the 
activities of the relevant foreign ministries. When the US drafted the ‘International 
Strategy for Cyberspace’ in 2010-11, 18 different government agencies contributed 
to the vision.345 As the US experience showed, the bundling of very different views 
from different mandates is a complicated, arduous process but it needs to be done. 
344 As defined in Potter, Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century, 7. However, 
Potter was referring to ‘e-diplomacy’ which is interpreted here as the ability to enable diplomacy with 
new media.
345 See Colleen O’Hara, ‘Global Cyber Sleuth. The State Department’s Chris Painter relishes his role as a 
cyber diplomat,’ Leadership Winter (2012): 43.
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In NCSS created during and after 2010, ‘international cooperation’ is always ranked 
as one of the top five initiatives.346
3.5.4. National Cyber Security: Coordinate, Cooperate and 
Collaborate
Each of the ‘dimensions’ described above refers only to one particular aspect of 
NCS: the importance of working with other actors within different contexts. This 
probably remains one of the single most important success factors in NCS. In this 
context, one can distinguish between three main working modes:
Coordination: within government, the challenge is to develop a unity of purpose 
across the different levels and types of government – especially within federal 
government and between federal and local structures. Although national political 
systems differ greatly, the intended effect will always be the same: the improved 
coordination of national efforts. As the term ‘coordination’ implies, this is only 
possible where there is a clear legal mandate to exercise control over functions 
situated in different parts of government. This can be a considerable challenge. In 
many liberal democratic governments, even the head of the government function 
(e.g., a prime minister’s office or similar) does not have the authority to order other 
parts of the national government. Even more difficult is the situation in political 
systems that are heavily federalised. In these systems, state and local governments 
(which of course can include major cities and national critical infrastructure) 
are often totally independent from central government on cyber security issues. 
Although most political systems have measures in place to ensure central control 
in case of a significant national emergency, the very information security measures 
that are supposed to prevent such emergencies are often not coordinated, greatly 
raising the risk of a significant cyber security event occurring.347 Addressing the 
coordination issue that exists both between, as well as within, the individual levels 
of government (central, state and local) nearly always represents one of the most 
significant challenges for NCS.
Cooperation: a further significant challenge for government represents non-state 
actors, both organised and non-organised which, as has repeatedly been pointed 
out, are absolutely central to all types of NCS issues. Within the larger, societal 
346 This includes the French Cyber Defence Strategy, as well as the UK, Dutch, German and other strategies 
published within that time frame.
347 There is an opinion that ‘overcentralise’ is actually the worse thing for NCS. This view states that 
diversity in both information security standards and especially ICT hard- and software represents the 
best assurance against a major cyber attack. Even within the most extreme interpretation of this view 
it is necessary, however, to have a single body that at least can ensure that certain activities are not 
duplicated, especially when these activities would certainly interfere with each other.
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aspect (WoN) the legal powers of the government will often be less clear and, in 
essence, secondary. This becomes obvious when the entire scope of necessary 
action across all national or societal components is examined. Certain non-state 
enterprises (such as defence contractors and perhaps even all critical infrastructures 
providers) may be directly regulated by the state. In some cases there might even 
be classified communication channels and exchanges of information. But there are 
limits to how far this could go. On a second level of analysis, for instance, other 
companies (such as virtually all the software companies as well as the hardware 
and ICT security companies) will not be addressed by any CIP legislation. The 
contribution of these companies, even when they are not directly connected to a 
national security infrastructure, is immense and often crucial. But they will seldom 
be the target of specific regulations and thus cannot be ‘ordered’ to do anything 
by the government. Even more difficult is the situation when a third and final 
analysis is applied: the smaller non-organised non-state actors. This includes small 
civil society, advocacy and research groups, and even includes individual bloggers 
and key technical volunteers. This group represents a major force in internet 
governance (indeed, it can be claimed that the internet is largely built by such 
individuals) but, due to their small individual size or non-hierarchal organisation, 
are very difficult for government to engage with. Legislative measures, at least 
within liberal democracies, can, therefore, never be comprehensive enough to be 
able to coordinate the non-state sector. The government instead can only encourage 
the voluntary cooperation among these actors, and this usually, in turn, depends on 
transparency and trust in relationships that can only be built over time.
Collaboration: within the international dimension (WoS) the elements of 
governmental collaboration and the national/societal cooperation becomes 
most apparent. From a government point of view this dimension can be roughly 
segmented into three layers and these illustrate the importance of the non-state 
actors in the domain. At the first, diplomatic, level, government reigns supreme, 
but even here non-state actors often play a crucial role – in particular within Track 
1.5 bilateral discussions348 and similar. At the second level, which includes internet 
governance and related activities, government already often has a minor role, 
especially within technical matters. Finally, at the third level, there are a galaxy 
of related scientific and industry working groups as well as other organisations. 
The government plays a very minor role. In fact, many of the technical standards 
and industry collaborations are agreed upon without any government influence 
whatsoever. The government will never be able to legislate itself through this 
environment – not only will other nations not necessarily want to adopt an alien 
agenda but the non-state actors of a particular nation will probably not just mutely 
348 This refers to ‘unofficially official’ diplomatic exchanges, mostly conducted with the help of non-state 
actors. See Sections 2.3.3 and 4.5.1.
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submit to a government agenda when it clashes with their own. Indeed, the opposite 
requirement is the case: government often does not understand international cyber 
security requirements, and completely depends on the non-state sector to help 
inform Track 1 (official) diplomatic discussions. In the contexts of international 
cyber security discussions, governments must appreciate this when dealing with 
foreign governments, giant transnational corporations, and little anarchic groups 
of programmers. 
3.6. STRATEGIC PITFALLS, FRICTIONS AND 
LESSONS IDENTIFIED
When creating a NCSS, there are a number of lessons that can be taken from other 
policy development processes, for instance, from developing conflict prevention 
frameworks and similar. These have been dealt with elsewhere.349 Here, a couple of 
macro trends are listed instead:
Underestimating Talk: as has been indicated above (Section 3.5.4), the need to 
work within an environment defined by the increased ‘diffusion of power’350 is 
perhaps the greatest challenge to government. The plethora of actors that need 
to be engaged to exercise NCS represents not only a conceptual challenge to 
government (adjusting to unclear hierarchies, unofficial mandates, and uncertain 
legal basis), but a considerable resource challenge as well. The necessity of engaging 
with all these actors is often much more time consuming than, for instance, policy 
development. But it is this engagement that builds trust, and basic trust is more 
important than any policy document.
Overestimating definitions: clarity of communication and concepts is extremely 
important. However, specific definitions are one of the most elusive components of 
cyber security. Between individual government mandates, let alone nations or ICT 
security interest groups, there is often a wide variety of specific definitions or legal 
frameworks that are used. This is partially due to the nature of the evolving cyber 
domain and, when evaluating strategy and strategic frameworks, it is necessary 
to be aware of fundamentals and not let oneself be constrained by the particular 
language of the forum in which one is operating. For this reason, any adjustment to 
legal frameworks has to pay particular attention to the vagaries and implications of 
349 See Alexander Klimburg, ‘Lessons from the Comprehensive Approach for Whole of Nation 
Cybersecurity,’ Per Concordiam 2, no. 2 (2011). (For a German version of this article see Alexander 
Klimburg, ‘Gesamtstaatliche Ansätze zur Cybersicherheit. Erfahrungen aus Österreich,’ in Strategie 
und Sicherheit 2012. Der Gestaltungsspielraum der österreichischen Sicherheitspolitik, ed. Johann 
Pucher and Johann Frank (Wien et al.: Böhlau Verlag, 2012).)
350 See Nye, The Future of Power: 113-51.
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specific definitions – not because these legal frameworks will determine the course 
of cyber security in the future, but because those frameworks will be ignored if 
the definitions they use do not reflect the true fundamental needs of NCS. It is 
often much easier and more useful for policy-makers to develop useful descriptions 
outlining general concepts, rather than fixating on tight definitions.
Encouraging path dependency: a major challenge to cyber security is the esoteric 
nature of the subject. Few issues relevant to national security are as multi-faceted 
and complex, or more dependent on confidential or secret information as sources 
of knowledge. This has encouraged a number of bottom-up processes. Essentially, 
these are viewed as positive developments, as they often are built on a sound 
technical basis. Unfortunately, in some cases, this can lead to essential strategic 
decisions being taken within a very narrow (and low level) strategic framework. 
Many organisations will strive to accomplish their specifically assigned goals (be it 
in intelligence collection or cyber defence, or similar) and will thus give themselves 
the greatest amount of leeway and resources to accomplish their mission. Changes 
to facilitate a particular task at this level can, however, greatly impact the core 
values of a nation. This can occur without the strategic or political level being 
fully cognisant of what is occurring – be it towards data protection, due process in 
awarding commercial contracts, investment in key infrastructures and technology, 
the use of law enforcement means, or the launch of offensive cyber attacks. At 
the strategic level, care must be paid to overtly delegating responsibility for these 
issues. The results could be quite the opposite of what policy-makers were aiming 
for.
Ignoring Flexibility: ‘learning by doing’ is a core element of most policy development 
processes, and, in NCS, it is absolutely vital. Rapid technological change and 
a variety of unknown unknowns (e.g., the true extent of the interdependence of 
critical infrastructures) mean that most policy documents, regulations, and even 
political and legal frameworks, are unlikely to withstand their first trial by fire 
without major challenges. In-depth operational exercises, exchange of lessons 
learned, and an emphasis on continuous policy development can help, but do not 
replace the basic need to continuously question basic assumptions. Otherwise, a 
lack of flexibility could easily spell disaster.
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Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance 
(OCSIA) 
The Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) of the 
United Kingdom is a strategic coordination body that is a good example of 
the Whole of Government approach (WoG). Originally formed in 2009, it 
became the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) 
in 2010. The OCSIA coordinates nearly all cyber security programmes 
run by the UK government that are directly relevant to national cyber 
security. Most importantly, it is responsible for the allocation of the 
(£650 million strong) National Cyber Security Programme funding. It 
has four main priorities: improving national cyber security, improving 
cyber defence of critical infrastructure; combating cyber crime and 
enhancing education and skills.
As part of the UK Cabinet Office, OCSIA provides strategic direction 
to all UK government stakeholders for cyber security and information 
security and is responsible for keeping the Cabinet and the National 
Security Council apprised of developments in this area. OCSIA is not an 
intelligence organisation but works closely (and is partially co-located 
with) the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), based within the 
headquarters of GCHQ.
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Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
is a strategic coordination body that perhaps best represents the 
Whole of System approach (WoS). As a private, non-profit corporation 
headquartered in California, ICANN is a global multi-stakeholder 
organisation, meaning that while governments have a voice, so do the 
private sector, technical experts, and civil society. Almost anyone can 
join ICANN working groups in a bottom-up, consensus-driven process. 
ICANN is, in effect, granted its mandate through a contract with the US 
Department of Commerce and the US government does have a special 
role to play. Nonetheless, ICANN is not subordinate to any government.
ICANN is responsible for the operation and coordination of many of the 
critical, behind-the-scenes functions that keeps the internet functioning. 
In particular, it helps maintain and secure the Domain Name System, 
the ‘telephone book’ of the internet that makes it possible to use names 
instead of internet Protocol (IP) numbers to navigate. As ICANN takes a 
tiny portion of sales for certain top-level domains (such as .com) it has 
grown in-line with the internet and, in 2011, had a budget of over $60 
million.
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The Dutch Cyber Security Council 
The Dutch Cyber Security Council (CSR) was officially set up on the 30th 
of June 2011 by the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice on the basis 
of the Dutch National Cyber Security Strategy. The CSR is responsible 
for proactively and reactively advising the government and the private 
sector of cyber security and threat developments: advising on R&D, 
education and awareness issues, and reviewing the state of cyber 
security legislation from the point of view of human rights and data 
protection. Although officially in an advisory and not a supervision role, 
the Council is made up of high-ranking members from the private and 
public sector who have the ability to request restricted information to 
help formulate their own opinion. The CSR has released some of their 
comments and criticisms to the public.
The CSR is staffed with resources from the public and private sectors 
as well as from the R&D and academic communities. The Council is 
publicly-privately co-chaired by the National Coordinator for Counter-
terrorism and Security, and the CEO of KPN Telecom. The Council meets 
at regular intervals but also had several meetings during the DigiNotar 
cyber security incident. In a national crisis situation, the CSR forms its 
own Whole of Nation crisis management ‘ICT Response Board’ (called 
IRB) from technical resources in the private and public sector. The IRB 
can directly engage with the wider cyber security community and pass 
recommendations and information, via the CSR, directly to the top of the 
national crisis management hierarchy.
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4. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES & 
CONSIDERATIONS
Eric Luiijf, Jason Healey
Section 4: Principal Findings
• Essentially, national cyber security (NCS) can be split into five distinct 
subject areas or mandates. These ‘Five Mandates’ are Military Cyber, 
Counter Cyber Crime, Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) & Crisis 
Management, Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence, and Cyber Diplomacy 
& Internet Governance.
• These mandates can be mapped along all stages of a cyber incident, 
as well as all four levels of government: the political/policy, strategic, 
operational, and tactical/technical levels.
• Further, these Mandates connect with ‘cross-mandates’: Information 
Exchange & Data Protection, Coordination, as well as Research & 
Development and Education. 
• While it is important to understand the uniqueness of each of the five 
mandates, it is even more important to understand their commonalities, 
and their need for close coordination.
• A wide range of organisations engage in international cyber security 
activities. The most relevant of these are often not state but non-state 
groups.
• A lack of understanding of the mandates can lead to stovepiped app-
roaches resulting in conflicting legal requirements and friction bet-
ween cyber security functions, organisations and capabilities.
• Assigning resources without a policy can be as dangerous as drafting 
a policy without assigning the resources.
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4.1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this section is to review specific types of national cyber security 
(NCS) areas (also called ‘mandates’) and examine the organisational and 
collaborative models associated with them. Before discussing the wide variety of 
organisational structures at the national and international levels, a decomposition 
model will be presented that delineates both common and specific cyber security 
functions, capabilities, and responsibilities along three different axes (Section 4.2). 
On the one hand we will distinguish between five NCS mandates. This section 
expands Klimburg’s351 segmentation and supplements it by three additional cross-
mandates. Other axes are the cyber security incident response cycle and the various 
levels of decision-making. This decomposition model shall assist the reader in 
understanding the rationale behind the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities 
of organisations involved in cyber security as entities which, over the years, have 
been shaped by the specific division of tasks between the government, its agencies, 
public organisations, associations, and private companies. Section 4.3 provides an 
overview of the stakeholders involved in the provision of cyber security.
Taking the decomposition model as the point of departure, Section 4.4 strives to 
determine the main focus of analysis along the five mandates mentioned in Section 
1 and three cross-mandates. Building upon this framework, Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 
4.7 introduce the common set of national and international organisations. It is 
important to note that these sections also pay due attention to the special tasks 
which may be recognised by, and assigned to, various organisational subunits or 
organisations all belonging to one and the same mandate, or to a single service 
organisation in one of the mandates with the aim of supporting the other mandates. 
Finally, Section 4.8 will discuss some organisational pitfalls and lessons identified 
when addressing cyber security at the national level.
4.2. DELINEATING ORGANISATIONAL FUNCTIONS, 
CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
To position the many cyber security functions, capabilities and responsibilities at 
the national and international levels, an analytical framework can be useful for 
further discussion. While there are certainly a number of methods that can be 
employed, the approach applied here focuses on three closely connected building 
blocks: the NCS mandates and cross-mandates; a generalised tool to analyse organi-
sational conduct at large, and the incident management cycle.
351 See Klimburg in Klimburg and Mirtl, Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65). 15-9.
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A first decomposition is to split the functions across the five perspectives (called 
mandates) as described at more length elsewhere352 and in Section 1.353 These 
mandates include: (1) Internet Governance and Cyber Diplomacy, (2) Cyber Crisis 
Management and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), (3) Military Cyber 
Operations, (4) Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence, and (5) Counter Cyber Crime. This 
approach is supplemented by three additional cross-mandates that work across all 
the mandates equally. They include (1) Coordination, (2) Information Exchange and 
Data Protection, and (3) Research and Education.
4.2.1. Across the Levels of Government
An obvious, second way of decomposition is a vertical one, perpendicular to each 
of the mandates and cross-mandates. Along four distinct levels of analysis, this 
approach combines both a military and a political understanding of war. 
The two probably most succinct (and opposing) notions on the nature of war 
equally address the most important relationship between the act of war and the 
political sphere: either ‘[w]ar is a mere continuation of policy’,354 or ‘[p]olitics is 
the continuation of war’.355 It is long understood that it is necessary to combine 
the military and the political perspective into a more comprehensive approach of 
understanding conflict, such as was done in the US military construct of state-
conflict.356 By adding a ‘political’ or ‘policy’357 level on top of the traditional 
war-fighting triangle (which is composed of the strategic,358 operational359 and 
tactical360 levels),361 this model goes beyond a purely military understanding of 
military operations. 
352 See ibid.
353 See Klimburg in Section 1.5.4.
354 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin Books, 1982 [1832]). 119.
355 Michel Foucault, ‘Society must be defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976 (New York: 
Pan Books Limited, 2003). 15.
356 David W Barno, ‘Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency,’ Parameters 36, no. 2 (2006).
357 Defined as: ‘principle or course of action’ (see Policy, Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford 
University Press, 2012)).
358 Defined as: ‘the art of projecting and directing’ (see Strategy, Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford 
University Press, 2012)).
359 Defined as: ‘a planned and coordinated activity involving a number of people’ (See Operation, Oxford 
English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, 2012)).
360 Defined as: ‘skilful in devising means to ends’ (See Tactical, Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford 
University Press, 2012)).
361 In the civil context, the operational and tactical levels of decision-taking are often reversed. In this 
section, however, we will use the military naming order: strategic, operational and tactical.
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To go even further, it is suggested here that the four-level construct can be 
applied as an instrument to study the much broader context of organisational 
decision-making structures in government at large. As such, the four levels can be 
transformed into a more generalised analytical tool including: policy level where 
long-term political objectives are defined (e.g., a ‘White Book’ announcing cyber 
security as a top national priority); a strategic level where organisations are set 
up to achieve the predefined objectives (e.g., a directive establishing a specific 
body to achieve cyber security); an operational level where the different tasks 
within an individual organisation are coordinated (e.g., the segmentation of an 
organisation into different departments), and a tactical level where the specific 
tasks are ultimately executed (e.g., the specific tactics, techniques and procedures 
that are employed for each task). This delineation will be used for the positioning 
of organisational functions and capabilities only – in particular, to help provide 
possible examples for operational NCS institutions. Up front, it is important 
to remark that a strict separation of decision-taking processes into strategic-
operational-tactical institutions does not necessarily reflect the actual reach of 
operational or tactical institutions. Effectively, a tactical level institution (say, a 
Computer Emergency Response Team within a crisis management unit) can take 
decisions that have global consequences, impacting not only the strategic but also, 
potentially, the political level as well.
Figure 3: The Four Levels of War as a Generalised Tool for Analysis 
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It is required that the organisational responsibilities are assigned at each of these 
levels. In many cases, however, a clear distinction between the various levels can 
be difficult. Sometimes specific tasks (at the tactical level) are ‘bolted on’ to the 
organisations or to strategic goals to which they are only partially suited. Indeed, 
this misalignment of specific tasks to unsuited organisations, levels or even 
mandates is a major challenge for national cyber security. The organisational 
embedding of a national Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) function362 
in a number of nations is a good example of such a misalignment. In various 
nations, the government CERT function has been a quick fix add-on to an existing 
government organisational structure. Often, this crucial tactical function is not tied 
into the most appropriate vertical decision-making structure or, indeed, within the 
best horizontal connections. For instance, one European national CERT is attached 
to the Ministry of Finance – a ministry that has effectively nothing in common 
with the particular mission of a CERT as described by CERT/CC at Carnegie Mellon 
University.363, 364 However, there are numerous examples where a government 
CERT will, for instance, not receive specific intelligence as it is not part of the right 
governmental information channel, even though they are often the only body 
that can actually act on this intelligence. This in turn limits the effectiveness of 
national-level CERTs, leading other departments to duplicate their activities which 
can ultimately lead to a ‘function creep’ with an inter-agency conflict as a result.
4.2.2. Across the Incident Management Cycle
A third method of delineation is to distinguish the cyber security functions, 
capabilities and responsibilities along the so-called ‘incident management cycle’. The 
‘plan-resist-detect-respond’365 security incident management cycle is one popular 
approach that has been specifically been adapted to information security.366 This 
362 Described within the present context as ‘tactical’ function, although, in fact, a CERT/CSIRT is essentially 
an ‘organisational’ unit with its own specific subordinate tasks (see Section 3.1.4). In essence, a CERT is 
group of people in an organisation who coordinate their response to breaches of information security 
or other computer emergencies such as breakdowns and disasters. Other accounts also refer here to a 
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), a Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) or just 
Incident Response Team (IRT). A CERT is a highly scalable entity: it can range in size from a single part-
time employee without an assigned workstation to an organisation with hundreds of staff providing 
24/7 services from a hardened facility.
363 See Carnegie Mellon University, ‘About Us’.
364 Robert Bruce et al., International Policy Framework for Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure: 
A Discussion Paper Outlining Key Policy Issues (TNO Report 33680), (Delft: Tuck School of Business at 
Dartmouth, 2005), http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/library/158.pdf. vii, and 77-80.
365 Lenny Zeltser, ‘The Big Picture of the Security Incident Cycle,’ Computer Forensics and Incident 
Response, 27 September 2010.
366 See, for instance, NITRD, ‘Interagency Working Group on Cyber Security and Information Assurance 
(CSIA IWG),’ NITRD, https://connect.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/index.php?title=Interagency_Working_
Group_on_Cyber_Security_and_Information_Assurance_%28CSIA_IWG%29.
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cycle closely resembles the traditional emergency management cycle (comprising 
four elements: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery), a cycle which is 
often found in the US emergency management literature and functional planning.367
In Europe, four or five elements are recognised in making up the cyber security 
incident management cycle: pro-action, prevention, preparation, response and 
recovery. Response and recovery are sometimes combined into a single element: 
suppression. Some nations, like the Netherlands, recognise another essential sixth 
element: aftercare/follow up.
The lack of a uniform structure for incident, emergency and crisis management is 
reflected by a wide variety of definitions for each of these elements in the security 
management cycle.368, 369 For the decomposition approach this will not be a problem 
as, in this section, it is only needed to understand the functional placement of NCS 
functions, capabilities, and responsibilities along the incident response cycle.
Pro-action: defined as ‘activities that reduce or remove the structural causes of 
insecurity.’370 Pro-action comprises carrying out a national risk assessment (NRA) 
for the cyberspace domain, establishing a legal framework for cyber security, and 
an organisational framework. The NRA may identify insufficient and non-existing, 
but required, cyber security capabilities. It is up to the policy level to decide when 
this identified gap is filled (or not).
Prevention: in an emergency management context this has been defined as ‘actions 
to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring.’371 For the 
purposes here, we use a slightly different definition: ‘actions to prevent hazards 
from developing into incidents altogether or to reduce the effects of possible 
incidents’. Preventive cyber security measures reduce vulnerability to the global 
cyberspace and to individual NCS in particular.
Preparation: defined as ‘planning, training and exercising’ or as ‘a continuous cycle 
of planning, organising, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking 
367 See, for instance, Michael K. Lindell, Carla S. Prater, and Ronald W. Perry, Fundamentals of Emergency 
Management (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2006), http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/fem.asp.
368 ICDRM, Emergency Management Glossary of Terms, (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 
2010), http://www.gwu.edu/~icdrm/publications/PDF/GLOSSARY%20-%20Emergency%20Manage 
ment%20ICDRM%2030%20JUNE%2010.pdf.
369 Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment, Handreiking Security Management, 




371 ICDRM, Emergency Management Glossary of Terms. 76.
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corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident 
response.’372
Response: addresses the immediate and short-term effects, and prevents further 
damage after an incident occurs.373
Recovery: this encompasses ‘activities and programs implemented during and 
after response that are designed to return the entity to its usual state or to a ‘new 
normal’.’374
Aftercare/follow up: takes into account the psycho-sociological impact of an 
incident to (parts of) the population, covers incident and incident management 
investigation (such as fact finding and the writing of lessons identified), as well as 
forensic analysis, criminal investigation and the prosecution of suspects.
The security incident management cycle stems from an understanding that the 
lessons identified during the preparation (through aftercare/follow up) need to be 
converted into lessons learned.375 These can subsequently either be adapted as a 
strategy and policy (pro-action), lay the foundation for new or revised prevention 
measures and approaches, help to develop and implement new or changed 
preparation measures (e.g., exercise programme), or can usefully be employed 
to implement and train changed procedures and processes that are part of the 
incident response element of the cycle.
Below, we will use this six elements model to discuss common and specific 
functions, capabilities and responsibilities at the national level.376 The functions 
and capabilities placed in the six elements model can easily be mapped by the 
reader to one’s national cyclic five or four elements model if required.
4.3. CYBER SECURITY STAKEHOLDERS
A wide range of stakeholders either provide or interact with cyber security 
functions, both at the national and international levels. These stakeholders are the 
same ones identified in the previous section: governmental, national/societal and 
372 US Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, (Washington, DC: FEMA, 
2008), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 145.
373 ICDRM, Emergency Management Glossary of Terms. 85-6.
374 Ibid., 82.
375 Note the distinction between ‘lessons identified’ and ‘lessons learned’.
376 This ‘operational’ perspective includes the (inter)national functions, capabilities and responsibilities, 
and not at the tactical level of cyber security organisations which is internal to a department, agency, 
or other organisation.
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international/transnational. Similar to what is described in the previous section, 
stakeholders are not necessarily constrained within each category but can operate 
with multiple ‘hats’. For example, a government body may act as an end-user (Whole 
of Nation); help develope a digital certificate for service providers (Whole of System), 
and establish regulation (Whole of Government). Therefore, we use the following 
three non-exhaustive sets:
• Governmental:
 - the national government, its public and semi-public agencies,
 - independent regulatory bodies,
 - inspectorates dealing with cyber security aspects for their top-level 
domains,
 - the military, and
 - local government/administration & municipalities;
• National/Societal:
 - critical infrastructure (CI) sector organisations & operators,
 - ICT service providers (e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISP) & cloud 
services),
 - industry and businesses at large (and their branch organisations),
 - small and medium enterprises (SME),
 - (national) software and hardware manufacturers and system integrators,
 - universities and research & development organisations,
 - specialised defence and security contractors,
 - the population at large;
• International/Transnational:
 - multinational arrangements & bodies (e.g., G8, EU, OSCE,377 ITU, World 
Bank, Europol, Interpol),
 - multi-stakeholder institutions (e.g., IGF,378 ICANN379),
 
377 OSCE = Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
378 IGF = Internet Governance Forum.
379 ICANN = Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
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 - international standardisation bodies (e.g., FIRST, ISO380),
 - informal international arrangements (e.g., IETF,381 IEEE),
 - key global infrastructure providers (e.g., backbone providers), and
 - key global software and hardware manufacturers.
When discussing specific cyber security functions, capabilities and responsibilities 
in the following sub-sections, this list of stakeholders will be referred to when 
applicable.
4.4. MAIN FOCUS OF ANALYSIS
4.4.1. Along the Mandates
Figure 4 shows the generic model with the six elements of the cyber security cycle 
versus the five mandates as defined by Klimburg382 and introduced in Section 1. 
The elements of the cyber security incident management cycle for each mandate 
which are not key at the national level are suppressed in the figure.
The internet governance/cyber diplomacy mandate acts across all of the incident 
cycle elements, such as international pro-active arrangements; harmonised 
prevention actions; exercises to be prepared for a hot phase response, and seeking 
international support during a hot response-recovery – follow up phase. The 
activities are mainly positioned at the policy/strategic levels.
The two areas of the cyber security crisis management and CIP mandate require 
a split. Cyber security crisis management requires a set of operational and tactical 
level functions for the preparation, response, recovery and aftercare/follow up 
elements of the incident response cycle, whereas the CIP strategic through tactical 
focus lies with prevention. The preparation through recovery elements are covered 
to mitigate the exposure in case prevention fails.
The military cyber operations mandate, above all, needs to protect its own cyber 
infrastructure. However, this is an internal organisational issue. At the national 
level, military cyber operational response and recovery capabilities need to be 
prepared (tactically and operationally) for countering cyber attacks against one’s 
380 ISO = International Organization for Standardization (www.iso.ch).
381 IETF = Internet Engineering Task Force – leads the internet protocol standardisation efforts.
382 See Klimburg and Mirtl, Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65).
117 Organisational Structures & Considerations
nation. These capabilities may include both pre-emptive cyber strikes and (counter) 
attacks. 
As part of their tasking, military cyber defence capabilities may be involved in the 
cyber protection of international alliances such as NATO and the EU. Currently, 
frameworks for collective military cyber defence operations do not exist or have not 
been made public. However, the Dutch government endorsed the view that: 
‘Under international law, the use of force in self-defence pursuant to Article 51 
of the UN Charter is an exceptional measure that is justified in armed cyber 
attacks only when the threshold of cyber crime or espionage is breached. For 
a cyber attack to justify the right of self-defence, its consequences must be 
comparable with those of a conventional armed attack. If a cyber attack leads 
to a considerable number of fatalities or large-scale destruction of or damage 
to vital infrastructure, military platforms and installations or civil property, it 
must be equated with an ‘armed attack’383
and: 
‘An organised cyber attack on essential state functions must be regarded as an 
‘armed attack’ within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter if it causes 
(or has the potential to cause) serious disruption to the functioning of the state 
or serious or prolonged consequences for the stability of the state, even if there 
is no physical damage or injury. In such cases, there must be a disruption of 
the state and/or society, or a sustained attempt thereto, and not merely an 
impediment to or delay in the normal performance of tasks.’384
It concludes that ‘Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty may be applied to 
attacks in cyberspace. Article 5 is worded so generally that it can cover all forms 
of armed force. Article 4 is not as extensive in scope and may be applied to cyber 
attacks that endanger national security but do not breach the threshold of an armed 
attack.’385 Therefore, collaborative cyber defence against a hostile actor causing a 
major cyber disruption to one or more nations of the Alliance is considered to be 
covered under the current North Atlantic Treaty.386




386 For a further discussion on this, see Section 5.3.
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The (counter-) intelligence mandate, first and foremost, focuses on prevention: 
the timely understanding plans and techniques of potential lone wolves, activists, 
terrorists, and adversary states. In case prevention fails, intelligence has to attribute 
attacks to specific attackers as part of response and follow up. Cyber security has 
been added as a new domain to the existing set of (counter-) intelligence activities 
which are mainly placed at the tactical/operational level. When applied, cyber 
security counter-intelligence is a preventing task by nature. However, the counter-
intelligence capability may include offensive disruption tasks, when applicable.
The counter cyber crime mandate requires specific strategic and operational pro-
action activities, and operational and tactical activities for all other elements.
Figure 4:  The Five Mandates and the Six Elements of the Cyber Security Incident Cycle 
Model
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4.4.2. Along the Cross-Mandates
In addition to the NCS mandates we also identified three cross-mandates. As is 
shown in Figure 5, the cyber security coordination cross-mandate crosses all of 
the five NCS mandates. At the political level this is synonymous with the overall 
coordination and control of NCS efforts. At the strategic and operational level it is 
primarily concerned with avoiding duplication of efforts, while at the tactical level 
it refers to the need to connect various tasks with each other.
The cyber security information exchange and data protection cross-mandate 
function has its main information exchange focus in prevention, response and 
recovery, and is active across all levels of activity. While at the tactical level it is 
important to exchange technical information on cyber threats, vulnerabilities and 
attacks, the sharing of intelligence at the very top of government and with private 
industry (e.g., critical infrastructure operators) when required, is no less important. 
However, most of the time, operational information exchange will occur during 
preparation and aftercare/follow up by specific organisations such as national 
crisis management and investigation organisations, respectively. Proper data 
protection processes are a pre-condition for operating cyber systems. The main 
focus is driven by the political/policy side, which must ensure the appropriate 
application of guidelines (OECD)387 or legislation (e.g., within the EU388) across all 
forms of information exchange. This is supervised by Data Protection (‘Privacy’) 
Authorities389 which keep the oversight as regulators at the operational level or 
working within the legal advisory frameworks of the relevant institutions (such as 
within the intelligence services). It is important to note that information that has 
been gathered in clear breaches of applicable data protection legislation can be 
sufficiently ‘contaminated’ that foreign partners may not want to use it – effectively 
depriving that respective nation of valuable diplomatic currency.
Cyber security research and development (R&D) and education (which includes 
awareness) form the third cross-mandate. Although each mandate may have its 
own R&D and education requirements and activities, cyber security awareness 
and education at the (inter)national level can effectively be organised across 
the five cyber security mandates to avoid duplication and waste of efforts. This 
cross-mandate capability will often be connected within an overall national and 
international R&D context (e.g., in researching internet security issues). Thus, it 
is primarily an (inter)national prevention capability. However, on the one hand 
387 OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.
388 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, Official Journal, L 281.A new draft Directive is being worked on in 2012.
389 For example the Information and Privacy Commissioner in Ontario, Canada: www.ipc.on.ca.
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it is also a very important ‘pro-action’ capability supporting efforts for national 
risk assessment. On the other hand, it includes the development of, for instance, 
awareness campaigns about cyber security for specific population groups.
Figure 5:  The Cross-Mandates and the Six Elements of the Cyber Security Incident Cycle 
Model 
4.5. THE FIVE MANDATES OF NATIONAL CYBER 
SECURITY
Based on the previous work of Klimburg390 and using the combined model 
outlined above, it is possible to position the common and specific cyber security 
functions along specific mandates/cross-mandates and the cyber security incident 
management cycle (figures 4 and 5). Also, it is possible to distinguish common cyber 
security functions and capabilities at the national level from specific functions 
which may be needed and fit only specific nations.
Before discussing the figures in more detail, it should be remarked that this is the 
optimal, clean sheet positioning of the cyber security functions – a theoretical best 
practice. As discussed by Klaver et al.,391 a nation shall keep in mind that its existing 
national (and international) organisational frameworks and the functional division 
between departments, agencies and public bodies gradually developed over a long 
period of time based on historic, cultural, legal, political and other reasons. In every 
nation there will be a number of specific local conditions that determine the current 
placement of functions and the course of existing institutions. Consequently, 
390 Klimburg and Mirtl, Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65).
391 See, for instance, Klaver, Luiijf, and Nieuwenhuijs, The RECIPE Project: Good Practices Manual for CIP 
Policies. For Policy Makers in Europe. 10-1.
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a transposition of the theoretical best practice institution to a country’s local 
conditions situation is certainly required. 
4.5.1. Military Cyber Operations
The cyber security functions resident within the military domain differ from nation 
to nation, as the exact definition of military cyber operations will also differ. Overall, 
this mandate can include a very wide range of sub-mandates, not all of which will 
be applicable in every nation. Firstly, this includes ‘cyber defence’ – the protection 
of its own ICT systems, usually with a CERT/CSIRT (Computer Emergency Response 
Team/Computer Security Incident Response Team) type of organisation in the 
lead and heavily dependent upon intelligence networks. Secondly, it can include 
options for strategic cyber operations – the ability to wage a ‘cyber war’ on the war 
fighting capability of the enemy.392 Thirdly, it can include specific ‘battlefield cyber 
capabilities’ – those that are deployable within an operational and tactical battlefield 
environment (for instance against an enemy air defence system). Fourthly, it can 
include the modernisation efforts of more traditional military capabilities, such as 
those associated with Network Centric Warfare (NCW). It is important to note that 
the mandate may not only be national: a military cyber organisation may receive 
a mandate to support that nation’s allies (e.g., within NATO) in an extension to 
its common security task. Apart from cyber defence (preparation, response and 
recovery), this may also include pre-emptive strike capabilities against a clear and 
present threat, counter-attack (response), or even an offensive capability mandate.
In case of a domestic national emergency, some nations have legal provisions for 
empowering the military to assist in emergency management, and help provide for 
internal security. Some of the military cyber security capabilities may, therefore, be 
trained to protect the ‘homeland’s cyberspace’ in case the normal crisis response 
exhausts its resources to counter a cyber security crisis. The operational/tactical393 
command and control chain of the provided military cyber capability is, however, 
usually subordinate to the civil response authorities.394
Some nations (e.g., the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) organise their 
operational/tactical military cyber security response force in a flexible way. Others 
392 See, for instance, Gregory Rattray and Jason Healey, ‘Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber 
Capabilities and Their Use,’ in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks. Informing 
Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, ed. National Research Council (Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press, 2010).
393 Note that the operational and tactical levels are reversed in the military structure as compared to civil 
structures.
394 France, the Netherlands and Switzerland are but three countries as an example.
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(such as Estonia395) have created reservist or paramilitary cyber organisations that 
can provide reinforcement for regular military cyber forces in an emergency. These 
approaches are particularly useful given the inability of most nations to actually 
maintain all potentially required technical cyber skills in their organisation at all 
times.
4.5.2. Counter Cyber Crime
The counter cyber crime mandate comprises a wide set of organisations. At the 
policy and strategic levels, a ministry of justice is involved in the national, and often 
international, development and maintenance of cyber security legislation. Similarly, 
a ministry of the interior will often manage the dedicated police resources. Unlike 
in other mandates, however, some of these capabilities may well reside at a ‘local’ 
(provincial) governmental level, and not only be the responsibility of the central 
government.
Cyber crime prevention is a multi-angled issue. From the economic perspective, 
a ministry of economic affairs may manage cyber security awareness at the 
operational level and development programmes against cyber crime. Note that this 
overlaps with the R&D and education cross-mandate to be discussed later.
From the Whole of Government (WoG) perspective, state security and cyber 
crime prevention is an organisational issue across all government department 
and agencies. Currently, nations increasingly assign this strategic/operational 
responsibility to a Chief Information (Security) Officer (CIO or CISO) who has to 
develop, maintain and monitor government-wide information and cyber security 
policies.
From the perspective of secure service provisioning to the public at large, non-
governmental service organisations such as ISPs may actively disrupt the spread 
of malware and other cyber crime activities. Public-private organisational 
arrangements such as an ISP Code of Practice and the identification of compromised 
customer systems exist in Australia,396 and there are a number of anti cyber crime 
organisations that represent a mix of state and non-state actors.397
395 The Estonian ‘Cyber Defence League’ has, for instance, about 150 experts on call if necessary (see: 
Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Around 150 Experts Associated with Estonia’s Cyber Defence 
League,’ Estonian Review, 3 October 2011.).
396 Australian Attorney-General’s Department, Cyber Security Strategy: 18-20.
397 One of these is, for instance, the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG). On a higher level, many of the 
top international network operators and similar technical experts regularly cooperate in a number of 
closed information exchange groups.
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At the operational/tactical level, a police function is needed to investigate cyber 
crime, to try to take cyber criminals into custody, and have them prosecuted. This 
function extends across the preparation (training and exercises), response, and 
recovery elements. Logically, this function is embedded as a special knowledge 
area in the national police and local police forces. Cross-links and information 
exchanges with foreign police forces exist, either based on bilateral collaboration, 
or via the high-tech crime/cyber crime units of international police organisations 
such as Europol and Interpol.
To be effective, the police organisation may tie in with the national (and other) CERTs 
and public-private Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) discussed 
under the cyber security crisis management & CIP mandate (Section 4.5.2). A 
common challenge is that, for many police forces, the act of starting a criminal 
investigation can put a sudden stop to information exchange that might help others. 
The public-private information exchanges and CERT organisations (Section 4.5.2) 
mostly deal with counter cyber crime prevention and response activities, and less 
often with the business continuity (or continuity of government) aspects managed 
under cyber security crisis management.
As part of the follow up, the national prosecution organisation has to extend 
and maintain its knowledge about cyber crime to operationally take care of the 
prosecution of cyber criminals as part of its normal way of operation. The forensic 
collection and analysis of data capability may (partially) be assigned to the police 
organisation. Some nations, however, have a national forensic service which covers, 
amongst other domains, the cyber security domain as well.
4.5.3. Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence
Distinguishing cyber espionage from cyber crime and military cyber activities 
is not uncontroversial. In fact, they all depend on similar vectors of attack and 
similar technology. In practice, however, serious espionage cases (both regarding 
intellectual property as well as government secrets) are in a class of their own. At 
the same time, it can be very difficult to ascertain for sure if the perpetrator is a 
state or a criminal group operating on behalf of a state, or indeed operating on its 
own. 
Irrespective of who is actually behind the attack, cyber espionage probably 
represents the most damaging part of cyber crime (if included in the category). 
Lost intellectual property, for instance, was said to have cost the British economy 
£9.2 billion in 2011.398 Cyber espionage, when directed toward states, also makes 
398 Michael Holden, ‘Cyber crime costs UK $43.5 billion a year: study,’ Reuters, 17 February 2011.
124The Five Mandates of National Cyber Security
it necessary to develop specific foreign policy response mechanisms capable of 
dealing with the inherent ambiguity of actor nature in cyberspace. At the same time, 
counter-intelligence activities (e.g., detecting and combating the most sophisticated 
cyber intrusions) very often will depend upon other types of intelligence activity, 
including offensive intelligence collection but also extensive information sharing 
between international partners.
Collecting information through cyber means is just an extension of the existing set 
of capabilities being used by these services. Mostly, intelligence collected by other 
means will be used to address cyber security threats. The main focus is the defence 
of government systems from advanced cyber threats by state and non-state actors. 
Common tasks include information collection, verification, aggregation, analysis 
and dissemination. 
Some nations allow their intelligence services to exploit the information for other 
purposes, or directly intervene in order to prevent threats from (re)occurring.399 It 
is also possible that a specific vulnerability (and, therefore, an attack vector on a 
different organisation, such as a private company) will intentionally not be disclosed 
in order to further specific intelligence needs. Overall, intelligence and counter-
intelligence organisations will concentrate their work within the operational/
tactical environment but they will play an important role on the strategic level as 
well, especially in conducting regular threat assessments and the like. They are 
thus concentrated in the preparation and response phases.
4.5.4. Cyber Security Crisis Management and CIP
Cyber security crisis management comprises at least an operational and a 
mostly tactical function which spans the preparation (e.g., training & exercises), 
response, recovery, and aftercare/follow up elements of the cyber security incident 
management cycle. At the tactical level, a national computer emergency/security 
incident response team (CERT/CSIRT)400 is required which preferably is fully linked 
to the national emergency/incident management structure at the political/strategic 
399 UK Cabinet Office, Cyber Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. Safety, security and resilience in 
cyber space.
400 Bruce et al., International Policy Framework for Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure: A 
Discussion Paper Outlining Key Policy Issues (TNO Report 33680). 112-3 and Appendix B.
125 Organisational Structures & Considerations
level.401, 402 Serious cyber incidents may lead to major disturbances and disruption 
of society. Incidents in, for instance, critical infrastructure sectors (such as energy 
and telecommunication) may have a serious impact at a national level when 
critical functions of cyberspace fail.403 Moreover, the national emergency/incident 
management capability is closely connected to the national crisis communication 
capabilities, a function which comes in handy to communicate to the society and 
population about a serious cyber security incident at the (inter)national level.
At the operational level, there is often only a limited amount of integration due 
to legal reasons. For instance, in many nations there is a separation between the 
government CERT and the national CERT. The national CERT will often not be under 
direct control of the government, and will largely only have advisory functions. 
The government CERT does have (to various extents) operational control over the 
networks and network connections within its constituency, and is increasingly 
being used as the tactical level national cyber crisis management facility. Examples 
of such an arrangement can be found in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and 
many other countries.404
Different from cyber security crisis management, critical infrastructure protection 
(CIP) activities put their main focus on prevention. These are substantial 
governmental tasks, and a number of countries have set up dedicated CIP 
organisations, often with close connections to the internal security services.405 
This requires tools such as a national risk analysis406 with perhaps corresponding 
national risk registries and regularly conducted assessments of specific risk factors 
401 This means that the top crisis management advisory group (e.g., COBR in the UK) have NCS fully 
integrated into it.
402 It shall be noted that cyber-related emergencies with a serious national impact, but with different 
escalation characteristics, may occur more often than other emergencies. National cyber incidents 
may require a more flexible escalation process which may not require additional legal ‘emergency’ 
powers to deal with every single cyber-incident of national significance. To avoid a ‘permenent state of 
emergency’ it is necessary  to re-conceptualise the tasks of ‘national crisis management’ to also include 
‘national incident management’. An equivalent level of emergency in another domain may be dealt 
with by a regional crisis centre, but the nature of cyber incidents at the national level may require the 
response of the national crisis response function.
403 For a concrete analysis of the economic effects of a major power outage, see: Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness Canada, Ontario – U.S. Power Outage – Impacts on Critical Infrastructure, 
(Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2006), http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/_fl/ont-us-power-e.pdf. 
More recently, an Austrian study was one of the few attempts to examine the consequences of a national 
blackout, see: Johannes Reichl and Michael Schmidthaler, Blackouts in Österreich Teil I – Analyse der 
Schadenskosten, Betroffenenstruktur und Wahrscheinlichkeiten großflächiger Stromausfälle, (Linz: 
Johannes Kepler Universität Linz, 2011), http://energyefficiency.at/web/projekte/blacko.html.
404 For a list of European CERTs and their constituents/stakeholders, see: ENISA, ‘CERT Inventory,’ ENISA, 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/cert/background/inv.
405 Examples of such organisations include the CPNI in the UK, and the CNPIC in Spain.
406 For a UK example, see: UK Cabinet Office, ‘Risk Assessment,’ UK Cabinet Office, http://www.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/content/risk-assessment.
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to specific objects, organisations or processes/services. Secondly, it requires the 
development or adoption of information security standards or legislation within 
both the government and the private sector. Implementing information security 
practices407 – perhaps the single the most basic and essential task within NCS – 
can be difficult to accomplish across central government, let alone the associated 
private sector critical infrastructure. Some countries simply proscribe the use 
of specific information security practices,408 while some countries have more 
comprehensive legislation.409 A third preventive tool, particularly for cyber 
security, is the information exchanges between the various actors. One approach410 
differentiates between three types of information exchanges. Firstly, a ‘third party’ 
model, which only involves exchanges between the non-state actors and without any 
government presence. Secondly, a ‘community’ model411 that is usually sponsored 
by the government and security services, and provided with limited amounts of 
intelligence on threats, but not controlled by them. An example of this arrangement 
is provided by the UK Warning, Advice and Reporting Points (WARPs), or the Dutch 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs).412 Finally, the ‘hierarchical’ model 
of information exchange is maintained by the government. It routinely delivers 
classified information to selected private organisations and companies. Examples of 
this arrangement can be found within France, Spain, the UK, the USA and a number 
of other countries. Particularly when these information exchanges are set up as 
public-private partnerships, they can further be connected internationally.413 The 
national crisis management capability may be closely linked with the information 
exchanges. For all of these relationships, however, a considerable amount of trust 
between the various state and non-state actors is a necessary condition, and trust 
can only be built over time.414
407 For examples of approaches to information security, see Section 1.3.
408 For instance the German Grundschutz approach, or the French EBIOS tool.
409 One of the most extensive legislative examples is the 2002 US Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA). FISMA is supported by a wide range of tools and services and aims to 
provide for standardised levels of information security across the civilian US federal government 
systems.
410 Sam Merrell, John Haller, and Philip Huff, Public-Private Partnerships: Essential for National Cyber 
Security [Transcript], (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 2010), http://www.cert.org/
podcast/show/20101130merrell.html. 5-7.
411 See, for instance, Austrian Federal Chancellery, National ICT Security Strategy Austria: 16.
412 See: WARP, ‘WARP – Protecting our information infrastructures,’ CPNI, http://www.warp.gov.uk. See 
also CPNI.NL, ‘Werkwijze ISACs,’ CPNI.NL, https://www.cpni.nl/informatieknooppunt/werkwijze-
isacs.
413 An example of this is the European Public Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R) maintained by the 
EU.
414 Klaver, Luiijf, and Nieuwenhuijs, The RECIPE Project: Good Practices Manual for CIP Policies. For Policy 
Makers in Europe. 10-11.
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4.5.5. Internet Governance and Cyber Diplomacy
Internet governance415 builds on an infrastructure of non-governmental driven self-
regulation, in which the internet grew bottom-up with a minimum of government 
and public sector influence. Internet volunteers and experts organised themselves 
to drive the architectural and protocol development of the internet in self-
organising structures such as the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) or the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). The internet-only part of cyber security is just one 
of the topics dealt with in internet governance but, despite different initiatives, no 
single organisational body drives the rate of progress on security issues.416 The main 
activity areas are related to pro-action/prevention, including the standardisation of 
security options in protocols, the development of specially designed cyber security 
protocols, and describing and standardising good tactical/operational practices. 
ICANN is one of the most important organisations within internet governance, and 
is responsible for coordinating activities to secure the core functionality of the 
internet and the global routing and naming infrastructure. Increasingly, incident 
response to cyber attacks on the basic backbone infrastructure (in particular the 
routing protocols) may require a globally operating operational and a distributed 
tactical incident response, recovery and follow up capability. ICANN has made 
proposals for a type of global crisis management capability417 and the ITU has 
made some suggestions along these lines as well.418
Cyber diplomacy419, 420 is considered here to be the general formal state engagement 
of a nation’s diplomatic processes in the overall theme of global cyber security. In 
particular, this refers to multilateral or bilateral activity aimed at managing state-
to-state relationships in cyberspace. Within the context of the United Nations, for 
instance, the Group of Government Experts (GGE) have been working on issues 
of international law of armed conflict in cyberspace, and are currently drafting 
principles for norms and standards of acceptable state behaviour. In 2012, 
the OSCE started a process to specifically create ‘Cyber Confidence Building 
Measures’. A large number of other initiatives exist, both hosted by international or 
415 A definition of internet governance can be found in: WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society 
(WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E) (Tunis: ITU, 2005). Para 34.
416 It is true that there have been several attempts to deal with cyber security issues within  internet 
governance. However, despite the security activities performed by DNS-OARC, ICANN’s Security and 
Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), its DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DNSSA-
WG), or the valuable inputs delivered by the annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and many others, 
it is not entirely clear where the organisational responsibilities overlap and where better coordination 
is needed.
417 In particular, the need to establish a global ‘DNS-CERT’ or similar.
418 Klimburg and Mirtl, Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65). 25-6.
419 Potter, Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century, 7.
420 Klimburg and Mirtl, Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65). 18-9.
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multilateral organisations (for instance, G8, OECD, etc.) or even stand-alone (such 
as the Meridian Group).421 At the bilateral level, a number of ‘major cyber nations’ 
have conducted so-called Track 1.5 discussions on ways for reducing tensions in 
cyberspace. Cyber diplomacy is thus more equivalent to traditional diplomacy 
activities such as arms control and counter proliferation. Cyber diplomacy should 
not be equated with ‘e-diplomacy’, which is more concerned with the delivery of 
government messages using ‘new media’ – even though there might be important 
overlaps. For instance, in 2012, China422 accused the US Embassy in Beijing of 
violating the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,423 as the Embassy was 
‘automatically’ broadcasting air quality for Beijing via Twitter.424
When it comes to designing structures for cyber diplomacy and internet governance, 
most nations find it difficult to assign specific responsibilities where they belong or 
take them away from where they have ‘historically’ been situated. For instance, 
internet governance – which is largely still totally separate from cyber diplomacy 
– is often dealt with by a ministry of economics or infrastructure, and is rarely 
involved in NCS issues. For many civil servants it can be difficult to perceive the 
larger picture within international cyber security, in particular, the view beyond 
their own department or mandate. This can often go hand-in-hand with a substantial 
lack of technical understanding. The challenge is particularly acute when dealing 
with ‘bottom-up’ internet governance organisations such as the IGF, IAB, IETF, IEEE 
and others – organisations that are still largely staffed by volunteers who often 
seem to speak a completely different language than government officials.
Moreover, government officials often lack insight into which of their national 
experts are playing key roles in the international organisations.425 Although internet 
governance is perhaps the leading example of a topic requiring a Whole of System 
(WoS) coordination, it has proven to be very difficult for governments to adequately 
find their way in the existing ‘multi-stakeholder’ environment. As a consequence, 
there has been increasing governmental support for an ‘intergovernmental’ 
solution to internet governance (e.g., one in which the non-state sector would play 
only a supporting role). This is despite the stated claim of most liberal democracies 
to keep the internet ‘free from government control’.
421 For a list of relevant organisations, see: US Government Accountability Office, Cyberspace. United 
States Faces Challenges in Addressing Global Cybersecurity and Governance, (Washington, DC: US 
Government Accountability Office, 2010), http://gao.gov/assets/310/308401.pdf.
422 Keith Bradsher, ‘China Asks Other Nations Not to Release Its Air Data,’ New York Times, 5 June 2012.
423 United Nations, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Vienna: United Nations, 1961).
424 Jovan Kurbalija, ‘Is tweeting a breach of diplomatic function?,’ DiploFoundation, 14 June 2012.
425 Creating and maintaining a collective ‘Who is who in cyberspace’ directory across the government may 
be a solution to overcome this hurdle.
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Figure 6:  The Organisational Picture Across Mandates (red = strategic, blue = 
operational, green = tactical at the national level; shaded = embedded in 
existing organisation; dashed = option selected by some nations)
4.6. THE THREE CROSS-MANDATES ACTIVITIES
Besides the five specific types or mandates of national cyber security, there are also 
activities that apply to each of these mandates. Figure 7 shows the position of the 
organisations along the elements of the incident management cycle. Furthermore, 
the often complex relationships with international organisational structures will 
only be touched upon here briefly. They will be explained at length in Section 4.7.
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4.6.1. Coordination
The cyber security coordination cross-mandate function is also seen as constituting 
national governance for cyber security. The coordination crosses the mandates 
discussed in Section 4.5 and spans the strategic, policy, and operational/tactical 
levels on the one hand, and all six elements of the incident management cycle on 
the other one. For a proper understanding, it shall be noted that the coordination 
concerns the wider understanding of cyberspace (or all ICT) and not just the 
internet426 – unless a nation has specifically restricted itself to internet-connected 
ICT only in its NCS strategy (NCSS).427
In contrast to many other national security domains, cyber security crosses most 
of the classical governmental mandates. This requires a pro-active governance 
function within the national government which coordinates and spans the Whole 
of Government approach (WoG) and the full spectrum of the cyber security 
incident management cycle. The coordination responsibility is often assigned to 
a department responsible for more cross-departmental and agencies coordination 
activities (e.g., like the Cabinet Office or similar head of government functions).
This function will have a number of central roles. These include the coordination of a 
NCS risk assessment; the development and maintenance of a NCSS,428 the alignment 
with the critical (information) infrastructure protection strategy (C(I)IP), and the 
possible establishment of a national (public-private) cyber security council.429 
Optimally, the same group will also play a decisive role in crisis management and 
any foreign security incidents involving cyber. A National (public-private) Cyber 
Security Council is meant to focus on pro-action, providing a well-balanced advice 
at the strategic level on cyber security issues and trends. However, during a major 
cyber security incident, crisis management may ask guidance from the Council. For 
that reason, the box in Figure 6 extends along all elements of the cyber security 
incident management cycle.
If a nation has developed and politically agreed on a NCSS, then it should set 
the policy outlines for the WoG. Each individual department may then develop 
strategies and policies for their own mandate, subordinate to the national policy 
and strategy. Moreover, the NCSS shall align with other national strategies and 
426 Includes, for instance, process control systems, medical equipment, in-car systems, or RFID-chips.
427 Nations which, according to their NCSS, use an internet-only understanding of cyberspace are: 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain and New Zealand.
428 Eric Luiijf et al., ‘Ten National Cyber Security Strategies: a Comparison,’ in Critical Information 
Infrastructure Security, ed. Bernhard M. Hämmerli and Stephen D. Wolthusen (Springer-Verlag, 
forthcoming).
429 For example: Eijndhoven, ‘Dutch Cyber Security Council Now Operational.’
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policies, and recognise internationally agreed and nationally ratified cyber security 
treaties, legislation and regulations (e.g., those set by the EU and the Council of 
Europe Cybercrime Convention430). Optimally, the coordination body would 
supervise these developments.
Although a nationally coordinated approach and an internationally harmonised 
NCS legal framework would be preferred, most nations split the specific function 
of ‘creation and maintenance of legal framework and regulation’ across the various 
departments involved. For example, specific cyber security legislation and regulation 
regarding the telecommunication sector lies with a ministry of communications 
or economic affairs, whereas counter cyber crime legislation is supervised by a 
ministry of justice (or the like). The military task of establishing standard operation 
procedures and rules of engagement within the cyber domain is often dealt with 
purely within the military domain, and is seldom carried outside – with the possible 
consequence that the foreign ministry and the military/intelligence community 
might have a very different idea of what is ‘legal’ in cyberspace.
The most obvious governmental organisation to look after the international cyber 
security arrangements is a ministry of foreign affairs. However, given the spread of 
functions and responsibilities across the governmental mandates, often a specific 
ministry such as the ministries of economic affairs, telecommunications or health 
takes the lead. To avoid conflicts between departments and to harmonise the nation-
wide approach, the ministry of foreign affairs is preferably in charge of the external 
cyber security policy coordination function, and draws on the other departments 
to provide factual expertise.
At the operational/tactical level, the coordination department, the intelligence 
community, or an interior ministry will be in charge of providing cyber security 
to the WoG, often under the responsibility of the government Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) or Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) (also see Section 4.5.5). 
Activities may, for instance, include awareness building; procedures and regulation 
for dealing with national secrets; standardisation of open source resources, and 
provision of, or oversight to, a government-wide digital signature infrastructure.
A separate, very specific, organisational function in the cyber security domain is the 
capability for an independent review of major cyber security incidents at the national 
level. By adding or contracting the right level of cyber expertise, this function can 
be embedded within an existing national incident review capability (e.g., a national 
safety and security board).431 An example of such a review is the lessons identified 
430 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185).
431 See, for instance, The Dutch Safety Board, http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en.
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study432 about the Dutch DigiNotar case, where the digital certificate provider for 
the Dutch government, its agencies, towns and municipalities and a number of 
private companies, was compromised.
4.6.2. Information Exchange and Data Protection
Few activities are as central to national cyber security as information exchange 
and data protection. The information exchange and data protection cross-mandate 
has its main focus on prevention, response, and recovery. The cross-mandate is 
mainly of operational/tactical nature. However, tactical information exchanges 
will occur during preparation and aftercare/follow up by specific organisations, 
such as national crisis management organisations and investigation organisations 
respectively. Data protection may be a consideration at the political/policy and 
strategic levels when considering new laws and cyber functions for society.
Information exchange433 on cyber security information builds upon trust and value 
between two or more organisations and, sometimes, is even limited to mutual 
trust between persons only. Information sharing should not be confused with 
information provisioning, where an organisation is required by law or its mandate 
to provide (processed) information one-way to other parties, subject to relevant 
data protection requirements. Key to information sharing is the two way value-
adding exchange of information on cyber security while balancing transparency 
and secrecy. Globally, the information age requires a need-to-share recognition 
balanced with trust and tempered by the need-to-know paradigm of information 
assurance. Cyber security information to be shared may include weak signals, 
incident data, threats, risk, security measures, coordinated defensive responses, 
tactical/operational experiences and good practices.434
Information sharing takes place within national and international communities that 
have a specific objective within the same mandate. This can include information 
exchanges between communities in alike mandates in different nations; international 
exchanges such as the European SCADA Security Information Exchange (EuroSCSIE); 
the European Financial Services Information Security Analysis Centre (FS-ISAC), 
and the Club de Berne (intelligence community), or between different communities 
in different national and international mandates such as critical infrastructure 
operators, police, and intelligence and security services.
432 The Dutch Safety Board, The DigiNotar Incident: Why digital safety fails to attract enough attention 
from public administration, (The Hague: Dutch Safety Board, 2012), http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/
docs/rapporten/Rapport_Diginotar_EN_summary.pdf.
433 Klaver, Luiijf, and Nieuwenhuijs, The RECIPE Project: Good Practices Manual for CIP Policies. For Policy 
Makers in Europe. 51-60.
434 Ibid., 52.
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4.6.3. Research & Development and Education
Typically, nations envision economic prosperity from information and 
communication technologies in their NCSS.435 Nations often assign their strategic/
operational level responsibility for stimulating innovation and economic development 
of cyber security R&D to their ministry of economic affairs. The strategic/
operational management level aspects of the academic, often more fundamental, 
cyber security research efforts are managed by a ministry of science/education, 
in a number of cases in close coordination with a ministry of economic affairs and 
the more security-orientated ministries. The actual R&D programmes are managed 
at the tactical/operational level either by existing national organisations which 
manage R&D programmes in a wide set of research domains, such as companies or 
universities, or by specifically established organisations. A specific, academic-based 
organisation may be established which assists in the analysis and identification of 
lessons about the government response to a major cyber crisis.
By nature, R&D efforts are often prevention activities. This is notwithstanding the 
fact that these efforts include the R&D on support methodologies and measures 
for the preparation, response and recovery elements of the cyber security crisis 
management, military cyber operations, and counter cyber crime mandates. It can 
also include in-depth research into cyber attacks and their consequences that could 
potentially be used in more offensive activities. 
Cyber security at the national level will fail when there is an inappropriate level of 
cyber security awareness and education. A nation requires its ministry of education 
and/or science to develop strategic/operational programmes for cyber security 
awareness and education. The base level programmes need to span a wide range 
of stakeholders: children at primary and secondary school, and a base level of 
awareness for adults and elderly people. Some of these programmes, however, may 
be organised and paid for by private industry (e.g., an anti-phishing TV campaign 
by financial institutions). It is, however, beneficial at the national level to orchestrate 
operational activities in order to avoid the duplication of efforts.
Apart from the general population and specific target groups within the population, 
a cyber security educational structure is required to assure that a sufficient number 
of cyber security experts and professionals are educated (and re-educated) to 
support all the cyber security activities outlined above, as well as in organisations 
outside the critical sectors and government.
At least as important as basic education is awareness raising among key decision-
makers in both state and non-state organisations as to the extent of the cyber 
435 Luiijf, Besseling, and Graaf, ‘Nineteen National Cyber Security Strategies.’
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security challenge. This is particularly acute as the complexity and sometimes 
esoteric nature of the subject prevents a ‘natural’ education of these decision-
makers over time. At the same time, the plurality of actors in cyber security means 
that especially the cooperation of non-state decision-makers is absolutely crucial in 
any NCSS – and this cooperation often will only occur when those decision-makers 
are fully aware of the extent of the challenge. 
Figure 7:  The Organisational Picture of the Cross-Mandates (red = strategic, blue = 
operational, green = tactical at the national level; shaded = embedded in 
existing organisation; dashed = option selected by some nations)
4.7. INTERNATIONAL CYBER SECURITY 
ORGANISATIONS
International organisations play a key role in cyber security, although they often 
only receive passing mention in NCSS. These NCSS will highlight the importance of 
international cooperation, and mention a few of the most prominent international 
organisations but often with a lack of detail of how or why these organisations are 
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important. First and foremost, NCSS deal with the international spectrum primarily 
as a WoG and, to a lesser extent, as a Whole of Nation (WoN) matter. Whole of System 
(WoS) approaches, when not government focused (such as within an international 
organisation), are much more difficult for national governments to conceptually 
deal with. These groups however represent a good share of international cyber 
security activity (in particular at the technical/operational level), which means that 
government consistently has trouble engaging to its full potential.
4.7.1. Government-Focused Activities
As mentioned earlier, the Whole of Government approach (also known in the UK as 
‘ joined-up government’ and the US as ‘networked government’) was originated to 
save costs and improve coordination. When discussing international organisations, 
WoG is being used here to discuss international cooperation between governments 
that generally exclude the private sector or civil society. These organisations tend 
to focus on the internet governance and cyber diplomacy, although much more 
emphasis is laid on the latter than the former. 
The governments of the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom provide 
good examples of organisations which coordinate all international aspects of 
cyber security. The US has an appointed US Cyber Coordinator (in the White 
House National Security Staff), Japan has its own National Information Security 
Center and the UK has established the Office of Cyber Security and Information 
Assurance (with the two latter organisations being attached to their respective 
Cabinet Offices). These offices have senior people in (generally) sufficient numbers 
to coordinate other government ministries and departments. Often, the members 
of these offices are actual detailees seconded from those ministries, which aids 
speedy coordination. For instance, the UK International Cyber Policy Unit (ICPU) 
is located within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but is largely staffed with 
individuals ‘double-hatted’ from the Cabinet Office. While the ministries of foreign 
affairs will have the functional lead, these central coordination groups have a strong 
role to play. In the United States, for instance, it was the National Security Staff, not 
the State Department, which led the writing and coordination of the International 
Strategy for Cyberspace.
WoG international activity solutions are often concentrated within bilateral 
agreements (i.e., cyber diplomacy), although there is a growing number of 
engagements inside intergovernmental forums. Bilaterally, there have been 
several important recent agreements. For example, India has signed cyber security 
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agreements with both the United States436 and Japan.437 To extend the extensive 
cyber security partnerships of the USA and the UK, the White House announced 
early 2012 that, ‘President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron reaffirmed the 
vital partnership between [their] two nations on cybersecurity,’438 and enumerated 
six specific areas of progress.
State to state agreements (outside of larger multilateral groupings) were originally 
relatively rare but, are rapidly increasing as an option for states,439 such as when 
‘the United States and the United Kingdom [...] launched a trilateral initiative with 
Australia to fund new R&D for improved cybersecurity.’440 Some agreements also 
already exist to facilitate cyber crisis management cooperation: a good example for 
this is the ‘China-Japan-Korea (CJK) agreement.’441
These bilateral and multilateral agreements typically do not lead to the creation 
of new organisations to shepherd the agreed upon actions. They rather lead to 
increased cooperation between existing organisations, especially CERTs and 
ministries of defence and justice/the interior.
Cyber security agreements through intergovernmental organisations rely on the 
existing staff and bureaucracies of those groups. The most important tend to 
be long standing groups created to coordinate traditional national security and 
diplomatic issues. In 2012, the United Nations will be hosting the third meeting of 
the Group of Government Experts (GGE), organised by the Office of Disarmament 
Affairs, to discuss cyber norms.442 China, Russia and other nations have issued a 
draft Code of Conduct calling for cyber norms, based on work done previously 
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.443 Meanwhile, the UN’s ITU is often 
perceived to be striving to ‘wrest control’ over the internet from ICANN.444
Cyber issues have been on the NATO agenda for some time. Unlike other international 
organisations, this military alliance has extensive cyber systems which need to 
436 US Department of Homeland Security, ‘United States and India Sign Cybersecurity Agreement,’ Office 
of the Press Secretary, 19 July 2011.
437 TNN, ‘India and Japan agree to boost maritime, cyber security,’ The Times of India, 1 May 2012.
438 White House, ‘Joint Fact Sheet: U.S.-UK Progress Towards a Freer and More Secure Cyberspace,’ Office 
of the Press Secretary, 14 March 2012.
439 See Section 5.3. for a discussion on non-NATO nation cooperation.
440 White House, ‘Joint Fact Sheet: U.S.-UK Progress Towards a Freer and More Secure Cyberspace.’
441 English.news.cn, ‘China, ROK, Japan pledge future-oriented partnership amid trilateral summit: joint 
declaration,’ English.news.cn, 14 May 2012.
442 UNODA, ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security,’ United Nations, http://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity.
443 Jason Healey, ‘Breakthrough or Just Broken? China and Russia’s UNGA Proposal on Cyber Norms,’ New 
Atlanticist, 21 September 2011.
444 See for instance http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19106420.
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interconnect with its many members during military operations. Accordingly, 
most of NATO’s recent initiatives have been aimed at improving the cyber security 
posture of its own systems and it has a more pronounced focus on the mandate for 
military cyber defence operations than other international groups.445
There are some other international groupings that are customised just to deal 
with cyber (and other information protection) issues. Meridian is perhaps the 
most well-known. Since 2006, a programme committee comprised of international 
governmental organisations organises the annual event and develops the agenda 
(such as the Department of Homeland Security of the United States or the Infocomm 
Development Authority of Singapore).446
4.7.2. Nation-Focused Activities
The Whole of Nation approach, as mentioned earlier, includes a mix of government, 
private sector and civil society. Compared to government and internationally-
focused organisation, WoN groups are the least difficult to categorise in the 
international sphere, although these non-governmental actors account for the bulk 
of what is termed ‘national’ cyber security, with a heavy focus on the mandates of 
crisis management and CIP. In international cyber security, WoN is used to describe 
where governments work closely with non-government groups, while still retaining 
a substantial voice, such as within the ‘Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – 
Computer Emergency Response Team’ (OIC-CERT).
The OIC-CERT is a grouping of organisations from Islamic nations to ‘explore and 
to develop collaborative initiatives and possible partnerships in matters pertaining 
to cyber security.’447 While it is open to membership from academia, companies 
and individuals, the group reserves full membership (and voting rights) only to 
governments.
A completely different example comes from recent collaborative ad hoc actions 
against networks of malicious computers called botnets. These ‘take downs’ were 
led by companies in the private sector but relied upon the coercive power of 
national justice systems. Microsoft has become especially well known for using this 
innovative tactic: teaming with other companies with knowledge of a particularly 
vicious (or vulnerable) botnet and then filing suit in court against the botnet’s 
organisers. Using this authority, Microsoft and its partners, ‘escorted by the U.S. 
Marshals – successfully executed a coordinated physical seizure of command and 
445 Jason Healey and Leendert van Bochoven, ‘NATO‘s Cyber Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,’ 
Atlantic Council Issue Brief, February 2012.
446 Meridian, ‘The Meridian Process,’ Meridian 2007, http://www.meridian2007.org.
447 OIC-CERT, ‘Mission Statement‘ OIC-CERT, www.oic-cert.net.
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control servers in two hosting locations to seize and preserve valuable data and 
virtual evidence from the botnets for the case.’448
4.7.3. System-Focused Activities
In the Whole of System approach there is cooperation among ‘like-minded actors.’ 
The government does not necessarily have any privileged position in the group. As 
in WoN, these WoS groups tend to keep a heavy focus on the mandates of counter 
cyber crime, crisis management and CIP. Despite the wide scope for effective and 
agile action of these non-state groups, they are often overlooked by NCSS.
One of the most important WoS organisations has already been discussed earlier. 
ICANN embraces a multi-stakeholder approach, so governments have a voice, but so 
do technical experts from the private sector and civil society.
The importance of WoS groups cannot be overestimated. For example, during the 
2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, private sector members of NSP-SEC (Network 
Service Provider Security), a leading cyber attack mitigation coordination body of 
internet network professionals ‘went to the EE-CERT [the Estonian CERT] to act as 
the liaison and to help the [Estonian] EE-CERT coordinate with CERTs and internet 
service providers in other countries to stem the attacks.’449 The support for Estonia 
came not from NATO or other governments but through a non-governmental group.
Getting vetted into NSP-SEC is especially difficult as, once you are in, you have a 
positive obligation to stop any attack traffic traversing your network as soon as you 
are notified by another member of the group, no questions asked. As Bill Woodcock 
summarised it: ‘If something needs to be taken down, it needs to be taken down 
and there isn’t time for argument and that’s understood up front, so there isn’t a 
mechanism for arguing about it. You can argue about it later.’450
While NSP-SEC only operates in the phase of incident response, there are numerous 
other groups that cover other parts of the spectrum. For example, since 1990, the 
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) has been ‘an international 
confederation of trusted computer incident response teams who cooperatively 
handle computer security incidents and promote incident prevention programs.’451 
As with NSP-SEC, governments are members but have no privileged status.
448 Jeffrey Meisner, ‘Microsoft and Financial Services Industry Leaders Target Cybercriminal Operations 
from Zeus Botnets,’ The Official Microsoft Blog, 25 March 2012.
449 Jason Healey et al., Building a Secure Cyber Future: Attacks on Estonia, Five Years On [Transcript], 
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2012), http://www.acus.org/event/building-secure-cyber-future-
attacks-estonia-five-years/transcript.
450 Ibid.
451 FIRST, ‘FIRST Vision and Mission Statement,’ FIRST, http://www.first.org/about/mission.
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FIRST is one of the founding blocks of the CERT community.452 Derived directly 
from the first worldwide CERTs and managed from a university, FIRST is essentially 
the most important certification body for any organisation or government seeking 
to be part of the worldwide CERT community. Members are able to collaborate with 
like-minded members across the entire spectrum of cyber security actions. FIRST 
working groups develop a whole range of tools, processes and products which are 
usually freely available.453
NSP-SEC and FIRST are long-standing groups, but other WoS organisations are ad 
hoc creations for a single purpose. Also known as ‘Security Trust Networks’,454 these 
groups are often volunteer based, and concentrate a lot of operational or research 
capability within a completely informal network. Led by Microsoft, the Conficker 
Working Group was ‘a collaborative effort with technology industry leaders and 
academia to implement a coordinated, global approach to combating the Conficker 
worm,’ a particularly virulent piece of malicious software.455 Even though these like-
minded groups are at the forefront of much of cyber security, especially incident 
response, governments typically have little understanding of them or how to aid or 
even make room for them. For example, after battling Conficker, members of the 
working group said they’ saw little participation from the government,’ indeed even 
‘zero involvement, zero activity, zero knowledge.’456
There are, of course, active government-only international cyber security groups 
(e.g., the European Government CERT Group is a vital organisation within European 
cyber security), but most international cyber security groups are still non-state. 
Recognising the importance of these WoN and WoS groups in NCSS is an important 
step to improving security. Understanding the importance of non-state groups is, 
however, absolutely essential.
452 Bruce et al., International Policy Framework for Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure: A 
Discussion Paper Outlining Key Policy Issues (TNO Report 33680). 77-80.
453 FIRST, ‘FIRST Vision and Mission Statement.’
454 Klimburg, ‘Whole-of-Nation Cyber Security.’
455 Conficker Working Group, ‘Announcement of Working Group,’ Conficker Working Group, http://www.
confickerworkinggroup.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/ANY/FAQ#toc6.
456 The Rendon Group, Conficker Working Group: Lessons Learned, (Washington, DC: Conficker Working 
Group, 2011), http://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/wiki/uploads/Conficker_Working_Group_
Lessons_Learned_17_June_2010_final.pdf. 34.
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4.8. ORGANISATIONAL PITFALLS, FRICTIONS AND 
LESSONS IDENTIFIED
As some nations concentrate their cyber security on internet-connected systems 
only, a wide open gate is left for cyber crime in the other parts of cyberspace. A 
wide organisational understanding of cyberspace is needed to avoid organisational 
failure at the national level.
Leaving a policy vacuum: one pitfall is that nations unintentionally may leave a 
strategic and/or operational level vacuum around tactical capabilities – in other 
words, may create a ‘labelled’ department bereft of basic expertise or tasks, and 
without a top-level strategic vision. This vacuum will progressively fill itself due 
to function creep both vertically and horizontally,457 leading to friction with other 
public and private organisations, and could also lack proper accountability.
Allowing stovepipes: cyber security is a global issue which crosses all governmental 
mandates, departments and agencies. There are many chances for the departments 
to engage in ‘cyber empire building’, using ‘stovepiped’ domains such as 
telecommunications, security, energy, health and economic innovation to overtly 
focus resources, legislation and regulations – detrimental to the exclusion of other 
issues. Moreover, the bureaucratic reality is that, in most nations, the cyber security 
subject areas are kept separate from each other in distinct mandates, often with their 
own definitions, emphasis and official slang.458 The risk is very high that a strong 
stovepiped approach will lead to a set of uncoordinated, even overlapping activities 
and miscommunication. It will confuse private organisations which are faced with 
conflicting laws and regulation. For instance, cyber security breach notification 
obligations may be in conflict with privacy legislation, financial oversight or stock 
exchange rules. A strong coordination across the Whole of Government and strong 
public-private arrangements may help to avoid that situation. Even better is to link 
existing organisational structures together in a matrix structure – an effective 
and efficient way of building connectivity across governmental ‘stovepipes’, across 
public-private partnerships, and across trans-border networks.
Drafting obsolete legislation: another pitfall noticed in many of the current NCS 
approaches, is the organisational lack of governmental structures to prepare for 
new cyber threats and new ICT innovations. The rate of change in cyberspace 
means that organisations are constantly challanged by the need to modfiy 
457 An incident response function like a CERT shall be focused on incident response and recovery. Some 
form of preparation is required. However, when such a CERT lacks a proper strategic/operational 
embedding, function creep may occur towards, for instance, pro-action and prevention aspects of 
critical infrastructure protection, and the area of cyber security policy development for its constituency.
458 See Klimburg and Mirtl, Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65).
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stovepiped services and legislation.459 As a result, cyber security legislation covers 
the digital crimes known from the past and do not embrace new ones. In particular, 
fundamental elements of cyber security – especially the need to concentrate on 
the obligation of the defender to adequately secure his systems rather than only 
trying to pursue a most often unknown attacker – have often not been appreciated 
by lawmakers.
Lack of flexible cooperation: apart from the WoG angle, new non-state organisations 
are constantly emerging whose work is relevant to NCS. Either in prevention or 
in the response/recovery/follow up phases, these new organisations often deal 
with cyber security issues in a bottom-up mode. They often find their existence 
in new types of community arrangements with minimum or even no government 
influence. The ability to flexibly work with these non-state organisations is thus an 
important part of future national cyber security.
Unclear Information Exchanges: when it comes to information exchange, 
unfortunately, many governments just know they want it. However, often they 
only have little knowledge about the actual goal of sharing or coordinating 
information between departments, let alone with international and/or non-state 
actors. Accordingly, companies in one CIP sector may get overlapping or competing 
requests to share information from ministries of the interior, justice or defence, 
from military services or commands, as well as functional ministries (such as 
financial regulators) and a cabinet office. This threatens to undermine the entire 
purpose of an information exchange, and can make a critical operational function 
into an organisational burden.
Tolerating Cyber-Illiteracy: another gap identified is the understanding of cyber 
security issues and ‘language’ by higher level public officials, decision-makers, 
judges and politicians. No standard and base level education training has been 
identified for those key individuals. The lack thereof causes misunderstanding, 
adverse decision-taking, imbalanced sentencing, and neglect of serious threats and 
incidents.
459 Luiijf, Besseling, and Graaf, ‘Nineteen National Cyber Security Strategies,’ 23.
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Internet Governance and Cyber Diplomacy
The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was one of the first 
foreign ministries to dedicate staff to coordinating and addressing the 
international aspects of cyber issues. Previously under the auspices 
of the FCO Director for Intelligence and National Security, the FCO 
dedicated resources from 2011, building up to a full team in 2012, in 
the newly-formed International Cyber Policy Unit (ICPU). ICPU staff 
are either from the FCO or the Cabinet Office for Cyber Security and 
Information Assurance (OCSIA). Its Director is double-hatted for FCO 
and the Cabinet Office. The ICPU is well-resourced – relatively speaking, 
no other NATO nation has committed a similar level of staffing to 
addressing international cyber issues. It leads and coordinates the UK 
engagement on international, multilateral and bilateral cyber diplomacy 
issues. These range from discussions on confidence building measures 
and norms of state behaviour to the economic and social benefits of 
cyberspace, while bilateral issues can also include transparency building 
to various degrees of operational cooperation.
ICPU works closely with the full range of UK government departments 
engaged in cyber issues from UK Department on Culture Media and Sport 
on internet governance issues, to the Home Office on cyber crime. Within 
the international multi-stakeholder context, ICPU has the oversight of the 
UK government position and supports other government departments 
where these are in the lead. Each UK government department has its 
own well defined role to play but OCSIA takes responsibility for ensuring 
delivery of the national cyber security strategy through coordinating 
government policy on cyber.
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Crisis Management and Critical Infrastructure 
Protection
The Centre Opérationnel de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information 
(COSSI) is the primary cyber defence organisation of the French 
government, and operationally responsible for managing national 
cyber crisis incidents. As part of ANSSI (a dedicated agency responsible 
for government information security within the Defence and National 
Security Department), COSSI is responsible for collating intelligence 
related to cyber threats both for the French government as well as for 
some of the critical infrastructure providers. COSSI is responsible for 
implementing many of the regulations and emergency ordinances of 
PIRANET, the French national cyber crisis management plan. In this 
context, COSSI depends mostly on CEVECS, a situational analysis and 
early warning centre that draws data from a wide array of feeds, and 
which has a 24/7 watch & warning component. The technical component 
of COSSI is mostly met by CERTA, the French government CERT, which 
receives technical alert information through a number of systems. At 
higher PIRANET alert levels, CERTA and CEVECS can be substantially 
reinforced with other personnel from the national security and defence 
ministry..
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Military Cyber Operations
The US military was probably one the very first militaries to have cyber 
units. The first such unit was the 609th Information Warfare Squadron of 
the US Air Force, which was stood up in 1996. The unit had both offensive 
and defensive capabilities that were to directly able to support combat 
operations.460 In 1998 the Department of Defense (DoD) created the first 
joint cyber command – commanded by a two-star general – with the 
authority to order, rather than just coordinate, military defences. Within 
two years, the Joint Task Force on Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) 
was also assigned the cyber offense mission, although this was re-assigned 
to another command a few years later when the JTF was given authority 
over, not just global network defence, but operations as well.461 JTF-CND 
retained this responsibility until 2010.
In the intermediate period, a great number of cyber organisations 
proliferated across the DoD and the US National Security Agency (NSA – a 
DoD subordinate agency). It was to streamline all these various organisations 
into one command that the US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was stood-
up in 2010. As a major shake-up of the US military in cyber, USCYBERCOM 
was designed to overcome a large number of ‘stovepiped’ conflicts within 
the DoD. Henceforth, the activities of all four branches of the armed forces 
would be communicated, coordinated and, in part, directly controlled by 
USCYBERCOM. As a subordinate of US Strategic Command, USCYBERCOM 
is also the top-level organisation with final responsibility for DoD-related 
cyber offensive and defensive activity. A major novelty of USCYBERCOM was 
its collocation within the NSA and the ‘double hatting’ of its commander as 
also the director of the NSA. Besides the obvious resource benefits that this 
relationship provided, it also addressed a number of significant operational 
concerns, particularly with regard to the difference between espionage and 
warfare. In 2011, the official USCYBERCOM budget was over $3.2 billion, 
but this did not take into account supporting budgets within the NSA or 
other aligned structures and commands.
East.460 well.461 
460 Jason Healey and Karl Grindal, ‘Lessons from the First Cyber Commanders,’ New Atlanticist, 14 March 
2012.
461 Ibid.
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Intelligence and counter-intelligence
Sweden maintains one of the most advanced Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) 
systems in Europe, operated by the National Defence Radio Establishment 
(FRA). With wide authority to tap foreign voice and data communications 
crossing its territory, FRA also operates under very close (and very 
transparent) supervision by specially appointed legal bodies. No data 
inspection may be conducted by the FRA without a specific request being 
issued by the Swedish Defence Intelligence Court – a body specially set 
up 2009 to protect ‘personal integrity’ in cases of surveillance. The Court 
also controls the search criteria and other provisions to limit the amount 
of accidental surveillance that may occur, and an independent ‘Integrity 
Ombudsman’ further shadows the work of the Court. Institutional oversight 
of the Court itself is provided by a separate judicial body, SIUN, which is 
also able to directly investigate intelligence activities of the Armed Forces. 
SIUN can also initiate investigations upon request of private persons.
Counter Cyber Crime
Brazil has been confronted with one of the fastest growing local cyber 
crime populations in the world. Increasingly, these cyber criminals are 
not only internationally active, but also pose a serious threat to Brazilian 
internet users as well. Consequently, in recent years the Brazilian Federal 
Police has greatly invested in counter cyber-crime resources, increasing 
both the ability to undertake network investigations as well as conduct 
(hardware) forensic analysis. Two units were especially emphasised – 
the centralised Cybercrime Suppression Unit (URCC), and the Computer 
Forensics Unit (CFU). The forensic specialists are particularly intended to 
support investigations of the URCC by being able to quickly and reliably 
respond to local investigations across the territory of Brazil. The CFU, 
which has been active since 1996, has a headquarters unit with around 
24 specialists, but mostly operates through some 180 forensic specialists 
in about 50 field offices. A highly flexible pay structure has allowed the 
Federal Police to offer forensic specialists and others very high salaries, 
leading to a high standard of recruitment.
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5. COMMITMENTS, MECHANISMS & 
GOVERNANCE
Victoria Ekstedt, Tom Parkhouse, Dave Clemente
Section 5: Principal Findings
• The national and international legal environment brings with it a 
large set of pre-existing commitments (e.g., treaties) that constrain the 
freedom of domestic policy-makers.
• A consensus is emerging that International Humanitarian Law can be 
applied to cyber conflict, and that a cyber attack could potentially rise 
to the level of an ‘armed attack.’ Human Rights are also increasingly 
being interpreted as being applicable to cyberspace.
• The Convention on Cybercrime is currently one of the most relevant 
international frameworks. In particular, Articles 23-34 make very 
specific demands to the level and type of international cooperation 
(for instance 24/7 point of contact) that need to be considered when 
designing national cyber security policies.
• All national cyber security policies should be connected to relevant 
Information Security Management architectures. Without such a link 
there can be no NCS.
• NATO has increased its focus on cyber security and is increasingly 
cooperating with non-NATO nations, the EU and International 
Organisations as well. This provides an additional planning framework 
with which to adjust localised, national structures.
5.1. INTRODUCTION
In many ways, the development of national cyber security (NCS) policy faces 
challenges both known and unknown. There are a host of familiar obstacles – 
political, bureaucratic and financial (both national and international) – as well as 
relatively new and unfamiliar obstacles, such as the power of the private sector in 
cyberspace, a rapidly shifting landscape and the gradual, yet inexorable, expansion 
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of this man-made domain. Growing societal dependence on this complex and 
entirely man-made environment produces risks that are often opaque and poorly 
understood. In addition, understanding how the cyber domain does or does not 
integrate into the domains of land, air, sea and space is a persistent challenge. Yet 
the potential opportunities – the myriad choices – presented by cyberspace are 
too lucrative for society to significantly curb its growing dependence on digital 
technologies. New frameworks and policies are needed to cope more effectively 
with the challenges that are emerging.
At the political level the challenges of cyber policy development may look 
familiar. While there may be new mandates and resources to be negotiated, their 
allocation conforms to political processes that are well understood by those vying 
for power. There are entrenched interests and prior commitments (both national 
and international) that must be navigated. These and many other cyber policy 
challenges conform – to a greater or lesser degree – to the political challenges 
inherent to policy development in most arenas.
At the strategic/operational level, some governments may choose to centralise 
the majority of decision-making powers, while others may devolve this to a lower 
level according to a particular need (e.g., to build resilience and responsiveness into 
highly decentralised and mostly privately-owned critical infrastructure). Although 
most nations will likely see a need for the development of cyber security policies at 
the central government level, in order to do this it may be necessary to create new 
offices to respond to cyber-specific requirements.462 Not every nation will consider 
a US-style Cyber Command to be the most appropriate model to emulate, and 
indeed few can match the resources available to the US Government.463 Resource 
constraints are always a consideration, yet financial pressures are no excuse for 
poorly conceived policy. Indeed, drowning a problem in money is a rarely good 
option and is also unlikely to produce sustainable policies.
The national and international legal environment brings with it a host of pre-
existing commitments (e.g., treaties) that constrain the freedom of domestic policy-
makers. Commercial law and the international economic environment will also 
influence the creation and constrains of domestic cyber security policies. In large 
part, commercial constraints on policy-making are a natural result of privately 
owned infrastructure, particularly critical infrastructure, over which a government 
may have limited influence.
462 For example, the UK Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (see: UK Cabinet Office, ‘Office 
of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA),’ http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/
office-cyber-security-and-information-assurance-ocsia.).
463 Wesley R. Andrues, ‘What U.S. Cyber Command Must Do,’ Joint Forces Quarterly 4, no. 59 (2010).
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This section describes some of the various frameworks and mechanisms that 
governments may need to consider as they develop cyber security policies. The sum 
of these tools is too numerous for any single publication to address and this section 
pays attention only to the most important ones. It notes the utility (or otherwise) 
of existing tools and identifies existing and emerging gaps in the policy landscape. 
This section is divided into three sub-sections. Section 5.1 analyses the nature of 
state commitments – legal commitments in particular – and the impact they have 
on the development of national cyber policies. Section 5.2 examines the practical 
interpretation of these commitments and tackles questions about how they can 
be governed and improved. Finally, Section 5.3 looks at NATO’s cyber position, in 
particular its practical activities and engagement with the EU.
Throughout this section, the general features of all commitments and tools are 
described, while providing sufficient information for more detailed enquiries to be 
made where desired. Attention is given to the flexibility and applicability of existing 
laws and frameworks as well as their relative pros and cons, levels of commitment, 
potential political returns on investment, and practical security advantages. 
Thought is given to tensions between national and international mechanisms and 
the difficulty these tensions generate for domestic cyber policy development. This 
section also builds on several primary themes, which are acknowledged for the 
sake of clarity and as a necessary courtesy to the reader.
Firstly, policy development is inherently about trade-offs: long-term vs. short-term, 
lavish vs. frugal, and expansive vs. limited. It is also an enduring example of an 
intergenerational equity problem. Many of the choices made today will lay the 
foundation upon which subsequent generations will build. This horizon does not 
mesh easily with the more limited time constraints that politicians must confront. 
In other words, ‘it’s hard to get people to make sacrifices today (i.e., in the form of 
higher energy prices, less comfortable houses and offices, more expensive travel, 
etc.) for the sake of people who haven’t even been conceived yet.’464 These trade-offs 
are also present in the regulatory environment, where greater clarity will reduce 
ambiguity but, at the same time, reduce freedom of action. 
Secondly, many of the cyber-related policy problems that governments are dealing 
with are neither new nor novel. The difference is not in kind so much as in degree. 
Cyberspace is less amenable to state control than any other domain. A diverse 
marketplace is beneficial for competition and innovation but is also harder to 
control from the perspective of the state. Regulation is done at the risk of driving 
profitable companies abroad, making compliance and risk management particularly 
important, yet delicate, topics.
464 Stephen M. Walt, ‘Who is full of hot air on climate change?,’ Foreign Policy, 23 July 2012.
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Thirdly, national cyber policy is at best immature – where it exists at all – and its 
development tends to be outpaced by societal exploitation of the domain. Mistakes 
will be made and accidents and misunderstandings will happen, yet the benefits of 
global interconnection will continue to outweigh the obstacles. Numerous cyber 
security concerns will look very different to the next generation, when the number 
of global users has doubled and the number of connected devices has increased by 
an order of magnitude. Policy-makers should resist the tendency to overestimate 
the short-term impact of new technologies, while underestimating their long-term 
impact.465
5.2. NATURE OF STATE COMMITMENTS
States make international commitments towards other states, organisations and 
private entities. This is usually accomplished through the creation of, or accession 
to, a treaty, but commitments may be made in a variety of ways, and can also create 
expectations among citizens and other individuals who are affected. It is difficult to 
categorise state commitments as either legal or political, since they usually contain 
elements of both. 
Commitments may appear to be legal or political, voluntary or mandatory, but they 
usually have effects that extend outside the originating area. It may be argued that 
all commitments made by a state are inherently political, even when the content is 
of a legal character. The political context in which they are entered into can make 
it difficult to label their acceptance as mandatory, compulsory or optional, at least 
when these terms are viewed from a legal perspective. However, these labels are of 
use when discussing the extent to which states have the freedom to interpret and 
implement the content of a treaty or express an opinion regarding its fulfilment and 
implementation.466
The number of potential new obligations related to the cyber arena is increasing 
and the nature of cyberspace brings with it increasing demands for international 
cooperation. This, in turn, may require long-term obligations to be re-evaluated, 
in order to determine what actions are needed to fulfil respective obligations in a 
cyber context. There are also more recent commitments that have developed as a 
465 John Naughton, ‘Thanks, Gutenberg – but we’re too pressed for time to read,’ The Guardian, 27 January 
2008.
466 See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna: United Nations, 1969). Art. 
31. The term ‘treaty’ is used in the generic sense as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. That is, an international agreement ‘governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation’ (ibid., 
art. 2, para. 1(a).).
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result of technical advances and the new possibilities cyberspace has brought to 
society.
5.2.1. Legal Commitments
There are numerous international law obligations that have relevance for the area 
of cyber security, stemming either from treaty law or customary law. States are 
free to decide which treaties they want to be part of, yet legal commitments which 
originate from an international treaty are mandatory once a state has signed up to 
them.467 However, there are parts of international law that are not optional in two 
different senses: international law that has reached the status of ius cogens,468 and 
law that has become customary.469 There is a difference between them, however, 
since states are free to agree on and contract customary law aside between each 
other, which is impossible with law that has the status of ius cogens. In addition, it 
may be noted that some international law treaties are largely unavoidable, either 
for political reasons or due to inherent treaty functions upon which states are 
dependent, such as the UN Charter.
Explicit regulation of a specific subject is useful since it provides clear legal advice 
which, in turn, provides for some predictability of state action. The trade-off with 
regulations – especially if they concern a specific area – is that they restrict the 
freedom of behaviour of the state. In addition, as cyberspace is characterised 
by continuous technical development, the risk of a law, treaty or regulation 
quickly being outdated is overwhelming. However, in general, trade-offs can be 
managed, at least to some extent. For example, legal constraints due to regulation 
of the cyber area can be handled by increased cooperation between actors with 
different mandates or by designing relevant organisations to enable flexibility 
of action, thereby achieving the goals and interests of a state and, at the same 
time, enjoying the benefits of an appropriate legislation. To ensure the attention 
and implementation of such goals among numerous stakeholders, this needs to be 
communicated, for example, in a national strategy.
Determining its legal commitments in a cyber context requires a state to take 
into account (a) the existing explicit commitments made by that state, (b) the 
obligations that exist due to ius cogens and customary law, and (c) the political will 
467 Ibid., art. 2, para. 1(b).
468 Ius cogens is a fundamental part of international law which is binding for all states irrespectively of 
their explicit consent to it. It cannot be amended or derogated away from it in any way.
469 Customary law is formed by the coherent actions taken by several states for a period of time, treated 
as a legal requirement. The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines customary 
international law as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’ (United Nations, The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (San Francisco, CA: United Nations, 1945). Art. 38, para. 1(b)).
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and ambitions of that state in the digital age. In many cases, treaties constitute the 
foundation of political commitments for states, and they are then complemented 
and fulfilled by state actions. Signing a treaty is in itself a political action, showing 
an explicit standpoint to its content. Political commitments in cyberspace could 
be demonstrated by adherence to certain standards or through different forms of 
cooperation. Signing up to a commitment can also bring benefits, from practical 
actions to demonstrations of intent meant to influence specific stakeholders.
Charter of the United Nations (1945)
Almost all existing states are members of the UN and thereby obliged to comply 
with the provisions of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations.470 The Charter is 
a multilateral treaty with a dual function; containing (a) rules on how the work 
of the organisation shall be carried out and (b) rules on the behaviour of states. 
The Charter contains a supremacy clause that makes it the highest authority of 
international law. This clause states that the UN Charter shall prevail in the event 
of a conflict between the (a) obligations of the members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and (b) their obligations under any other international 
agreement.471 For example, the North Atlantic Treaty refers to the provisions of the 
UN Charter, clearly indicating its superior status.472 However, the precise scope and 
content of the UN Charter is the subject of constant interpretation by states. 
The features of the cyber arena pose demands for special interpretation of the 
Charter, particularly regarding the principles set out in Article 2 on territoriality, 
equal sovereignty between states and non-intervention in domestic affairs where 
the features and possibilities offered by cyberspace challenges this part of 
international law.473 Another part of the UN Charter which affects national cyber 
security strategies is Articles 39-42 and 51 on the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and the prohibition of the use of force. Scholars and practitioners have extensively 
discussed the applicability and use of these Articles in a cyber context, although 
the discussions cannot be described exhaustively in this section. In addition, to date 
there are no formal cases specifically regarding cyber incidents which have been 
brought up before UN institutions, such as the Security Council. Therefore, states 
need to consider and seek guidance within their individual existing approaches to 
this part of international law and evaluate what possibilities, as well as constraints, 
470 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, CA: United Nations, 1945).
471 Ibid., art. 103.
472 See: United States et al., North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, DC: NATO, 1949). Preamble, art. 1, 5, 7, and 
12.
473 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: art. 2, 39-42, and 51.
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the UN Charter offers when drafting their NCS strategies and how they want to deal 
with them.474
Another concern with regard to the application of the UN Charter is the difficulty of 
determining and categorising cyber incidents. For practical reasons, it is important 
that this is done at an early stage of a dispute, in order to be able to address the 
problem correctly and activate the right players. In short, the inter-connectivity and 
global character of cyberspace challenges those who use and interpret UN Charter 
Articles, not least as the digital interdependency between states is increasing. State 
interests are global and threats are now stemming not just from states, but also 
from individuals who can leverage cyberspace to reach around the globe. The 
Charter is without doubt applicable to these new dynamics. The content and design 
of a state’s NCS strategy will have to reflect its contemporary opinion on these 
issues, while remaining flexible enough to evolve as understanding (regarding UN 
Charter Articles) continues to grow.
International Court of Justice (1945)
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is annexed to the UN Charter 
and all members of the UN are ipso facto parties to the Statute.475 The ICJ’s role ‘is to 
settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states 
and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorised United 
Nations organs and specialised agencies.’476
In contentious cases only states are eligible to appear, since the court has 
no jurisdiction to deal with applications from individuals, non-governmental 
organisations, corporations or any other private entity. The states concerned 
in these cases must consent to and accept the Court’s jurisdiction, which is a 
fundamental principle governing the settlement of international disputes. It is 
worth noting that a significant number of European nations, as well as Canada, 
only accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction with reservations, and that the USA has 
withdrawn its acceptance of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. In addition, and unlike 
Europe and Canada, the US is not a participant in the International Criminal Court.
No cases specifically on cyber incidents have been brought before the court, but 
there are earlier cases with content which has relevance in discussions on cyber 
474 One example of this is the Dutch Advisory Council of International Affairs (a civil-society staffed 
governmental advisory body) report on ‘cyber warfare’ (See AIV/CAVV, Cyber Warfare.).
475 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: art. 93.
476 International Court of Justice, ‘The Court,’ http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1.
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law. The most important is the Nicaragua case,477 which provides guidance on use of 
force. In its Nuclear Advisory Opinion, the ICJ states that all established principles 
and rules of International Humanitarian Law apply to all forms of warfare.478 This 
clearly also includes the use of cyber means. The court has also provided guidance 
on the issue of state responsibility in regard to actions of non-state actors in U.S. 
v. Iran479 (Hostages) (1980) and Congo v. Belgium (2002).480 These cases are of 
importance in a cyber context with regard to the problem of attributing malicious 
cyber actions to a state.
International Law Commission (1945)
The International Law Commission (ILC) is a committee of the UN General Assembly 
that contributes to international law through its mandate, which is to foresee the 
development of international law.481 The ILC produces Draft Articles that codify 
customary law as it should be, according to the opinion of the ILC. As with the ICJ, 
the ILC has not produced anything specifically regarding cyber but previous work 
of relevance, especially when drafting a NCS strategy, is its Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for Wrongful Acts.482 These Articles govern when and how states are 
held responsible for breaches of an international obligation. In this way, they are 
secondary rules that address basic responsibilities in case of breach of primary 
rules, for example, a treaty. They also establish under what circumstances an act of 
an official as well as an individual, may be attributed to a state.
477 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
ICJ Reports 1986, 70.
478 The ICJ stated that ‘the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which 
permeates the entire law of armed conflict applies to all forms of warfare, and to all kinds of weapons, 
those of the past, present and the future’ (See: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, ICJ 226, para. 86.).
479 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), ICJ Reports 
1981, 64.
480 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
ICJ Reports 2002, 3.
481 International Law Commission, United Nations, https://www.un.org/law/ilc.
482 See: Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the 
International Law Commission. Fifty-third session 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10). Rather than set 
forth any particular obligations, the rules determine, in general, when an obligation has been breached 
and the legal consequences of that violation. In this way they are ‘secondary’ to the rules regarding 
the obligation in question, and their general wording also gives room for more specific agreements 
and regulations. To apply, the international wrongful act must be attributable to a state, and constitute 
an obligation of that state. This makes it necessary to prove a causal connection between the injury 
and an official act or omission attributable to the state alleged to be in breach of its obligations. This 
has become an increasingly significant contemporary issue, as non-state actors play a great role in the 
cyber area.
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International Telecommunications Union (1865)
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is the UN agency for 
information and communications technology, and is a provider of international 
telecommunications law. Its work is based upon the ITU Constitution and the ITU 
Convention.483 The Constitution contains general provisions regarding obligations 
and rights for states in regard of telecommunications. Examples of important 
provisions are found in Section 6 which states that best practices are to be applied 
regarding the maintenance of telecommunication lines, and that states are obliged 
to protect and maintain the means for telecommunication.484 These provisions also 
apply to the telecommunications means of the internet and since they put specific 
obligations on states with regard to security and stability of telecommunications, 
they need to be taken into consideration in a cyber security strategy.
Other legal regulations regarding international telecommunications and wireless 
internet connections include treaty law on satellite activities made by major satellite 
companies (which are themselves former intergovernmental organisations). These 
treaties contain provisions that put restraints on cyber operations, for example 
forbidding interference with other users, services and equipment.485
UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security
To date, there have been a total of five UN groups of experts on cyber-related issues, 
two of which can be classified as being ‘economic’ and fell within the remit of the 
UN Third Committee, and three of which can be classified as ‘political-military’ and 
fall within the UN First Committee. It is only the latter that has the official title of 
UN Group of Government Experts (GGE), although both tracks have run somewhat 
in parallel to each other.486 The first GGE in 2004 was created by the General 
Assembly’s First Committee with the second one publishing its report in 2010.487 
In 2004, ECOSOC set up an intergovernmental expert group on identity-related 
483 See: Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, Constitution and Convention of the International 
Telecommunication Union (Geneva: ITU, 1992). Also see: Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, 
Instruments Amending the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union 
(Geneva, 1992), Decisions, Resolutions and Recommendations (Geneva: ITU, 1994).
484 Plenipotentiary Conference, Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (Geneva, 
1992) as amended by subsequent plenipotentiary conferences(Geneva: ITU, 2006). Chapt. VI, art. 38.
485 See: INTELSAT General Corporation, ‘Terms of Use,’ http://www.intelsatgeneral.com/terms. Also 
see: Inmarsat, ‘Legal notices. Terms and Conditions of Use,’http://www.inmarsat.com/Terms_and_
conditions.aspx.
486 See Tim Maurer, Cyber Norm Emergence at the United Nations – An Analysis of the Activities at the UN 
Regarding Cyber-Security, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2011), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf.
487 Ibid.
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crime which has evolved into the core group of experts.488 The ITU set up a high-
level expert group that developed the Global Cybersecurity Agenda in 2007 and 
the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice established 
an open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cyber crime in 2010.489 Due 
to the complexity of the issues involved, the First Committee Group was unable 
to reach a consensus on a final report, but the second (2009-2010) produced a 
report on law applicable in the context of cyber security and confidence building 
measures in cyberspace.490 Both groups have examined and described existing and 
potential threats against information security as well as what challenges this will 
bring to society. The last report stresses the need for shared perspectives among 
states, and practical cooperation by a broad range of activities, such as sharing best 
practice, exchange of information and capacity building. The reports are of high 
value for states, providing guidance on threats as well as measures that need to be 
taken towards achieving increased information security, stability and resilience in 
cyberspace.
A third GGE was established in 2010 by a UNGA resolution491 to follow up the work 
of the previous groups and to continue to study the ‘existing and potential threats 
in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address 
them, including norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of states and 
confidence building measures with regard to information space’. This group will 
initiate its work in 2012 and report in September 2013.
5.2.2. Cyber-Enabled Terrorism
It is reasonable to presume that cyberspace could be used as a vector for initiating 
physical attacks to further the aims of a terrorist: terrorist groups also use 
cyberspace to recruit, spread propaganda and organise their activities. Terrorism 
is prohibited in both international and national law (since national legislation needs 
to be complemented by international measures due to the character terrorist acts 
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
490 See: Group of Governmental Experts, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications 
in the Context of International Security (A/65/201), (New York: United Nations, 2011), http://www.
un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/DisarmamentStudySeries/PDF/DSS_33.pdf. 
This report was followed up by another report on the same topic where the Member States had the 
opportunity to express their opinions on the content of the first report, see: UNGA, Developments in 
the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. Report of 
the Secretary-General (A/66/152/Add.1) (New York: United Nations, 2011). More information on the 
evolution of the First Committee’s position on cyber security can be found here: Maurer, Cyber Norm 
Emergence at the United Nations – An Analysis of the Activities at the UN Regarding Cyber-Security.
491 UNGA, Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
security (A/RES/66/24) (New York: United Nations, 2011).
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may take). States and organisations which support terrorist actions may become 
responsible for the acts of that subject on the same legal grounds as described 
above on the judgements of the ICJ.492 Cyber terrorism is not specifically proscribed 
in any international convention, which is of special importance due to the fact that 
international law on terrorism is scattered, and the means used (cyber technique, 
kinetic energy, etc.), have an effect on the applicable law.493
There is no overarching general convention on terrorism494 but, in 2006, the 
UN General Assembly adopted a resolution called the Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy.495 The strategy consists of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action, and 
underscores the importance of existing international counter-terrorism instruments 
by pledging Member States to becoming parties to them and implementing their 
provisions. The strategy provides Member States with a common strategic approach 
to fight terrorism, not only sending a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable 
in all its forms, but also resolving to take practical steps individually and collectively 
to prevent and combat it. Acts of cyber-enabled terrorism are encompassed by this 
strategy, however, since it merely encourages states to take necessary measures, it 
needs to be read together with, and is complemented by, regulations that deal the 
inherent specific features of cyber-enabled terrorism and cyber crime. In addition, 
UN Member States are currently negotiating a Draft Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism, which will complement the already existing conventions 
on the topic.
492 It is an extensive discussion regarding circumstances when a state should be responsible for such 
acts, which cannot be dealt with in detail in this manual. For further guidance on this matter, see: 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Also see: Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America).
493 Examples (not exhaustive) of very specific regulations on terrorism are the ICAO, Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (‘Montreal Convention’) (974 UNTS 
177) (Montreal: International Conference on Air Law, 1971). Also see UNGA, International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (A/59/766) (New York: United Nations, 2005). For a 
complete list, see: http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml.
494 Since 1963, the international community has elaborated 14 conventions (of which 12 are in force), and 
four amendments to prevent terrorist acts. Those conventions are developed under the auspices of the 
UN and they address specific terrorist acts, like bombings, or specific environments, like the maritime 
safety.
495 UNGA, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) (New York: United 
Nations, 2006).
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In 2002, all EU Member States agreed on a definition of terrorism to be used in national 
legislation,496 and the Council of Europe subsequently adopted the Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005).497 A defining feature of the Convention is 
Article 5, which contains a definition of a ‘Public Provocation to Commit a Terrorist 
Offence’, the first attempt by international law to define incitement to terrorism. It is 
controversial due to the inclusion of ‘indirect’ incitement. The limits of this concept 
are not defined; however Article 12 requires parties to implement the offence in 
a way that is compatible with the right to freedom of expression as recognised 
in international law. States face a challenging task balancing the prevention of 
terrorism (including cyber-enabled terror) with the requirements of the Convention 
and relevant human rights principles.
5.2.3. Cyber Espionage
One prominent area of international law where states clearly prefer not to have a 
specific international regulation is espionage or, in this context, cyber espionage. 
There is a range of probable reasons why states have chosen to keep this area 
legally unregulated but most tend to revolve around the benefits that this ambiguity 
provides. It could be argued that acts of espionage are banned by the principles of 
the UN Charter Article 2 on sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs, but 
there are very few cases where a state has taken action in accordance with these 
regulations.498
National legal obligations and the limits of state action are often regulated by the 
constitution of the state. Legal obligations in international law are, to a large extent, 
subject to the opinions of states, since they have flexibility to choose the scope and 
content of their obligations. However, once adhered to, it is difficult for a state to 
withdraw from commitments, although there may exist a margin of appreciation 
on the degree of flexibility states are permitted during the fulfilment of their 
obligations. This is determined by the status and design of the legal instrument 
in question. States commit themselves to obligations in expectation of certain 
benefits. But there is usually a trade-off involved in this process, for example, taking 
496 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 164. This has been changed by another decision in 2008 (Council 
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/
JHA on combating terrorism, Official Journal of the European Union, L 330.), although the definition 
of a terrorist crime was not changed. A terrorist crime is defined as any of the offences defined under 
the 12 existing international conventions on terrorism presently in force, complemented by additional 
provisions.
497 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/196.htm.
498 For one example, see: the ‘Rainbow Warrior Case’ arbitrated by a tribunal chaired by then Secretary-
General of the UN in 1986, see: Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v. France). Ruling of the UN 
Secretary-General of 6 July 1986, 74 ILR 241.
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a strong stand for human rights principles is a form of self-imposed restriction, and 
may make it more difficult or expensive for a state to fulfil other tasks. Regulations 
also restrict state behaviour in the sense that, if a state that commits itself to a 
certain rule, it is obliged to adhere to it. Therefore choosing not to regulate can 
also be an advantage, in order to maintain a state’s freedom of action. Contrary 
to international law, espionage is commonly regulated in national criminal law as 
a crime if committed by an individual. This is an effect of the need for states to 
provide themselves with legal instruments to restrict as well as prohibit espionage 
on its territory against its interests. However, the criminalisation of terrorism 
and espionage in the domestic legal system does not have any effect outside the 
jurisdiction of the state.
Espionage in cyberspace can be conducted by Computer Network Exploitation 
(CNE),499 which is an action to explore and investigate the technical structure, 
design and content of a certain area of cyberspace. However, unless conducted 
in accordance with the national criminal law requirements – which generally 
demand that espionage provides a state with information which otherwise would 
be impossible to retrieve – CNE is a mere intrusion and possibly a crime. This is a 
complicating factor for international law.
The possibilities that digitisation of society offers for CNE are vast – not just for 
states, but for organisations, commercial entities and individuals. This can come 
from any part of the world, for any reason, against a broad range of targets from 
military weapon systems to the civilian telecom industry.
A comparison between cyber espionage which has no explicit regulation in 
international law, and cyber-enabled terrorism, gives us a picture of states trying 
to handle two types of threats in very different ways: the first by avoiding legal 
commitments, and the latter by numerous and detailed legislation.
5.2.4. Cyber Criminality
All legal obligations require implementation but the strictness and detail of 
the demands posed on states differs. One area that benefits from detailed 
implementation is the countering of cyber criminality, or cyber crime.500 Due to 
the global penetration of information and communications technology (ICT) in all 
aspects of society, as well as the interconnected nature of the internet, cyber criminal 
acts are easy to commit abroad. This makes it fundamental that states cooperate 
499 The implications of the CNE definitions within the context of ‘cyber attack’ are discussed in Section 1 
and Section 3.
500 See Section 1.2 for a discussion on cyber crime.
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and support each other on these matters, which brings with it responsibilities, as 
well as legal obligations. Combating cyber criminality has become an activity of 
interest for all actors concerned with information security. Due to this, the topic 
benefits should be addressed from a governmental level in order to ensure coherent 
and coordinated efforts.
Cyber crime can be conceptualised either as a ‘new’ or an ‘ordinary’ type of 
crime501 committed in, or by, the use of cyber means and infrastructure. For 
example, unauthorised access (intrusion) into closed networks, or the construction 
and use of botnets, are crimes that have evolved due to technical developments. 
They stand side by side with ‘ordinary’ crimes such as theft, fraud, sabotage and 
threatening behaviour, all of which are also now possible to commit in cyberspace. 
Due to this, two ‘ordinary’ types of crime: terrorism and espionage, are dealt with 
separately in this section because of their special features and effect on the digital, 
interconnected world.
The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) has recognised the 
evolving problem of cyber crime and has launched a programme in response. It 
consists of eight main points and contains both training and operative measures.502 
INTERPOL has concluded cooperation agreements with international organisations 
such as the UN and the EU in order to fight international criminality. This has 
enabled cooperation with the European Police Office (EUROPOL) which was 
founded in 1992503 and which became an official organ of the EU in 2010,504 in 
response to the European Commission’s communication ‘Tackling Crime in our 
Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre’.505 EUROPOL is Europe’s 
specialist centre on law enforcement and provides analytical expertise and 
operational support on cyber criminality. The recently established European 
Cybercrime Centre (housed in EUROPOL) has a slightly different aim; to pool 
expertise and information and collaborate with key EU stakeholders, non-EU 
countries, international organisations, internet governance bodies and service 
providers, internet security companies, the financial sector, academia, civil society 
organisations and CERTs as to become the focal point in the EU’s fight against 
501 See, for instance, European Commission, Towards a general policy on the fight against cyber crime 
(COM(2007) 267 final) (Brussels: European Commission, 2007).
502 For more information, see: INTERPOL, ‘Cybercrime,’http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/
Cybercrime.
503 A European Police Office for the cooperation between Member States was mentioned in the European 
Union, Treaty on European Union (‘Treaty of Maastricht’) (Brussels: Official Journal C 191, 1992). Art. 
K.1(9).
504 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol) (2009/371/JHA), 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 121.
505 European Commission, Tackling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre 
(COM(2012) 140 final) (Brussels: European Commission, 2012).
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cyber crime.506 It supports Member States and the EU in building operational and 
analytical capacity for investigations and cooperation with international partners 
including non-EU countries.
In 2002, the EU presented a proposal for a Framework Decision on Attacks against 
Information Systems, which takes note of the Convention on Cybercrime, but 
concentrates on the harmonisation of substantive criminal law provisions that 
are designed to protect infrastructure elements.507, 508 The Framework Decision 
has been reworked and a revised version is expected to be adopted in the fall of 
2012. This version substantially strengthens both the minimum penalties involved 
while, at the same time, seeks to strengthen the legal environment to encourage the 
adoption of better information security principles by legal persons.
5.2.5. Convention on Cybercrime
Several initiatives have been taken to increase international cooperation and fight 
cyber crime.509 One of the most important legal instruments in the fight against 
cyber crime is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, also known as 
the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime or the Budapest Convention, described 
below. It is the only binding international treaty on the subject that has been 
adopted to date. The Convention is open to signature by non-European states, 
and there are currently 47 signatories, of which 37 have ratified the Convention. 
It provides guidelines, including legislative direction, for all governments wishing 
to protect against cyber crime.510 Its objective is to pursue a common criminal 
policy, particularly through adopting appropriate legislation and fostering a fast 
and effective regime of international cooperation. This is done through developing 
legislation against cyber crime; harmonising domestic criminal laws (such as 
substantive law elements of offences); improving investigative technique; providing 
506 The centre will be operational by 1 January 2013, see: Europol, ‘European Cybercrime Centre to be 
Established at Europol,’ Media Corner, 28 March 2012.
507 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications), Official Journal, L 201.
508 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information 
systems, Official Journal of the European Union, L 69.
509 The European Commission on Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of 
Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-related Crime, the EU Forum on Cybercrime, 
the OECD Security Guidelines and the G8 Committee on High-Tech crime, the UN General Assembly 
Resolution on Combating the Criminal Misuse of Information Technology (2000, 2002).
510 As early as 1997, the G8 released an action plan and principles to combat cyber crime and protect 
data and systems from unauthorised impairment. Later, the G8 called for standardisation on laws on 
cyber crime, cross-border communication and enhanced cooperation on extradition cases of suspected 
cyber criminals. This was made at the same time the Council of Europe launched the Convention on 
Cybercrime, which met the essential demands of the G8.
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for domestic criminal procedural law powers, and prosecution of such offences 
as well as other offences committed by means of a computer system (or related 
evidence which is in electronic form).
The Convention provides legal solutions aiming to tackle the consequences of 
criminality taking advantages of the global nature and anonymity of cyberspace. 
It provides guidelines and legislative direction for all states wishing to protect 
themselves against cyber crime in cooperation with other states. The Convention 
creates stipulations for the most important actions which need to be taken to 
combat cyber criminality but, at the same time, gives some leeway which facilitates 
implementation. For example, the content of the Convention does not have to be 
copied into the domestic legislation of the states (for ratification, states need to have 
laws which provide an equivalent framework to the content of the Convention); 
some Articles allow states to add qualifying circumstances, and the offences listed 
in Chapter II of the Convention are considered a minimum-standard model which 
means states are free to legislate more extensively on these matters. 
The aim of the Convention is to pursue a common criminal policy, particularly 
through adopting appropriate legislation and fostering a fast and effective regime 
of international cooperation.511 This is done through (1) harmonising the domestic 
criminal substantive law elements of offences and connected provisions in the 
area of cyber crime, (2) providing for domestic criminal procedural law powers 
necessary for the investigation and prosecution of such offences as well as other 
offences committed by the means of a computer system or evidence in relation 
to which is in electronic form, and (3) setting up a fast and effective regime of 
international cooperation.512 The content is divided into four chapters (use of terms, 
measures on substantial and procedural law, international cooperation, and final 
clauses), but the commentary here is concentrated on Chapters II and III. 
Chapter II
Chapter II contains three sections: substantive criminal law (Articles 2-13), 
procedural law (14-21) and jurisdiction (22). The first section lists relevant offences, 
thereby aiming to create a common minimum standard which makes it difficult 
for perpetrators attempting to perform their illegal activities in states with lower 
standards or even lack of criminalisation of such activity. Another positive effect 
of coherent legislation is that extradition between states is facilitated when the 
offence is criminalised in both of them. The offences which the Convention lists 
511 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 
185), (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/html/185.
htm. Para. 16.
512 Ibid.
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cover crimes which are computer-related, such as illegal access (unauthorised 
access into computer systems and data); illegal interception (monitoring or 
surveying communication without right); system interference (seriously sabotaging 
the function of computers and data), as well as ordinary crimes committed by the 
means of computers such as computer-related forgery and fraud. Finally, the last 
Article of Section 1 is another example of the Convention not over-regulating the 
matter: instead of requiring specific sanctions and measures for each crime, the 
Article requires states to ‘adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to ensure that the criminal offences [...] are punishable by effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of liberty.’513
The second section contains provisions for procedural law issues which concern 
the obtaining and collection of data for criminal investigations and proceedings. 
It applies to the offences established in the first section but also to any offence 
committed by the use of computers as well as electronic evidence. The first Articles 
(14-15) contain safeguards provisions which require the states to ensure that the 
obligation to introduce the procedural law provisions do not interfere with human 
rights or the principle of proportionality. The following Articles (16-17) apply to data 
which is stored, for example, at telecom companies and Internet Service Providers. 
The Convention requires that competent authorities have the right to obtain such 
computer and traffic data for criminal investigations and proceedings. This is very 
important legislation for states to have in place since, if the data is impossible to 
retrieve, investigations and the possibilities of providing support and cooperation 
with other actors will be seriously hampered. Article 19 contains procedural rules 
on search and seizure of stored computer data. This type of rule exists in domestic 
legislation with regard to tangible objects and the Convention provides guidance 
on how to modernise such laws in order to ensure effectiveness for electronic 
data. However, due to the interconnectivity of computer systems, there is always 
a risk that data is stored outside of a jurisdiction. Therefore, the need for trans-
border actions requires international cooperation, which is addressed in Chapter 
III. Collection of real-time traffic and content data is addressed in Article 20 and 
21. Often these rules, like search and seizure, already exist in domestic legislations 
with regard to telecommunications, and the Convention provides guidance on how 
to apply it to computer data.
The third section contains one provision on jurisdiction. The Article is based on the 
international law principle on territoriality and contains criteria under which states 
have to establish jurisdiction.514
513 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185): art. 13.
514 Ibid., para. 232-9.
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Chapter III
Chapter III describes international cooperation and provides an important addition 
to the provisions in Chapter II. As mentioned earlier, the interconnectivity and 
global features of cyberspace, the inherent character of volatility with regard to 
computer data, and the possibilities of deception and anonymity create conditions 
which require states to be willing and able to work together by providing mutual 
support and cooperation in order to fight cyber criminality. Chapter II describes 
what needs to be in place and, to gain effect, Chapter III describes how to achieve 
this, for example, by providing rules on mutual assistance and extradition. 
The Chapter is introduced by Article 23 which contains general principles on 
international cooperation: cooperation is to be provided to the widest extent possible, 
on all criminal offences within the scope of this Convention and, in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention, relevant international agreements and 
domestic laws.515 The following Articles are detailed rules which form a coherent 
and effective framework which gives directions on what domestic laws need to 
be in place, as well as information on cooperation and the like. Article 24 deals 
specially with extradition, an area where international and bilateral agreements 
often are in place, and the provisions cover both situations where there are rules 
already in place between the states, as well as when such legal basis does not 
exist. Articles 25-34 contain substantial stipulations on mutual assistance and 
cooperation on criminality, collection of electronic evidence and more and, in order 
to further enhance and secure the operational effects of the Convention, Article 35 
requires states to arrange for a point of contact available 24/7. The aim is to ensure 
rapid response to requests for assistance either by facilitation, direct measures 
or coordination with relevant components. This means that the 24/7 units need 
to be provided with appropriate skills and a mandate which ensures a quick and 
effective response. The data for investigations is to be provided via the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) which regulates these exchanges. Chapter III also 
holds Article 32 (b), which effectively allows law enforcement to access data held 
abroad. This is the most significant challenge to Russia, which has used Article 32 
(b) as a reason to reject the entire Convention.
5.2.6. Human Rights
The most important parts of human rights legislation in a cyber context are the 
rights to freedom of expression and opinion, and the right to privacy. The internet 
has become an indispensable tool for the exercise of these rights, which makes 
access to the internet an important priority for states that are interested in 
515 Ibid., para. 243-4. Note that Article 24, and 33-34 permit a different scope of application.
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supporting these rights. In some states, internet access as such is seen as a human 
right.516 However, this standpoint has been criticised by those who argue that the 
internet is merely a tool for exercising pre-existing rights. They also emphasise the 
development of national cyber policies to make internet available and accessible 
for all individuals, free from restrictions on its content. Mere access means little by 
itself, if content is subject to censorship and restrictions. 
Freedom of expression may bring with it inconvenience for states, since it may be 
used as a tool for raising political awareness, criticising and holding governments 
responsible for their actions. A drawback to freedom of expression is that, to a 
certain extent, it may permit the flow of information of a criminal character. 
However, security measures – such as blocking, filtering, banning, enforcing real-
name policies, censorship, speech criminalisation and surveillance – must be 
carefully considered as they may pose a threat to human rights. State-sanctioned 
police and intelligence powers are necessary in order to fulfil societal obligations 
and human rights law does not prohibit them as long as they are designed and used 
with care and consideration. 
The UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights is a UN General Assembly 
declaration codifying human rights.517 The declaration defines the fundamental 
rights of individuals, and exhorts all governments to protect these rights. Provisions 
of interest in a cyber context are Article 12 on the protection from arbitrary 
interference by authorities518 and Article 19 which contains the right to freedom 
of expression.519 However, all Articles are subject to a general exception which give 
states right to limit rights and freedoms of individuals for purposes vital for the 
function of the society.520
The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is an 
international instrument for human rights. It is a multilateral treaty adopted by 
516 In Estonia, Finland, France, Greece and Spain, internet access is a legal right.
517 Declarations of the UN General Assembly are not legally binding for states according to the UN Charter 
Articles 10-17. Although parts of the declaration are considered to reflect customary law, there is no 
consensus on the specific parts this reflection may encompass.
518 ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.’
519 ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers.’
520 Article 29 states: ‘In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society.’
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the General Assembly in 1966,521 and is the first universal human rights treaty.522 It 
differs from the universal declaration mentioned above, since Part II of the covenant 
contains a positive obligation on states to undertake necessary measures to provide 
effective remedies for individuals who think their rights according to the covenant 
have been violated. Enforcement of the covenant is to some extent undermined 
by the reservations made by states which render ineffective the covenant rights 
which otherwise would require changes in national law to ensure compliance with 
covenant obligations.523
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a European initiative 
regarding human rights that established the supranational European Court of 
Human Rights.524 Parties to the Convention include all 47 Member States of the 
Council of Europe. Its provisions are written in general terms, which leads to a need 
for clarification in certain circumstances (and which is met by interpretative court 
decisions). Individuals have a right to bring their claims to the court and Member 
States – in cases where the court decides there is a violation – are bound to comply 
with and execute the court’s decision, which gives the Convention a strong legal 
impact upon states.
Provisions of interest525 in the cyber context are Articles 8 and 10. Article 8 protects 
individuals from unlawful searches and arbitrary interferences by public authorities, 
but the scope of the provision is even broader due to the protection of ‘private and 
family life’.526 In a cyber context, this indicates that the provision is applicable not 
only to personal data and other information owned and stored by an individual, or 
521 The covenant came into force in March 23, 1976.
522 There are also numerous regional human rights treaties worth to be mentioned; the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam.
523 Jamal Greene, ‘Hate Speech and the Demos,’ in The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking 
Regulation and Responses, ed. Michael Herz and Péter Molnár (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012).
524 European Court of Human Rights, www.echr.coe.int.
525 A comprehensive research report on case law regarding internet-related matters has been made by 
the research division of the court; ‘Internet: case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’ and 
the following discussion is based on the findings of the division. For the full report, see: Research 
Division, Internet: case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, (Strasbourg: European Court 
of Human Rights, 2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/E3B11782-7E42-418B-AC04-
A29BEDC0400F/0/RAPPORT_RECHERCHE_internet_Freedom_Expression_EN.pdf.
526 Article 8: ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.’
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to e-mail exchanges, but also to ICT-based systems and networks including internet 
traffic. There are also positive obligations for the authorities inherent in the respect 
for private or family life, for example, a duty to ensure an effective deterrent against 
grave acts to a person’s personal life. The compilation, storage, use and disclosure 
of personal data by authorities constitutes interference with the rights as set out in 
Article 8, however, such data may be collected and stored in the interests of national 
security as long as there are adequate and effective legal guarantees against abuse.
Article 10 on the freedom of expression – of which the internet has become an 
important tool – deals with a basic right in a democratic society.527 The court has 
taken a position in case law that offers little room for restrictions on this right 
by state authorities. The right to ‘receive and impart information [...] regardless of 
frontiers’ also prohibits states from actions aiming to censor internet content by 
blocking, filtering or otherwise restricting access to information which others are 
willing to impart.528
States are obliged, not only to ensure their citizens are able to exercise their legal 
rights, but also to ensure their protection and security. These duties are sometimes 
in conflict and states need to find a balance in order to fulfil these interests. The 
case law of the court provides valuable guidance on these matters, ensuring the 
protection of individual rights and freedoms and, at the same time, recognising the 
needs of authorities to ensure the function of the democratic society.
5.2.7. International Humanitarian Law
The purpose of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is to limit the hardship and 
suffering of the civilian population and combatants during conflict, by providing 
a minimum standard of protection. The main treaties are the Geneva Conventions 
and its Additional Protocols, as well as the Hague Conventions. Significant portions 
of these treaties are also recognised as customary law and contain rules for 
warfare such as the principles on proportionality, necessity, distinction and non-
discrimination. The use of IHL is of great importance regarding the deployment 
527 Article 10: ‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with 
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’
528 Note that Article 10 does not provide a right for individuals to access all official documents of a state. 
Information may be restricted from public access due to conditions prescribed by law and for reasons 
necessary in a democratic society.
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of cyber effects in conflict situations, due to the inherent nature of civilian and 
military functions within the same areas. The centre of gravity in cyber conflict 
situations is, due to the nature of cyberspace, likely to take place amidst the civilian 
population. Therefore states needs to pay attention to IHL at the government level 
when assuming and designing its commitment to military operations and military 
forces need to exercise due care and attention to the interpretation and application 
of IHL regulations, since this will direct the scope and content of military rules of 
engagement and national caveats. 
As evident from its purposes and scope of regulation, the rules of IHL are applicable 
in armed conflict situations, declared war and occupation.529 Internal domestic 
conflicts complicate the landscape, as IHL only applies if the conflict reaches 
the threshold of a non-international armed conflict (e.g., ‘civil war’). However, the 
difference between the legal rules regarding these types of conflict has diminished. 
For example, since 1996, all IHL treaties that have been created are applicable in 
both types (internal and external) conflict.530
IHL instruments do not reference ‘peace-keeping forces’, but the UN has provided 
clear directions that peace-keepers need to apply IHL and, as far as applicable, also 
human rights.531
However, problems can still occur when the same force comprises troops from 
states that are party to IHL treaties and states that are not. One solution provided 
by the EU is the European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with 
international humanitarian law, which provides operational tools for Member 
States and ensures coherent compliance in all actions taken by the EU within this 
area.532 The guidelines encourage Member States to comply with their obligations 
according to IHL in applicable situations. The guidelines may also be applied on 
non-state actors if this is in the interest of a Member State. This last provision is 
of interest in a cyber context, due to the fact that malicious code can be developed 
and used by individual actors, in addition to problems with a definitive attribution 
to a perpetrator.
529 ICRC, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention) (Geneva: ICRC, 1949). Art. 2.
530 See, for example, the Convention on the Prohibition, Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997) (also ‘Ottawa Treaty’), or the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (2008).
531 UNSG, Secretary-General‘s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian 
Law (ST/SGB/1999/13) (New York: United Nations, 1999).
532 European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), 
2009/C 303/06.
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The features and use of malicious cyber activities in non-armed conflict situations, 
as well as the scope and consequences of cyber criminality, have stimulated 
discussions among lawyers on the applicability of IHL principles regarding 
peacetime incidents in cyberspace.533 The value of these analyses remains primarily 
academic, as the chances of practical use is limited due to the fact that states are 
generally reluctant to formally declare themselves in situations of armed conflict 
due to the range of additional consequences this brings.
Important guidance regarding the applicability of IHL to cyber activities will 
be found in the Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(also known as the Tallinn Manual). The manual was written by an international 
independent group of experts, invited by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence. It aims to provide interpretations on how IHL applies in 
cyberspace, as well as to generate and deepen discussions on these topics between 
lawyers at the international level.534
5.2.8. Legal Thresholds
Cyber incidents can encompass a wide range of activities. This means there are 
different definitions, or legal categories, depending on the character of the incident. 
These categories are separated by thresholds. In essence, a threshold evolves when 
a legal framework changes due to the shift in the characterisation of an incident. 
Thresholds are closely linked to the provisions of the UN Charter but also to the 
problem of attribution. With regard to the UN Charter, only states are subject to its 
provisions. Therefore, without a positive attribution to a state, the Charter is not 
applicable. The assumptions are likely to be that the perpetrator is an individual, 
and the cyber incident at stake will be labelled as cyber crime or cyber terrorism, 
which calls for the application of criminal law, not the UN Charter.535
If cyber incidents (initially) are likely to be regarded as crimes, they will be 
handled by the police. However, in addition to the overall context, investigations 
will show the extent and severity of the threat and whether it is to be attributed 
to an individual (situated domestically or abroad) or a state. Depending on what 
information can be provided to the legal evaluation, it is to be decided if the incident 
has reached another threshold, which opens up a different definition and a different 
legal framework. This situation calls for cooperation. A NCS strategy would benefit 
533 See also Section 1.4 and Section 3.1.3 for a discussion on cyber attacks.
534 For more information about the manual, see Schmitt (gen. ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare.
535 The principle on state responsibility is relevant in this context, as well as international law on attribution 
of responsibility of a State on activity performed by individuals. These topics are further discussed in 
this on ILC and ICJ. 
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from addressing the need for fast and efficient cooperation on these matters, in 
order to prevent from responding incorrectly or too late.
Regarding actions of states, three thresholds will be mentioned:536 (1) the UN 
Charter Article 2(4) which contains the prohibition of use of force (which is when a 
state breaches a peacetime rule); (2) the UN Charter Article 39 clarifying when an 
incident amounts to a threat or a breach of the peace or an act of aggression (which 
calls for action from the UN Security Council), and (3) the UN Charter Article 51 
which gives a state the right of self-defence in response to an armed attack.537
Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force between states.538 The use of force is 
traditionally regarded as the use of kinetic force which brings with it death or injury 
to persons, or damage and destruction to objects. Cyber incidents may generate a 
range of effects, including incidents similar to kinetic attacks. But the means of 
accomplishing such incidents are generally different. Guidance is provided by the 
ICJ which states in the Nicaragua case that actions of non-kinetic nature can be 
regarded as a use of force.539
Articles 39-42 regulate under what circumstances the UN Security Council can 
decide that a situation represents a threat, a breach to peace or an act of aggression 
(Article 39). It is also clarified if action is to be taken by the international community 
in accordance with Article 41 and 42 to restore international peace and security. 
The Security Council has chosen to categorise a wide range of situations within 
Article 39 (‘threat or breach to the peace’), including civil war, large numbers of 
refugees threatening to destabilise a region, or the degradation of democratically 
elected political leaders. The basis for this decision was not purely legal, but also 
accounted for global processes as well as political reasons, since Article 39 ‘opens 
up’ for Articles 41 and 42. What constitutes an ‘act of aggression’ is defined in 
the UN General Assembly resolution ‘Definition of Aggression’.540 It is increasingly 
assumed that cyber incidents of a certain extent and effect can fall within Article 
39, especially taking into account the interconnectivity and the global nature of 
cyberspace.
Article 51 of the Charter gives states a right to self-defence in case of an armed 
attack. There has been extensive debate on whether a computer network attack 
536 Cyber criminality is addressed in chapter 5.1.3.
537 For an excellent and comprehensive discussion on these topics, see Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Cyber 
Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited,’Villanova Law Review 56(2011), http://www.usnwc.edu/
getattachment/f1236094-416b-4e5b-bf58-32e677aed04a/villanova_cyber_ad_bellum.
538 This is also recognised as customary law, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Para. 98.
539 Ibid. Note 4 para. 228.
540 UNGA, Definition of Aggression (A/RES/3314(XXIX) (New York: United Nations, 1974).
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can amount to an armed attack. However, in order to find an answer, one must try 
to define ‘armed attack’ in the cyber context. Again, the notion ‘armed’ is targeted 
at kinetic force, which brings with it death or injury to persons, and damage and 
destruction to objects.541 From an effect-based approach, cyber incidents generating 
such consequences could fall within Article 51, giving the target state a right to 
respond by necessary and proportionate means.
5.3. INTERPRETATION OF COMMITMENTS
When states decide to adhere to a certain commitment, each party will perceive 
the content of that commitment differently. The extent of these differences is 
dependent on the nature and context of the commitment, as well as on the mood 
and the strength of the respective government. The differing interests of states, 
and their relative positions of power in cyberspace, will be reflected in their NCS 
policies. This, in turn, inevitably means that the implementation and the fulfilment 
of commitments will vary. States can choose what obligations they accept and what 
obligations they adhere to, and will decide their level of commitment in line with 
the national need.
If the economic, social and security benefits of an obligation outweigh the costs 
and constraints, the state can make the decision to adhere to it. However, this 
judgement will vary from state to state based on the individual interpretations of 
the content of the obligation. In some cases, these interpretations can be overruled 
by the European Convention on Human Rights, where the court has the authority 
to make binding decisions on a state’s interpretation and implementation of the 
Convention.
The implementation of a state’s commitment is crucial for the effect it will have. 
Due to the pervasive character of cyberspace, cyber issues often require a broad 
perspective. Depending on the complexity and scope of the specific obligation, 
there might be a need to engage a broad range of government departments.542 
Delivery in a stovepiped manner, or by a single department, risks a narrow or 
ineffective solution. An example of a commitment requiring the engagement of 
several departments is the objective of the European Commission’s Digital Agenda, 
which is to ‘deliver sustainable economic and social benefits from a digital single 
market’.543 To make this type of commitment work, states need to ensure adequate 
541 Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited’. 588.
542 See Section 4 for a broad discussion on operational cooperation.
543 Directorate General for Internal Policies, Briefing Note: Digital Agenda for Europe – An Overview 
for the 37th EEA JPC, (Strasbourg: European Parliament, 2011), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deea/dv/1011_10_/1011_10_en.pdf.
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cooperation between agencies as well as measures that facilitate shared tasks and 
responsibilities.
5.3.1. Governance
Governance of the cyber domain – in particular of the internet and its networking 
protocols – is the remit of a number of organisations which this section will 
mention, in addition to a myriad of stakeholders which are beyond the scope of this 
enquiry. Cyberspace is an environment that states operate within and, to a certain 
extent, can influence but not control. From NATO’s perspective the primary, initial 
challenge is to decide its role in the global cyber ecosystem. And, subsequently, 
it must divide responsibilities between its command structure and the forces 
assigned to it. In other words, what tasks does NATO carry out and how much does 
it rely on Member States?
Recent national policy initiatives have recognised the importance of addressing 
cyber governance from a variety of perspectives. Commercial incentives drive the 
vast majority of the market for cyber security goods and services. Government is 
a non-negligible player in the procurement market for ICT goods and services, and 
has an interest in promoting secure products (e.g., Trusted Computing Group544). 
The economic aspects of cyber security are also of increasing prominence, as noted 
in the 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy – sub-titled ‘Protecting and promoting the 
UK in a digital world’.545 However, for NATO, which is designed to be a political-
military alliance, its interests in cyberspace could be said to coalesce around a 
number of primary areas or mandates.546 This includes military activities, counter-
crime, intelligence and counter-intelligence, critical infrastructure protection and 
national crisis management, and diplomacy and internet governance.547
The governance of cyberspace is of international concern, given the inherently 
international nature of cyberspace and its attendant risks and opportunities. 
National cyber security policies would benefit from adopting a broad perspective 
and viewing the digital domain from beyond a purely military viewpoint. There are a 
number of governance-related organisations that are of relevance to security policy-
makers. One of the most influential is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN), which is a non-profit private organisation based in the US. 
The importance of ICANN stems from the organisation’s work on the coordination 
of the internet systems of unique identifiers by coordination of IP addresses and the 
544 Trusted Computing Group: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org.
545 UK Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world.
546 Klimburg and Mirtl, Cyberspace and Governance – A Primer (Working Paper 65). 15-9.
547 These mandates are introduced in Section 1 and described in more detail in Section 4.
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Domain Name System (DNS), a hierarchical organisation of namespace that is vital 
for the functioning of the internet. For most governments, the local registries548 
are even more important, as they manage the internet space for a national top-
level domain (such as .fr or .de) and have a direct relevance for NCS. Registries 
often work through local groupings such as the Regional Internet Registries (RIR), 
and the RIR responsible for Europe and the Middle East (RIPE) also maintains its 
own Network Coordination Centre. Other relevant organisations include protocol 
and standard setting groups which, for the most part, are simply collections of 
volunteer engineers. A preeminent example is the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), a pure volunteer network of engineers which produces technical and good 
practice documents called RFC (Request for Comments). The IETF is a famously 
anarchic organisation that, officially, does not even exist (it is a subchapter of the 
Internet Society). However, there are few technical organisations that have done as 
much to help build (and fix) the internet, or whose influence has gone as unnoticed 
for so long. In recent years, however, there has been a clear movement of large 
private sector companies (including Chinese hardware manufactures) into the 
IETF – many of the more recent RFCs were probably directly drafted with specific 
industry backing. Government, in comparison, still plays a very minor role among 
IETF experts.
Related telecommunications issues are dealt with by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) which is the UN agency for information and 
communication technologies. ITU is founded on two documents: the ITU 
Constitution and the ITU Convention.549 The ITU has 193 members, as states become 
parties to the organisation automatically by its affiliation to the UN. However, UN 
Member States are free to decide what support they want to contribute.550 The 
ITU is based on public-private partnership and, in addition to the states, over 700 
private-sector entities and academic institutions are members. Its main efforts are 
to be found within the technical domain regarding three main areas of activity; 
radio communications (coordination of radio communication services and the 
international management of the radio-frequency spectrum and satellite orbits), 
standardisation (fundamental for internet access, communication protocols, 
voice and video compression, home networking, and other telecom protocols) 
548 Also known as ‘country-code top level domain’ (ccTLD) registries.
549 See: Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, Constitution and Convention of the International 
Telecommunication Union. Also see: Additional Plenipotentiary Conference, Instruments Amending 
the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (Geneva, 1992), 
Decisions, Resolutions and Recommendations.
550 For the position of UN Member States that have signed, but not ratified the ITU Constitution and 
Convention, see: Plenipotentiary Conference, Constitution of the International Telecommunication 
Union (Geneva, 1992) as amended by subsequent plenipotentiary conferences: chapt. IX, art. 52.
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and development (programmes for various purposes such as development of 
connectivity or enabling telecom expansion in emerging markets).
In addition, the ITU hosts study groups and arranges global and regional events 
and workshops that are open to non-members. The ITU hosted the World Summit 
on Information Society (WSIS), which was held in two phases in 2003 and 2005. 
This resulted in the Geneva Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Plan of 
Action (2003), as well as the Tunis Commitment and the Tunis Agenda for the 
Information Society (2005).551 These documents provide principles and target goals 
on the development of the global information society. A related actor is the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF), whose purpose is to support the UN Secretary-General 
in carrying out the mandate from the WSIS with regard to convening a forum for 
multi-stakeholder policy dialogue.552
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) offers a platform 
for discussion, dialogue and practical work on security issues.553 The work of 
the OSCE has a broad approach, taking into account not only military security 
matters, but also economic, environmental and human issues. This is an advantage 
for addressing cross-dimensional, transnational threats which is consistent with 
addressing cyber threats. The cyber security aim of OSCE is traditionally focused 
on individual aspects such as combating cyber crime and the use of the internet 
for terrorist purposes but, in 2011, it was expanded to include direct discussions 
on possible Confidence Building Measures (CBM) with PC Decision 1039. A 
restructuring of the OSCE Secretariat in 2011/2012 saw the new Trans-National 
Threats (TNT) Department directly assume responsibility for ‘threat emanating 
from the misuse of ICT’, which currently supports the PCD 1039 process. The 
TNT Department also includes two organisations which previously dealt with 
international cyber security issues from their respective mandates: the Action 
against Terrorism Unit (ATU)554 and the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU).555
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was founded 
to stimulate economic progress and world trade.556 It offers capacity building 
activities that are also open to non-Member States that participate as observers. The 
OECD hosts a number of committees that discuss and review policy development in 
specific areas. The work of the committees may result in multilateral agreements, 
standards and models, and recommendations and guidelines. Several committees, 
551 For all official documents and more information about WSIS, see: http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html.
552 Internet Governance Forum: http://www.intgovforum.org/cms.
553 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe: http://www.osce.org.
554 Action against Terrorism Unit: http://www.osce.org/atu.
555 Strategic Police Matters Unit: http://www.osce.org/spmu.
556 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: http://www.oecd.org.
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in particular the Committee on Information, Communications and Computer Policy 
(ICCP), have contributed to analysis of policy development within the cyber arena.
Commitments regarding these organisations and others are followed by 
implementation which, in turn, may demand measures to be taken by states. These 
come with a price, as they may require the establishment and/or reorganisation 
of public institutions and agencies. There are also likely to be demands for new 
methods and processes. Requirements for new capabilities, technical development 
and education are only few examples of consequences for states that want to 
participate in the benefits of cyberspace.
Due to the advantages offered to society by the digital environment, such 
investments continue to be made. State caution on entering into commitments, on 
the other hand, is increased due to fears of over-regulated and limited freedom 
of action. These constraints come with the acceptance of new obligations related 
to cyberspace and must be measured against the expected advantages of a given 
commitment.
The growing importance and, indeed, the integral nature of ICT to core societal 
functions must be taken into consideration. This is a strong consideration when states 
examine their options and freedom of choice regarding activities in cyberspace. For 
example, membership in ICANN is optional. There are no formal obligations for 
states to become members of this organisation. Yet it is not a plausible strategy 
for states to ignore the existence and activity of such an organisation. This is 
compared with the ITU (some of whose activities could overlap with ICANN) whose 
membership is essentially mandatory as it comes with UN membership. Yet, even 
in this case states are free to choose the level of engagement with and investment 
into the organisation.
Due to the inherent features of the digital society, where vulnerabilities can be 
widespread and interdependency is high, information sharing can offer advantages 
to the handling of cyber threats. Cultivating this skill and formalising its performance 
within an organisation can provide better preparedness and improved incident 
response capabilities. However, this is generally a voluntary arrangement, which in 
turn presupposes an element of trust. One mechanism for building trust (and other 
measures) at the state level is the establishment of Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERTs) and Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRTs), but only 
when these organisations are seen as being responsive to legitimate cooperation 
requests, and generally counting as ‘trust actors’ within accredited peer groups 
(such as the FIRST network). Information sharing557 or building connectivity 
557 For a further discussion on information exchanges, see Section 4.
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between stakeholders at an international and national level between CERTs/
CSIRTs and governments is critical for the protection of critical infrastructure (and 
critical information infrastructure). As operational-level CERTs/CSIRTs information 
sharing continues to increase, improvements must also continue to be made, 
particularly between CSIRTs with national responsibility.558 Information sharing 
(also described as Information Exchanges) is increasingly being driven by public-
private partnership models, even within international contexts.559 Cross-border 
information sharing mechanisms are crucial to managing a crisis and mitigating 
incidents, in particular, those that could spread quickly beyond the capacity or 
ability of the local operational CERTs and impact delivery of critical infrastructure 
services.560, 561
5.3.2. Assurance Mechanisms: Information Security
A principle of all government activity is quality assurance – a component of quality 
management that is ‘focused on providing confidence that quality requirements 
will be fulfilled.’562 This is ensured through specific business processes, design 
principles and risk management criteria that ultimately form the bedrock of 
information security in general, and NCS in particular.
Information Security (which is often used interchangeably with the phrase 
information assurance, although the latter is a considerably wider concept) is often 
directly equated with cyber security, and forms the critical process-orientated 
assurance component in delivering cyber security for any organisation.
Information Security is generally defined as the ability to protect information 
and information systems from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction.563 This is accomplished 
through a process of Information Security Management that defines a ‘security 
target’ – such as a specific file, a computer, a system or an entire organisation. This 
558 One such group is the European Government CERT Group. 
559 On example for an international PPP is the European Public Private Partnership on Resilience (EP3R) 
of the European Commission. 
560 European Network and Information Security Agency, (ENISA), NATO Computer Incident Response 
Team (NCIRC), Task Force – Collaboration of Computer Incident Response Team, (TF-CSIRT), Forum of 
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is an organisation for sharing best practice information.
561 On information sharing, the International Watch and Warning Network (IWWN) is another example of 
an organisation states are free to join. The purpose of the IWWN is to coordinate the efforts of national 
CERTs and government agencies as well as to offer informal globally operating consultation in the 
event of cyber incidents. Its members are AZ, CA, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, JP, NL, NZ, NO, SW, CH, UK, US.
562 AS/NZS ISO 9000:2006, ‘Quality management systems – fundamentals and vocabulary,’ 9.
563 For a general presentation on the topic see Bodgan Mosneagu, Edgardo Vasquez, and Jay Lam, 
‘Information Security as a Profession,’ (2012).
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security target is then protected according to a specific protection requirement or 
protection profile, which will address basic information security principles of that 
target. The most basic of such security principles are confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (C-I-A)564 but further principles can be added as required.
Information Security Management is closely connected with a number of steps, in 
themselves related to the process of Risk Management. Using the ISO 27002 series 
structure as a point of departure, this includes:565
Risk assessment: a thorough evaluation of the various ‘attacks’ (which includes 
intentional and unintentional acts of human and natural origin) that a system can 
be subjected to. Risk assessment (also known as risk analysis) is a very in-depth 
process that often is software-supported566 due to the large number of attacks (often 
numbering in the thousands) and their cross-linkages that need to be considered.
Security policy: this includes general guidelines to be aware of, ranging from 
such issues as how to deal with ‘Bring Your Own Device’ up to the granting of 
administration rights to desktop clients, or rules about which websites can be 
accessed.
Organisation of information security: this includes the specific assignment of 
roles (such as system administrator or auditor) and responsibilities (such as setting 
access privileges) for the organisation as whole. In particular, this also defines who 
will be responsible for ensuring that the Information Security Management process 
is adhered to.
Asset management: this includes inventory and classification of information 
assets – usually physical, such as in hardware or in computer peripheries. Asset 
Management often also connects to the critical issue of ‘trusted supply chain’ – the 
protection of hardware from intentional interference.
Human resources security: in government, this includes the handling of relevant 
personal security clearances and ensuring that this process is connected to 
information security. This becomes a particular issue with regard to special 
compartmentalised information.
564 See also Section 1.2 and 3.1 for further discussion of the C-I-A triad. 
565 ISO/IEC 27001:2005, ‘Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management 
systems – Requirements.’; ISO/IEC 27002:2005, ‘Information technology – Security techniques – Code 
of practice for information security management.’; ISO/IEC TR 27008:2011, ‘Information technology – 
Security techniques – Guidelines for auditors on information security controls.’ For an introduction see: 
http://www.27000.org.
566 A wide range of software-supported risk analysis systems exist, including the BSI Grundschutz, EBIOS, 
CRAMM and a number of others.
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Physical and environmental security: this refers to building and perimeter 
security from both a safety and security perspective. In information security, 
electronic emissions mean that often a secure environment has to extend outside 
of the immediate physical vicinity. Buildings themselves can be TEMPEST567 proof, 
but other considerations (such as regarding the nature of electric power supply) 
need to be taken into account.
Communications and operations management: this is the ‘heart’ of much of cyber 
security, and includes defining the responsibility for the management of technical 
security controls in systems and networks including, for instance, firewalls and 
similar tools.
Access control: usually working in conjunction with human resources security, 
access settings are a critical in determining who has the right to access what part 
of a computer network, system, application or data. Traditionally, many of the 
most serious breaches of information security have come through errors in access 
control – particularly regarding expired accounts of former employees.
Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance: in general 
closely associated with Asset Management, this function is often split in larger 
organisations, sometimes repeatedly, as it includes, in essence, three separate 
tasks. Acquisition, in particular, is often a highly sensitive issue, particularly with 
regard to compartmentalised networks.
Information security incident management: this function includes the entire scope 
of ‘cyber crisis management’ (also known as business continuity management or 
as continuity of government), which itself encompasses a large set of procedures 
normally dealt with separately. This component also includes disaster recovery – 
usually meaning the separate storage and treatment of relevant data.
Compliance: this function details the roles and responsibilities of the monitoring 
process, as well as ensuring that other relevant standards and regulations are 
adhered to.
The above categorisation is intended to be scalable, and thus applies equally to very 
small and very large organisations. In fact, each of the above sections will normally 
amount to an entire organisation, or even a number of different organisations, 
within a governmental structure.
567 TEMPEST involves shielding an object from spurious electronic emissions (see SANS Institute, An 
Introduction to TEMPEST, (Bethesda, ML: SANS Institute, 2012), http://www.sans.org/reading_room/
whitepapers/privacy/introduction-tempest_981.
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The importance of having a government-wide Information Security Management 
System (ISMS) cannot be overemphasised. There is no chance of even a basic level 
of cyber security if these protection matters are not dealt with in an encompassing 
and systematic fashion. This does not mean that, for instance, all government 
departments must use a single specific ISMS, or even that within a single department 
only one specific ISMS is used. It does, however, imply that every ISMS in use should 
be put into a relationship with other, ‘neighbouring’ ISMS and that, overall, for each 
‘measurable unit’ (be that a system or a department), there is a closed loop within 
the basic Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle.568 As the results of each of these ISMS must 
be able to communicate with each other, widely-shared frameworks (such as the 
‘Common Criteria Approach’) can be useful.
The ‘Common Criteria Approach’ represents the outcome of efforts to develop criteria 
for the evaluation of IT security which are widely used within the international 
Information Security community. It is based on an alignment with, and development 
from, a number of source criteria, including the existing European, US and Canadian 
criteria (Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC); Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC); Canadian Trusted Computer Product 
Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC), respectively). It is a contribution to the development 
of an international standard, and opens the way to worldwide mutual recognition 
of IS evaluation results.569
Common Criteria processes are particularly useful as a driving force for the 
mutual recognition and adoption of secure IT products. By using a Common 
Criteria framework, users can develop a common understanding of their security 
requirements (their protection profile) and communicate these to vendors, who can 
implement the relevant security attributes in their products, which can further be 
independently tested and evaluated. Thereby, Common Criteria provides for a basic 
level of assurance in international information security. To a limited extent, and in 
conjunction with relevant consumer protection legislation, this can help to shift 
liability to vendors and producers, albeit only within a narrowly-defined context. 
In addition, standards guide and assist consumers in defining their requirements. 
Purchasers of computers and information security systems representing the public 
sector also benefit from this system but, in order to take full advantage of it, they 
need to ensure an effective application of the Common Criteria (e.g., by specifying 
what functions and not what products, are of interest). Common Criteria can, 
therefore, be a powerful tool in promoting international cyber security.
568 Also known as the ‘Deming Cycle’ (see, for instance, Paul Arveson, ‘The Deming Cycle,’ Balanced 
Scorecard Institute, http://www.balancedscorecard.org/TheDemingCycle/tabid/112/Default.aspx.).
569 See Syntegra, ‘Common Criteria. An Introduction,’ NIAP, http://www.niap-ccevs.org/cc-scheme/cc_
docs/cc_introduction-v2.pdf.
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No certification or understanding of business information characteristics can 
reduce risk to zero. There will always be an element of residual risk. To protect 
everything is very difficult to accomplish and, as high-profile attacks proliferate, 
there is a growing move towards an ‘assumption of breach’.570 In other words, a 
public or private sector organisation should design their cyber security systems in 
the implicit knowledge that targeted attacks are likely to successfully breach those 
systems. A key question is: which elements of its information inventory should an 
organisation protect at all costs? This question will be difficult to answer, as the 
cost of maximising the protection applied to information will likely result in it being 
less accessible for its original purpose.
Delivering Improvements
Development and improvement of national cyber policy can occur across three 
main areas: (1) within government organisations, (2) in cooperation between the 
public and private sectors, and (3) outside of government. One significant variable 
running through these areas is the balance of power between actors. For example, 
government has significant leverage in delivering improvements in the first area – 
working within and across the public sector. Improvement of national cyber policy 
is, in large part, dependent on organisational mandates, and central government 
leverage comes in large part through the division of responsibility. Overlapping or 
conflicting mandates tend to encourage inertia and exacerbate inter-departmental 
tensions, leaving policy gaps that can be exploited.
Allocation of resources is another familiar tool for driving change. Cyber-related 
resources (e.g., money, people or political support) are often directed towards 
organisations that already hold related mandates (e.g., security services and/or the 
military). As long as resource allocation can be linked robustly to a strategic (i.e., 
long-term) plan, it can be an effective tool for driving cyber policy improvements. 
Governments will also be aware that allocation of resources is likely to be time-
consuming; especially if it involves new or expanded organisations (which will 
themselves need to develop a plan to metabolise and prudently spend taxpayer 
money).
Governments acknowledge the importance of working with the private sector 
in the construction and management of the (largely privately-owned) networks 
upon which they and their populations rely. A significant challenge is to shift 
this cooperation beyond its current transactional mode and towards a model that 
integrates the respective strategic strengths of these powerful organisations. It 
comes as a surprise to many officials to realise that the private sector has a vast 
570 Brian Prince, ‘NSA: Assume Attackers Will Compromise Networks,’ eWeek.com, 17 December 2010.
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amount of data about the network traffic that passes over its systems and is able 
to develop outstanding intelligence about the capabilities and activities of users. 
Executives representing key ICT corporations/service providers often publicly 
comment that they would welcome improved cooperation with governmental 
institutions – state institutions often work hard to generate information that could 
be made available to them at low cost and enhanced with private sector cooperation. 
Improvements can be driven outside government, with government entities 
encouraging – from a detached perspective – cyber security progress in the private 
sector. Economic incentives can be calibrated according to specific sectors and, 
from a broader perspective, governments can make progress with setting the right 
‘system defaults’ that permit possibilities for future innovations. A more nuanced 
understanding is needed, in government and in wider society, of the modern digital 
environment (e.g., technological diffusion, the dramatic increase in connected users 
and devices, etc.). This will help to place NCS measures in the proper perspective – 
as a means to a specific end (e.g., as a means to the larger social and economic goals 
sought by all governments). Governments that can adapt internally to increase their 
compatibility with rapidly changing economic and technological environments will 
reap the rewards of greater competitiveness and prosperity.
5.4. NATO’S CYBER DIMENSION
Digital communications are the backbone of society and, whilst they are a capability 
that NATO exploits for operational and administrative advantage, it is neither an 
environment that NATO, nor its Member States, can claim to control. The ability to 
collect, process and deliver vast amounts of data requires huge increases in military 
and bureaucratic efficiency. At the same time, all NATO nations need to work with 
the fact that their dependence on cyberspace, including the internet, is a major 
vulnerability and, unless invested in, will result in deteriorated overall resilience.571 
NATO, the armed forces, International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) that work with it expose themselves to known and unknown 
risks while operating in the digital domain. Business as usual for NATO includes 
the procurement and organisation of military capabilities, engaging in the political 
processes that support the operation and coherence of the North Atlantic Council, 
and the administration and control of the NATO command elements and forces 
assigned to NATO activities. It is a huge undertaking with operational, logistic, 
economic, political, technical, environmental and reputational risks.
The Alliance is inextricably linked to the digital domain and is faced with many 
threats that create problems for Member States since cyberspace is international 
571 Melissa E. Hathaway, ‘Toward a Closer Digital Alliance,’ SAIS Review 30, no. 2 (2010).
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by nature. The interconnectivity makes a weakness of one country a weakness in 
all, which means that states and organisations cannot deal effectively with cyber 
threats on their own. 
To tackle these challenges, NATO endorsed the ‘in-depth cyber defence’ concept at 
the Lisbon Summit 2010,572 a strategy which cuts across a variety of stakeholders 
and implicitly embraces the Whole of Government approach, due to the fact that the 
lead responsibility of cyber defence in most nations resides in civilian agencies and 
with non-governmental actors. In 2010, NATO presented its latest Strategic Concept 
which recognised the growing international significance of cyber security, both as 
an issue for NATO to address in terms of capability, and as a challenge in respect 
of NATO’s future international relevance.573 The strategic concept was followed by 
the 2011 Policy on Cyber Defence (and associated Action Plan) which directed the 
defence of NATO systems as well as placing a responsibility on Alliance Members 
to protect their own critical networks.574
Functionally, NATO has only responsibility for its own computer networks, not 
for the networks of Allies. The most important operational body to protect these 
networks – the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) – was 
established in 2003 and expanded in 2011-12. In particular, this has led to an 
increase in the forensic capability analysis – a function that can also be provided to 
NATO member countries and partners as needed. 
There are different opinions about whether a major cyber attack could overwhelm 
a state and reach the threshold of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, requiring 
collective defence measures.575 So far, the predominant view is that the risk that this 
will occur is low. However, there is an expectation that a significant attack could 
result in a NATO Article 4 discussion. What is not clear is what that discussion 
would look like, depending on the extent of damage, the degree of certainty 
regarding evidence, and to what extent political leaders would have to rely on 
‘security bureaucrats’ to interpret events and formulate responses. 
5.4.1. NATO’s Collective/Cyber Defence
The North Atlantic community came together in 1949 to create NATO, pledging to 
come to each other’s defence when called upon. This collective defence, enshrined 
in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, also applies to cyber security – but not under 
572 NATO, Lisbon Summit Declaration (Lisbon: NATO, 2010).
573 NATO, Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (Lisbon: NATO, 2010).
574 NATO, Defending the networks. The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence.
575 See United States et al., North Atlantic Treaty.
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all conditions. Within the context of using the ‘five mandates’ model of NCS576 this 
means that it does not apply across all five of the NCS mandates.
NATO first suffered significant cyber attacks in 1999, during operation ALLIED 
FORCE against Serbia, with a number of variously entitled ‘patriotic hackers’ 
conducting denial of service attacks and webpage defacements.577 As these attacks 
were relatively minor they were primarily an issue for the ‘counter cyber crime 
mandate’ of NCS, and not one for ‘collective defence’, no matter how interpreted. 
Even the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia did not trigger an Article 5 response. 
Despite the severity of those attacks, it was not considered to have actually crossed 
the line where military collective defence would be necessary. As with the 1999 
incident, the ‘military mandate’ did not come to the fore, although nations did 
provide technical and policing assistance relevant to other mandates.578 However, 
NATO has decided that its 2007 response to Estonia was too limited, and has 
since sought to expand both its capabilities as well as its strategic and operational 
procedures in this area.
NATO made clear in the Policy on Cyber Defence579 that collective defence does 
apply in cyberspace, and even discusses the process the Alliance will use to invoke 
collective defence – while maintaining ambiguity about specific thresholds. This 
process for escalation begins at the tactical (technical) level. If an incident has 
political implications for collective defence, the incident would get escalated up 
through respective technical and policy levels to the North Atlantic Council.580 The 
process for Article 4 consultations in case of a serious cyber attack has also already 
been especially addressed.581
 As part of the dual concepts of ‘smart defence’ and increased ‘pooling and sharing’, 
NATO has stipulated for the possibility of deploying a NCIRC Rapid Reaction Teams 
(RRT)582 to assist Alliance Members in their efforts to deal with cyber-related 
incidents. The deployment request may be politically or strategically originated; 
the deployment of these teams may assist a country resolve a technical issue, 
or the team may be able to collect independent evidence as to the nature and 
576 These mandates include (1) Military Cyber (2) Counter Cyber Crime (3) Cyber Diplomacy and Internet 
Governance (4) Intelligence & Counter-Intelligence (5) CIP and Crisis Management. See Section 1, 
Section 4.
577 For more details, see Healey and Bochoven, ‘NATO‘s Cyber Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow.’
578 Ibid., and Healey et al., Building a Secure Cyber Future: Attacks on Estonia, Five Years On [Transcript].
579 NATO, Defending the networks. The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence.
580 For more details, see: Healey and Bochoven, ‘NATO‘s Cyber Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow.’
581 NATO, Defending the networks. The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence.
582 NATO, ‘NATO Rapid Reaction Team to fight cyber attack,’ NATO Newsroom, 13 March 2012.
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possible cause of the incident. Another step taken is the establishment of the NATO 
Communications and Information (NCI) Agency,583 a result of the merger of the 
NC3A, NACMA, the ALTMB Programme and the NATO Headquarters.584 The NCI 
Agency will provide NATO with IT and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). Finally, a proposed 
‘Cyber Red Team’ (CRT) has been under discussion since a number of years. The 
CRT is intended to conduct penetration testing of NATO’s own systems, but could 
theoretically be employed to support NATO Members and partners. 
These developing NATO capabilities should not be seen as absolving an Alliance 
Member from taking all reasonable steps to protect their capabilities, ensure their 
resilience, and expedite their recovery after attack. The 2012 Chicago Summit 
Declaration stresses the overall commitment to improve the protection of NATO 
digital assets, and the further integration of cyber defence measures into Allied 
structures and procedures.585 However, NATO nations are increasingly making it 
clear that they view the subjects of NCS and (collective) cyber defence to be closely 
interconnected. The White House has said this most directly, saying: ‘All states 
possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile 
acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments 
we have with our military treaty partners.’586 Other national strategies typically 
mention NATO commitments but not directly collective defence, such as the French 
NCSS: ‘strong relations between allies form the basis of an effective cyber defence 
policy.’587
Exactly what ‘collective cyber defence’ may entail is not necessarily clear, and can 
cover a very wide range of cyber-specific actions. These could include:
• Using the military or civilians to help defend critical infrastructures in an 
affected nation,
• Using military or civilians to help on crisis management tasks, from the easiest 
(note taking and call management) to professional incident responders to lead 
incident response,
583 See: http://www.ncia.nato.int/Pages/default.aspx.
584 NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), The NATO ACCS Management Agency 
(NACMA).
585 NATO, Chicago Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012.
586 White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked 
World: 14.
587 French Secretariat-General for National Defence and Security, Information systems defence and 
security. France’s strategy: 18.
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• Deploying forensic investigators to assist the investigation,
• Deploying teams or other groups to assist with coordination with NATO 
or other nations or sectors. For example, a representative of the FS-ISAC588 
could travel to the country to help information flow on attacks to finance; or a 
military liaison team could do the same for military coordination,
• Ordering (or convincing) Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block attack 
traffic destined for the nation under attack,
• Ordering (or convincing) ISPs to throttle traffic to the nation suspected of 
being behind the attack until they cooperate in helping to end the attack,
• Active defences to selectively disrupt Command & Control infrastructure 
behind the attack,
• Build additional local Internet Exchange Points and other local infrastructure 
to help them weather the attack and increase their defensive options,
• Ordering or otherwise ensuring that manufacturers of networking gear 
prioritise shipments to the country under attack to help them build additional 
capability,
• An Alliance Member deploying its own offensive cyber forces to engage in 
counter-attacks on behalf of the Alliance. 
Given the ambiguity involved in the term ‘collective cyber defence’ (indeed, the 
term itself is not officially used within NATO) there is no reason to believe that 
retaliatory actions would not be ‘cross-domain’, i.e., occur outside of cyberspace. 
However, if interpreted narrowly, collective cyber defence offers also other 
interesting possibilities: as much of it could become active without Article 5, this 
leaves the possibility open that NATO could engage in ‘collective cyber defence’ 
with non-NATO nations as well. 
588 The Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) is one of the oldest, largest, 
and most successful information exchanges in cyber security. Founded in 1999, FS-ISAC has 12 of the 
largest US banks as well as other critical financial institutions as its members.
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5.4.2. Cooperation with Non-NATO Nations
In recent years, NATO has considerably expanded its remit for cooperation with 
non-NATO nations. In the fall of 2011, Austria became the first country to enter 
into a specific bilateral cooperation scheme managed by the NATO Emerging 
Security and Challenges Division (ESCD), focusing on ‘all relevant aspects of cyber 
security.’589 Since then, a half-dozen other nations have signed similar agreements 
with NATO.590
Bilateral cooperation agreements of this nature can include a whole range of 
different options: harmonisation of crisis management procedures; exchange 
of relevant information and assessments; mutual inclusion in research projects; 
joint mentorships in third countries to raise awareness; development of joint 
‘lessons learned’ processes, including cyber aspects of crisis management 
operations; establishment and enhancement of cyber security related capabilities 
and procedures; training and exercises (including participation at the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Center in Tallinn), and the involvement of the private 
sector, as appropriate.591
Besides specifically tailored bilateral programmes for selected Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) and possibly Mediterranean Dialogue Program (MDP), and Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative (ICI) nations, NATO is also reaching out via established 
instruments and policy proposals. Some parts of NATO’s Cyber Policy and Action 
Plan are open to non-NATO nations. Recent suggestions have been tabled that 
would see the Individual Partnership Cooperation Program (IPCP), the Planning 
and Review Process (PARP) and the Science for Peace Studies Programme (SPS) 
significantly expand their cyber security focus. As these programmes represent 
some of the main programmes for non-NATO nations, the strengthening of the 
cyber security dimension could have a significant impact on the overall relationship 
of NATO to these countries.
NATO may also choose to run specific projects to improve the cyber preparedness 
of its Alliance Membership and other allies as part of Mediterranean Dialogue, 
Partners for Peace, or the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Where systemic weakness 
in critical cyber infrastructure creates critical national vulnerabilities, the nations 
themselves or NATO may consider compensatory measures to reduce the residual 
risk.
589 Gerhard Jandl, ‘The Challenges of Cyber Security – a Government’s Perspective,’ Human Security 





There is a rough consensus592 that NATO and the EU Institutions should work 
together to create an environment where a single set of security and resilience 
standards are promoted, and where there is coherence between societal, economic 
and national security strategies. Operational level discussions have been partially 
hampered by the significantly different focus of both organisations – the operational 
capabilities of NATO and the regulative capabilities of the EU both have virtually no 
commonality in the each other’s organisation. 
Cooperation between NATO and the EU was institutionalised in the 2003 Framework 
for Cooperation, which still is the basis for most common efforts. Regular meetings 
occur at all levels from the tactical to the political. There are regular staff contacts 
at all levels between NATO’s International Staff and International Military Staff, and 
their respective EU interlocutors (Council Secretariat, European External Action 
Service, EU Military Staff, European Defence Agency, Commission, European 
Parliament, etc.). Permanent military liaison arrangements exist to especially 
facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has 
been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was 
set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium) in 
March 2006.593
Within the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework, one of the 
most significant agreements the EU and NATO have is the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement.594 
In effect, the agreement guarantees that the EU has the right to expect the support of 
NATO facilities, staff, and even deployed equipment in case of a ‘crisis management’ 
CFSP mission – but only if NATO does not require the same resources. Particularly 
important for cyber defence was that the agreement also regulated the exchange 
of confidential information.595 Since the agreement, NATO and the EU have 
expanded cooperation on a range of other issues, including counter-proliferation, 
counter-terrorism, and general capability development. NATO cooperation with the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) has been expanded in recent years, and EDA has 
defined cyber defence as a priority within its overall Capability Development Plan. 
592 See, for instance, Reyhaneh Noshiravani, ‘NATO and Cyber Security: Building on the Strategic Concept,’ 
Chatham House Rapporteur Report, 20 May 2011.
593 See: NATO, ‘NATO-EU: a strategic partnership, ’http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm.
594 Tim Waugh, ‘Berlin Plus agreement,’ European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf.
595 See: EU-NATO, The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus (Brussels: Council of the 
European Union, 2003).
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The discussion on what framework would work best for NATO-EU cooperation on 
cyber security has been ongoing for many years: some favour specifically-expanded 
‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, others would like a specific comprehensive agreement. 
In fact, the current NATO-EU cyber cooperation is already partially regulated by 
existing agreements – there will certainly be some form of cooperation between the 
NATO NCIRC and the CERT-EU, for instance. The expansion of this cooperation into 
other areas – in particular counter cyber crime and critical infrastructure protection 
(CIP) – is contentious due to concerns regarding NATO’s actual mandate in these 
areas, the status of EU non-NATO nations, as well as data protection issues.596
5.4.4. The NATO Defence Planning Process
The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is one of the principle tools of the 
Alliance, intended to enable member countries to benefit from the political, military 
and resource advantages of working together. Within the defence planning process, 
Allies contribute to enhancing security and stability, and share the burden of 
developing and delivering the necessary forces and capabilities needed to achieve 
the organisation’s objectives. Crucially, the NDPP is intended to ‘prevent the 
renationalization of defence policies, while at the same time recognizing national 
sovereignty, inter. operability between Alliance members as well as guaranteeing a 
certain level of overall efficiency.’597
The NDPP is composed of a number of specific procedural ‘steps’ as well as a 
number of Alliance – based supporting institutions and committees.598 It has been 
repeatedly stated that cyber will be added to the NDPP, in particular through the 
‘building of resilience’,599 although no details have been made public. 
The possible repercussions of including cyber within the NDPP are considerable. One 
of the most important aspects of the NDPP was the ‘burden sharing’ arrangement 
regarding specific defence infrastructure. Under the NDPP, for instance, NATO 
was able to largely directly finance the construction and maintenance of crucial 
airbases in northern Norway during the Cold War. Given that the vast majority of 
cyberspace infrastructure is privately held, it is not clear how NATO could help 
build Alliance capabilities through a direct financing effort, as was done with 
basing infrastructure. Nonetheless, as there is likely to be Alliance funds available, 
it can be presumed that a solution will be found to this dilemma as well.
596 Brian Beary, ‘As momentum for action builds, EU’s role remains unclear,’ Europolitics, 3 May 2012.
597 See: NATO, ‘The NATO Defence Planning Process,’http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49202.
htm.
598 For a full list, see ibid.
599 NATO, ‘Cyber defence: next steps,’ NATO Newsroom, 10 June 2011.
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5.5. CONCLUSION
One relevant question for policy-makers remains: why should they invest resources 
in the commitments, mechanisms and governance required by a NCS strategy? After 
all, the majority of investments in this domain will require trade-offs; very few are 
cost-free. The answer is provided by the potential benefits that accrue to states that 
develop a coherent NCSS. A governmental strategy is necessary for dealing with the 
myriad digital issues that confront policy-makers in the 21st century. The benefits 
of connectivity are too great to ignore, and policies that can deliver these benefits 
in a safe and secure manner can bring a significant return on investment. Without 
communicating a strategy which contains goals as well as expectations, the efforts 
made are at risk of being uncoordinated and without sufficient coherency, thereby 
at risk of diminishing their original effects. 
The development of national cyber security policies – and the process of 
constructing and navigating cyber-related commitments, mechanisms and 
governance structures – is inherently about trade-offs. But not all trade-offs are 
similar and some will change the course of a nation. Failing to achieve the societal 
or the economic potential available through digital technologies could – over time 
– relegate a previously successful state to a junior division in a league of nations. 
It can be tempting to isolate cyber risks from the broader environment – to treat 
them separately, perhaps behind closed doors, in a manner that is less transparent 
than that of other societal risks. This approach misses the point that cyberspace 
is a thin, but highly conductive layer that complements nearly all facets of daily 
life for most people around the world. It has permitted the spectrum of human 
activities to be transposed into a digital environment. This includes many positive 
actions but it also encompasses crime, espionage, terrorism and warfare. These 
activities may take on different capabilities in the digital age, but their essential 
nature remains the same.
As complex bureaucracies and social systems have evolved in order to deal with all 
the issues that face a modern state, so too will complex approaches be required to 
deal with the problems that will permeate the new century. The digital environment 
is evolving rapidly – yet creating law is a lengthy process. All legislation is based 
on political will which, in turn, is shaped by social and economic forces. What are 
needed are more approaches that link policy-makers around the world, in the same 
manner as the issues are linked. Increased compliance does not necessarily equate 
to increased security. States need to be active and take necessary action on the 
information they possess. Information-gathering alone will not be sufficient. In 
areas where the process of alignment – between policy-makers and issues – has 
taken place, there will be a need for a system of capturing and preserving useful 
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knowledge. This lessons learned process (or more modestly, ‘lessons identified’), 
will become increasingly critical as more nations develop cyber security policies. 
Ingenuity in the digital age is thankfully in abundant supply, and significant 
amounts of human capital are focussed on delivering cutting-edge capabilities. By 
comparison, very little capacity is being used to address the security considerations 
that accompany technological development. It is critical that knowledgeable 
policy-makers are cultivated across the public and private sectors, who are able to 
understand the complexity and ambiguity created by the cyber layer, and how it 
affects the delivery of current and future objectives. NATO’s primary challenge is 
to decide the role it will play in the global cyber ecosystem, develop its capability 
to operate – even in a cyber degraded environment – and delineate responsibilities 
between the command structure and Member States.
5.6. TACTICAL/TECHNICAL PITFALLS, FRICTIONS 
AND LESSONS IDENTIFIED
Under/Overvaluing International Commitments: national law should always 
be the defining element behind any governmental cyber security instrument. 
International law, both soft and hard law, is however less likely to play a less rigorous 
role in defining national approaches. This is largely due to the as yet embryonic 
understanding of cyber conflict, and the exact role that international treaties, in 
particular the Law of Armed Conflict, have in this domain. This even more important 
when assessing the possible behaviour of other nations in cyberspace: building a 
cyber security system that completely depends on foreign cooperation in case of 
attack, for instance, could well find itself short of critical capabilities when it needs 
them. At the same time, ignoring or undervaluing international commitments could 
further weaken attempts aimed at creating international normative frameworks for 
cyber security.
Failing to understand Information Security requirements: cyber security is 
impossible without the implementation and provision of in-depth Information 
Security Management Systems (ISMS) that are applied across an organisation in its 
entirety. The implementation of an ISMS system can cause considerable disruption 
to traditional business practices, and thus this can this be one of the most difficult 
tasks to accomplish in a NCSS. It is, however, one of the most crucial: without a single 
overarching ISMS (or a seamless integration of multiple ISMSs) it is impossible to 
provide for the even the most basic protection of government systems.
Lack of International Interoperability: interoperability in cyber security is a must. 
Unlike, for instance, traditional territorial defence, it is very difficult for a nation 
190Tactical/Technical Pitfalls, Frictions and Lessons Identified
to defend itself against major cyber threats purely with its own governmental 
means. Interoperability means that government cyber security staff must be able 
to cooperate not only with other governments, but also with non-state partners. In 
particular, it means sharing a similar skill base and overall knowledge level as the 
international partners – and, optimally, a similar appreciation of threats as well.
Ignoring Lessons Identified: as a relatively new and very quickly evolving field, the 
role of lessons identified (and, optimally, lessons learned) in NCS is a vital one. Very 
often the initial legal and organisational responses to a specific cyber threat will 
turn out to be inadequate, or obsolete in the face of technical and social change. 
Sharing experiences between different organisations nationally and internationally 
is a very important way to communicate answers as well as identifying the 
underlying issues. Ultimately, the ability to rapidly adjust systems, processes and 




6.1. THE ROAD SO FAR
‘Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.’ The famous quote of George 
E. P. Box was originally applied to statistical models, but it could be said to be at 
least as applicable to describing models of national cyber security. The very term 
‘national cyber security’ (or NCS) is hardly ever defined in official publications, 
although the term itself is certainly in widespread common usage. Even the spelling 
of the word ‘cyber security’, let alone its definition, is contentious. The same lack of 
clarity applies to many of the constituent terms of NCS, and, indeed, can be said to 
be representative of the domain of cyberspace itself: there are few terms, let alone 
models, that will not be contentious. Therefore, the goal of this publication, namely 
to inform readers of the various factors to consider when drafting a NCS, can only 
partially be achievable.
A basic assumption of this publication is that there is no such thing as a single perfect 
framework for national cyber security. Each individual system of government will 
provide its own particular set of circumstances that need to be addressed, and each 
particular strategy will wish to emphasise individual mandates. In an optimal world 
it would be possible to view the entire process of creating a national cyber security 
strategy (or NCSS) as being composed of a step-by-step process – but in reality 
any such process is likely to be more impromptu. Therefore, the most important 
contribution this document can offer is to raise awareness of the most critical 
issues in a NCSS – and how they can be defined.
Unlike other publications that have sought to inform policy-makers on the options 
available in drafting a NCSS, this publication does not concentrate solely on a set of 
specific tasks or elements that must be delivered for a NCS to be considered useful 
(e.g., ‘information exchange’, ‘public-private partnerships’, etc.). While this approach 
has its own validity, it is especially designed to explain NCS from one particular 
viewpoint – for instance, one that emphasises, say, critical infrastructure protection 
– and concentrates on the ‘ten most important tasks’ needed to accomplish this goal. 
This type of approach may succeed in communicating a particular view of NCS, 
but does not provide the reader with an all-round view of the various options and 
their consequences. Moreover, such an approach is usually specifically targeted at a 
certain level or type of policy-maker, to exclusion of all others. This contributes to the 
overemphasis on a specifically selected process, and an unquestioning assumption 
of definitions and concepts. In short, it does not provide the more strategically-
minded or critical reader with the actual strategic context in understanding what, 
exactly, NCS could entail. This is especially problematic as context is absolutely 
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central to any interpretation of NCS. There are no purely descriptive approaches 
to the subject – either implicitly or explicitly, all views on NCS are informed by a 
specific theoretical approach.
Theoretical approaches to the subject are, therefore, not optional; they are 
mandatory in order to frame a country’s particular brand of NCS. Further, these 
frameworks need to be applied to the correct level of conceptual understanding 
as well as organisational responsibility within a governmental structure – this 
document, after all, is focused on a governmental view of the subject. Conceptually, 
one hierarchal model is to see policy clearly developing in a ‘top-down’ fashion: the 
national security strategy (e.g., the Dutch 2008 National Security Strategy) informs 
the national cyber security strategy (e.g., Netherlands NCSS 2011) which outlines a 
set of specific organisations (e.g., the Netherlands National Cyber Security Centre) 
which each have sub-organisations and specific tasks attached to it (e.g., a Computer 
Emergency Response Team, or CERT). The levels of responsibility articulated in this 
model correspond to the different sections of the present publication: the political 
(Section 2), strategic (Section 3), operational (Section 4) and tactical (Section 5).600 
The sections can also be read independently, or as a group – it is up to the reader to 
decide which level of detail is required, and at what level.
The core theoretical approaches of this publication are directly applicable to the 
various levels of policy development. They reflect what the authors consider here to 
be the ‘essential truths’ of the NCS domain. These read as follows:
1. The multifaceted nature of National Cyber Security (the ‘Five Mandates’): 
as is shown in detail in Section 4, NCS tends to be interpreted differently in 
the five specific fields of government endeavour that comprise the operational 
level of NCS.601 These five views, or mandates, have developed historically 
and often in relative isolation from each other. They each have differing 
goals, organisational structures, and even specific definitions associated 
with them. Policy-makers need to be aware that most initial attempts at 
formulating a NCSS will, by default, only address a few of these mandates 
from the outset. NCS is an enormously complex subject, with a number of 
different interpretations, depending on the viewpoint of the observer. By 
applying a variant of the incident management cycle to the five mandates, 
it is possible to show where most mandates will be active (and have specific 
600 Properly, the section is really intended to address Cyber TTP (Tactics Techniques and Procedures) 
issues within all types of specific sub-organisations: in particular, what does the decision-maker at this 
level need to know about when designing operational procedures, or similar?
601 Cyber Diplomacy & Internet Governance, Critical Infrastructure & Crisis Management, Intelligence & 
Counter-Intelligence, Military Cyber, Counter Cyber Crime – plus a number of ‘cross mandate’ activities 
including information exchange, research & education, and coordination.
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organisations) at which stages. Different countries will emphasise different 
NCS mandates and cross-mandates according to their specific national 
preferences.
2. The importance of different stakeholder groups (the ‘Three Dimensions’): 
probably no other subject in security policy has such a plethora of actors as 
does NCS. In fact, government is only one of the actor groups to consider. 
The other actors, namely the non-state ‘societal’ or ‘national’ actors as well 
as the international and transnational groups, are at least as important to 
any individual country’s NCS as the government is. However, most liberal 
democratic governments have major conceptual challenges in engaging with 
these stakeholders. As shown in detail in Section 3, the challenge is to apply 
the lessons learned in other parts of security policy (such as peacekeeping 
or stabilisation operations) and apply them via public policy theory to NCS. 
3. Balancing the cost and benefits of security (the ‘Five Dilemmas’): the authors 
do not conceive of cyber security as being a zero-sum game. Ultimately, better 
cyber security should make a society both more prosperous and more free. 
However, in the short-term, NCS can have its costs, commensurate with the 
level of specific protection that is aimed for. As Section 1 explores in detail,602 
the policy challenge is to find the balance between economic growth and 
individual freedoms on the one hand and NCS requirements on the other. 
This balance is precarious. Overemphasising one side could ultimately be 
detrimental to both individual freedom and national security.
One advantage of this framework versus a more specific step-by-step approach is 
its universal application; not only to different types of democratic governmental 
systems, but also across different levels of technological sophistication and economic 
development. One of the most obvious realities is that there is a true global ‘digital 
divide’ – most NCS efforts are concentrated in highly developed economies, with a 
high reliance on information and communication technology (ICT). Most countries 
in the world have not, as of yet, developed a NCSS – often perceiving the risks 
associated with ICT as a ‘rich world problem’, and a relative minor one given the host 
of other concerns less developed nations have to deal with. This view is incorrect, 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, the economic development of all nations will 
increasingly be tied to issues relating to the stability of basic infrastructure,603 and 
602 These dilemmas are: (1) stimulate the economy vs. improve national security, (2) infrastructure 
modernisation vs. critical infrastructure protection, (3) private sector vs. public sector, (4) data 
protection vs. information sharing, (5) freedom of expression vs. political stability.
603 For an example of the importance of infrastructure development in China’s development, see Pravakar 
Sahoo, Ranjan Kumar Dash, and Geethanjali Nataraj, Infrastructure Development and Economic 
Growth in China (Discussion Paper No. 261), (Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, 2010), http://
www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/261.pdf.
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these infrastructures will increasingly be reliant upon ICT. Secondly, ICT is having 
a specific and direct impact on all aspects of economic and social development – 
from education to quality of life – and the advantages that accrue through this 
‘ICT for development’604 approach will be imperilled if a government does not take 
appropriate measures to safeguard trust in the infrastructure. Finally, and by no 
means least importantly, the direct national security implications of the rise of ICT 
are universal. From new challenges to internal security to the threat of state-to-
state conflict being carried out by ‘cyber’ means, all countries are impacted by this 
development, albeit to varying degrees.
6.2. FINAL REMARKS
The advent of the ‘fifth domain’ – the rise of cyberspace as a field of human endeavour 
– is probably nothing less than one of the most significant developments in world 
history. Cyberspace directly impacts every facet of human existence including 
economic, social, cultural and political developments, and the rate of change is not 
likely to stop anytime soon. Socio-political answers to the questions posed by the 
rise of cyberspace on the whole significantly lag behind the rate of technological 
change. Personal data, for instance, will remain a decisive issue for the foreseeable 
future, and one where the questions asked will depend on the specific ICT-enabled 
socio-economic developments. Who, for instance, could have predicted the role that 
social networks would be set to attain six, seven years ago? The rise of cyberspace 
means that as soon as one question is supposedly answered, many more appear – 
perhaps even invalidating the original question along the way.
The issue of NCS – both in its constituent components, but also as a subject or concept 
in its own right – is emblematic for the perpetual threat of obsolescence that stalks 
all attempts to adapt existing paradigms to this new world. A more extreme view 
could even state that the concept of ‘national cyber security’ is really nothing more 
than three illusions for the price of one: not only is cyberspace a faulty concept 
in its own right, it cannot be regulated in a national context and, at least in its 
present form, is inherently and perpetually insecure. Even a slightly more generous 
assessment of the validity of talking about cyber security in a national context 
could say that NCS is an insufficient construct. In the future, NCS will ultimately 
become a mainstreamed issue – something that will be included in all facets of 
public life more or less automatically, and will have no further validity than the 
term ‘quality assurance’ does today for all manufactured goods and processed 
604 For an early example see Kerry McNamara, Poverty and Development: Learning from Experience, 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), http://www.infodev.org/en/Document.17.html.
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foodstuffs. Talking about NCS is therefore akin to talking about ‘national hygiene’ – 
it depends on many factors that governments can only partially influence. 
The concept of NCS introduced here is not intended to provide a strategic road-
map that can be applied, in cookie-cutter fashion, to all government systems, in 
all perpetuity. Rather, it is an attempt to inform the reader on the comprehensive 
challenges that ‘cyber’ means for the security systems of the modern state, and 
how these challenges can be conceived of, and addressed, at different levels of 
government. Individual threats, strategic concepts, legislative frameworks and 
organisational structures will certainly change in the future – but the basic 
conceptual challenge to government will remain. As such, the very notion of 







ANNEX: LIST OF PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES
STARTING THE NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY 
STRATEGY
• Importance: every strategy starts with an acknowledgement of the 
importance of cyberspace and the rewards of a digital society, while stressing 
the precarious balance between cyber benefits and cyber risks (or threats). 
See Section 1.4.2 for more. 
• Threats: a national cyber security strategy (NCSS) will typically include a 
section on threats, including terrorists, foreign nations, espionage, organise 
crime, or political activism. See Section 2.2.1 for more.
• Definitions: strategies often will also define important terms; however, exact 
definitions can be less important than descriptions and clarity in meaning. 
Not all NCSS use the same definitions; for example, some equate ‘cyberspace’ 
to essentially just the internet, while others embrace a far broader definition. 
See Section 1.2 for more.
• Goal: as with any national strategy, a NCSS should enable government 
departments to translate the vision into coherent and implementable policies; 
clarify how the nation might act in international affairs; and be linked to 
other, related strategies. See Section 2.1.1 for more.
SCOPING THE NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY 
STRATEGY
A far-reaching NCSS will address all types (or ‘mandates’) of NCS. These have 
to equally be dealt with in the three areas (or ‘dimensions’) of state behaviour. 
However, a strategy that wanted to start small might focus on just a smaller subset, 
but would acknowledge the other mandates or dimensions. 
Three Dimensions. A NCSS almost always focuses most on governmental activities, 
but should at least also mention international and national stakeholders as well. In 
future, these last two are likely to grow in importance as the role of international 
and non-state actors is increasingly realised. See Section 1.4.1 and Section 3.5 for 
more.
1. Governmental: requires a Whole of Government approach for improving the 
coordination of government actors.
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2. International: a Whole of System approach for improving international, trans-
border, and ‘like-for-like’ coordination.
3. National: a Whole of Nation approach for cooperating with internal national 
non-state actors, from civil society to critical infrastructure providers.
Five Mandates. Just as all NCSS must look across the three dimensions of 
governmental, international, and national actions, they should also consider the five 
main ‘mandates’ of governments in cyberspace. The most comprehensive strategies 
will include political aims, strategic goals and organisations for all five. See Section 
1.4.2 and Section 4.5 for more.
1. Military Cyber: a national military must not only defend itself from cyber 
incidents but consider how to use cyber capabilities offensively as well. 
Defence is usually considered the first priority; however offensive capabilities 
will increasingly important in the future.
2. Counter Cyber Crime:  fighting crime and reducing its impact are typical 
centrepieces for most NCSS.
3. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence: using cyberspace for espionage – and 
stopping adversaries from doing the same – is increasingly important for 
states.
4. Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Crisis Management: includes 
protecting key sectors and institutional structures to enhance cooperation 
and response.
5. Cyber Diplomacy and Internet Governance: diplomacy adapting to the new 
global information environment, and managing the future of the internet.
There are also ‘Cross Mandate’ areas including cyber security research and 
development, coordination, and information sharing and data protection.
Five Dilemmas: NCSS have to make implicit or explicit decisions about several key 
areas that can be seen as trade-offs between two public goods. See Section 1.5 for 
more.
1. Stimulate the Economy or Improve National Security: there can be an 
inherent tension between the openness required for innovation and the 
requirements of public security.
2. Infrastructure Modernisation or Critical Infrastructure Protection: the 
economic gains of adopting new technologies must be balanced against 
possible increases in security risks. 
3. Focus on Private Sector or Public Sector: governments have a key role to play 
in cyber security but need to decide on either a ‘regulatory’ (mandated) or 
‘voluntary’ approach to critical infrastructure protection.
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4. Data Protection or Information Sharing: while information sharing is 
absolutely essential to NCS, the reality of (vitally needed) data protection 
legislation complicates these efforts. 
5. Freedom of Expression or Political Stability: governments must ascertain 
to what extent, if any, they think the curtailment of ‘internet freedoms’ is 
justifiable for public safety. 
Common Themes: The most common themes addressed in NCSS (and reflected in 
the frameworks above) are the following. See Section 2.2.1 for more.
• Maintaining a secure, resilient and trusted electronic operating environment,
• Promoting economic and social prosperity,
• Promoting trust and enabling business and economic growth,
• Overcoming the risk of information and communication technologies,
• Strengthening the resilience of infrastructures.
NCSS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
Transparency and Coordination: NCSS generally require more govermental 
coordination and public transparency than other strategies, as cyberspace does 
not belong to any department, or indeed any nation. Indeed, compared to other 
top-down national security issues, cyberspace is dominated by the bottom-up 
companies, non-state groups and citizens that build the networks and add content. 
Accordingly, each of the following issues has a special role to play, depending on 
the goals of the NCSS:
• Tension between Military and Civilian, Law Enforcement and Intelligence: 
because of fundamentally different approaches, each of these groups will 
want to influence the NCSS to favour their mandate. See Section 3.3 for more.
• Transparency: while many NCSS are unclassified, others are fully or partially 
classified. The more open the NCSS, the wider the goals of the nation acted 
upon by stakeholders during creation and implementation. This comes at the 
price of reducing ‘strategic ambiguity’ and can curtail a goverment’s freedom 
of action. See Section 2.3 for more.
• Coordination: the importance of coordinating government activities across 
the various mandates cannot be overemphasised. In the very least, there must 
be a political policy coordination, but a strategic coordination body is helpful 
as well. See Section 4.6.1.
• Development Process: the development of a NCSS can occur primarily 
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top-down or bottom-up (i.e. building on existing expertise). Optimally, both 
processes need to occur at the same time. Similarly, governments can decide 
to draft a NCSS in a ‘closed group’ or larger ‘big tent’ approach, but should 
not attempt a ‘reiterative’ approach until a certain experience with the NCSS 
process exist.
Balancing Offense and Defence
• Depending on their level of ambition, states will aim to protect their own 
government systems, assist in protecting the critical infrastructure, or extend 
to projecting power via cyberspace and cyberspace-related issues. Each of 
these  levels of ambition will imply a slightly different stance; however these 
levels are not necessarily tied to a nation’s respective size. 
• A key aspect of both offensive and defensive stances in cyberspace is that 
both tasks will be accomplished by state and non-state actors, in both cases 
operating nationally and internationally. The greatly diverging institutional 
‘size’ is however a poor indication of relevance – some of the most relevant 
actors will appear to be the least institutionalised.  See Section 3.1.1 for more.
• Overall, the two most prevalent approaches to NCS can be described as 
‘deterrence’ (imposing unacceptable costs to the attackers) or ‘resilience’ 
(denying the benefit to the attackers). Most nations will seek a balance of the 
two approaches depending on their ultimate level of ambition. See Section 
3.2 for more.
ORGANISING FROM THE STRATEGY
Within Nations: each of the five mandates has fundamentally different tasks and 
outlooks, and requires specific organisations. The cross-mandates help tied the 
disparate mandates together into a coherent NCS. See Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 for 
more. 
1. Military Cyber:  military cyber ranges from simply protecting the specific ICT 
systems (cyber defence) to enabling network-centric capabilities, supporting 
operational tasks, and accomplishing strategic missions. 
2. Counter Cyber Crime:  counter cyber crime activities will primarily involve 
organisations to facilitate law enforcement (such as public points of contact, 
forensic capabilities, etc.) as well as judicial means to facilitate prosecution. 
In some national cases these capabilities can largely lie outside of central-
government control. 
3. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence: a primary beneficiary of many 
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cyber-related tasks, they will often seek to exploit cyber-means to facilitate 
information collection. At the same time they will depend on other collection 
capabilities (e.g., SIGINT) and international cooperation in order to be able to 
generate strategic intelligence on likely and actual cyber-adversaries. 
4. Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Crisis Management: 
while CIP programmes are essentially preventative and crisis management 
essentially reactive, both aspects will largely depend upon Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPP) to generate intelligence and agree upon defensive and 
crisis management measures. 
5. Cyber Diplomacy and Internet Governance: often dealt with in a highly 
disparate fashion (two largely contrasting world-views), it is necessary to 
connect both of these relevant aspects to be able to adequately represent a 
government position in the respective multilateral and bilateral frameworks. 
International:  national cyber security is never ‘purely national’. The necessity of 
cooperation with a wide variety of international state and non-state actors needs 
to be appreciated in its complexity. These include government-to-government, 
international organisations, and non-state groups.
OTHER ISSUES
Aligned with Legal Commitments: NCSS must also match international legal 
commitments. See Section 5.2 for more.
• Legal: UN Charter, International Court of Justice, International 
Telecommunications Union, prevention of terrorism and others,
• Cyber crime: Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,
• Human rights: Universal Declaration on Human Rights, European Convention 
on Human Rights,
• Military: International Humanitarian Law.
Comply with Information Assurance Practices:  Information assurance practices 
are essential in any operational NCS. 
• A NCSS must first and foremost tie to INFOSEC fundamentals, such as those 
defined in international standard 27002. See Section 5.3 for more. It is not 
necessary to have a single Information Security Management System (ISMS) 
across the entire government structure, but it is important that these different 
ISMS are interlocking.
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Aware of the NATO Cyber Dimension: There are several issues that a NATO and a 
non-NATO nation might consider:
• Collective defence and cyber defence,
• Cooperation with non-NATO partners,
• NATO-EU Cooperation.
LESSONS IDENTIFIED IN THE NCSS PROCESS
A review of other NCSS has revealed a number of important lessons identified:
• Resist making the document a ‘one size fits all’ by copying directly from other 
nation’s strategies (Section 2.4),
• Link the NCSS to other national and international strategies (Section 2.4),
• Include a policy update and review mechanism (Section 2.4),
• Ensure there is both a top and mid-level interagency coordination group 
(Section 2.4),
• Identify critical services and infrastructure (Section 2.4),
• Create awareness, especially among policy-makers (Section 2.4),
• Don’t underestimate the importance of ‘talk’ (exchange) (Section 3.6),
• Don’t overestimate the importance of definitions (Section 3.6),
• Don’t encourage path dependency (allowing essential strategic decisions to be 
made with a narrow and low-level framework) (Section 3.6),
• Encourage organisational flexibility (Section 3.6),
• Don’t leave a policy vacuum (Section 4.8),
• Prevent organisational stovepipes (Section 4.8),
• Don’t draft or accept obsolete legislation (Section 4.8),
• Enable flexible coordination (matrix structure) across operational components 
(Section 4.8),
• Clarify information exchanges and data protection issues (Section 4.8),
• Combat cyber illiteracy (Section 4.8),
• Neither under nor overvalue international commitments (Section 5.6),
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• Integrate fundamental INFOSEC requirements (Section 5.6),
• Design around international interoperability (Section 5.6),
• Seek to learn from lessons identified (Section 5.6).
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